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Abstract 
The purpose of the thesis is to assess the mathematical 
achievements of Bernard Bolzano on the basis of the five early published 
works. The material is divided into the areas of the foundations of 
mathematics, geometry and analysis. In making this assessment there 
have been two principal considerations. Firstly, any judgement of the 
significance of Bolzano's work should be made in the light of the historical 
context, so considerable space is devoted to the relevant 18th century 
sources. Secondly, as a general framework to the thesis there is the 
question of how Bolzano's general views about mathematical proofs and 
concepts are related to his achievements. The main claim and conclusion 
of the thesis is that this relationship was unusually clear and significant 
in the case of Bolzano's work. 
There is an Appendix containing the first English translation of 
all five of Bolzano's works as well as the German texts of their first 
editions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1,1 The Aims, Scope and Organisation of he Thesis 
The rain purpose of the thesis is to investigate, in one particular 
case, the way in which views about the nature of mathematics have been 
related to the L'evelopment of important new mathematical concepts and 
methods. The case we shall examine is that of the early work of Pernard 
Bolzano as this is exemplified in his five mathematical works published 
between 1804 and 1817. These works are concerned with the foundations 
of mathematics and with geometry and analysis. The papers of 1816 and 
1817 contain a number of substantial and original contributions to analysis. 
Bolzano was also especially interested in exdmining the concepts and proofs 
of mathematics in a philosophical spirit. As a Professor of Theology at the 
University of Prague he was relatively isolated In his mathematical work; 
he lacked immediate criticism and influence from contemporaries and he 
was most forthcoming in his writing about the general approach and motiva- 
tion behind his work. These factors combine to make a study o. ' his work 
particularly witable for our purpose. 
The relationship of general views to particular results in the work of 
C 
an individual is liable to be a rather vague matter. Nevertheless the question 
of such a relationship offers a useful backgrocnd for certain preliminary 
studies which are worthwhile in their own right. 'I htse are: 
(a) to state as clearly rs possible Bolzano's views on the nature 
of mathematics, particularly its concepts and proofs. 
(b) to describe and assess Bolzano's early mathematical work in 
the light of his own time. 
Most of the thesis is concerned with achievZag these two goals, but as an 
overall framework we shall make various references to, and finally draw 
some 'conclusions about, the wider question of the relationship of (a) to 
(b). As a general aid to these purposes and for the sake of promoting a 
wider app': eciation of Bolzano's work we have added, in an Appendix, both 
the texts and full English translations of the five mathematical works con- ' 
cerned. 
Any assessment of Bolzanc's mathematical work i squires some pre- 
liminary account of the use and meaning of various terms and concepts at 
the beginning of the nineteenth century. It Is very difficult even to describe 
any achievement of this period direc%'ly In modern terms without thereby 
giving a misleading Impression of the achievement. For this reason we 
have devoted considerable space to the discussion of important works which 
would be known to ßolzano. This is particularly necessary for the chapters 
3 
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on analysis. 
The primary source materials for the thesis, those referred to in 
the title, are the following five works: 
Betrachtungen Über einige Gegenstände der Elementargeometrie. 
(Considerations on some objects of elementary geometry. ) 
Prague 1804 X+ 63 pp. (BG) 
Beyträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathematik 
(Contributions to a more well-founded Presentation of Mathematics. ) 
Prague 1810 X VI + 152 pp. (BD) 
Der binomische Lehrsatz, und als Folgerung aus ihm der polynomisehe, 
und die Reihen, die zur Berechnung des Logarithmen und Exponential- 
grossen dienen, genauer als bisher erwiesen. 
(The binomial theorem, and as a consequence from it the polynomial 
theorem, and the series which serve for the calculation of logarithmic 
and exponential quantities, proved more strictly than before. ) 
0 
Prague 1816 XVI + 144 pp. (BL) 
Rein analytischer Beweis des Lehrsatzes, dass zwischen je zwey Werthen, 
die ein ent7egengesetztes Resultat gewähren, wenigstens eine reele 
Wurzel der Gleichung liege. 
(Purely analytic proof of the theorem, that between any two values, which 
10 
give results of opposite sign, there lies at least one real root of the 
equation. ) 
Prague 1817 60 pp. (RB) 
Die Drey Probleme der Rectification, der Complanation und der 
Cubirung, ohne Betrachtung des unendlich Kleinen, ohne die Annahmen 
des Archimedes, und ohne irgend eine nicht streng erweisliche Vorausset- 
zung gelöst zugleich als Probe einer gänzlichen Umstaltung der Raumwiss- 
enschaft, allen Mathematikern zur Prüfung vorgelegt. 
(The three problems of rectification, complanation and cubature, solved 
without consideration of the infinitely small, without the hypotheses of 
Archimedes, and without any assumption which is not strictly provable; 
at the-same time being presented for the scrutiny of all mathematicians as 
a sample of a complete reorganisation of tie science of space. ) 
Leipzig 1817 XXIV + 80 pp. (DP) 
These five works will be referred to throughout the thesis by the abbrov- 
Cations BG, BD, BL, RB, DP respectively. Further bibliographical 
information and background to the works is given in 1.3. The full text of 
their first editions, together with English translations and notes, comprise 
the Appendix to the thesis. 
There is a large amount of other mathematical material : 'hlch was 
written by D 1zano during the period we are considering. He kept a kind 
of mathematical diary containing notes, drafts of articles, cLc., but these 
11 
remained unpublished until very recently. The first two volumes of this 
material (covering the years 1803 to 1811) have now appeared in the 
series Miscellanea. Matheinatica (edited by Prof. Bob van Rootselaar 
and Anna van der Lugt) wf. ich is currently being published as part of the 
Bolzano Gesamtausgabe (Complete works) (Bolzano [1]) by Frommann 
Verlag of Stuttgart. However, although some reference will be made to 
this material it has not been studied or taken into account here in detail. 
It would be essential for a thorough understanding of the development of 
Bolzano's thought in this period but this has not been our first priority. 
The published works represent Bolzano's most significant mathematical 
work. during the first part of his life and they therefore represent anatural 
and reasonaNe way to restrict the material for this thesis. 
The organisation of material In the main thesis has already been 
summarised in the Contents pages. There is a separate page of Contents 
in the Appendix for details of the arrangement of the translations and their 
notes. Thy: references are arranged alphabetically by author, the works 
of each author being numbered in square brackets. Thus specific refer- 
ences will be given in the form "Kant [2] p. 57", unless the work 
concerned is referred to only once when the page reference may be given in 
the List of References. When the date of a work is particularly relevant 
this may be included with the reference thus "Kant [1 (1800) p. 57". 
Because of the special place of the five works listed already. (p. 9) their 
I 
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bibliographic details appear in 1.3 and will not be repeated In the main 
List of References. 
References to the main thesis will be by page number or, if more 
appropriate, by section number, as in the previous sentence. References 
to th3 texts of the five main works will be given in two ways: the page in 
the Appendix which has the translation of the relevant passage, and the 
standard abbreviation for the text followed by the page or paragraph number 
in the first German edition. The Appendix has been separately paginated 
with the prefix A to the page numbers. For brevity we shall omit the 
abbreviation 'r,. ' In all references to the Appendix. Since the Prefaces of 
the five German texts have separate Roman numeral paginations every page 
of these texts has a unique dual reference.. Thus the beginning of the main 
text of BD has reference: (A108; BD, 1). 
Many of the quotations made throughout the thesis are from works 
originally published in German, French or Latin. For the most important 
of these the quotation has been given in the original language and In trans- 
lation but often quotations have simply been given in an English version. 
All such translations, as well as translations of titles and headings etc., 
are by the present author unless they have been otherwise ascribed. 
a 
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1.2 Biographical Remarks on Bolzano 
The outline of the first half of Bolzano's life and work which is 
given here is brief and only Intended to provide the context and background 
for the five mathematical works. The principal sources used are the 
biography Winter [l]and the autobiography Bolzano [2]. 
Bernard Bolzano was born on the 5th October 1781 in Prague where 
he lived an i worked for most of his life. He died there in 1848. Thus the 
background to his childhood and early career was the state of almost un- 
interrupted wax which existed over most of Europe between 1789 and 1015. 
Pra; ue was the main town of Bohemia which at this time was part of the 
Habsburg Empire controlled by the Kaiser in Vienna. 
Bolzano's father, an Italian art-dealer, had emigrated to Prague In 
th3 1760's and then married Cecilia Maurer. Of their twelve children only 
tcw survived to adulthood. " Bolzano himself was not a strong child but in 
spite of headaches and a weak heart he says; "I was a very lively boy who 
never rested for a moment" (Bolzano [2] p. 56). This disposition to 
Incessant activity did not abate as he grew older and is manifest in the huge 
amount of manuscript material which he worked at continually throughout, 
his life. 
At ; Lrst the young Bolzano was educated at home by a tutor. Then at 
the age of tca he attended the nearby Pianist Gymnasium where his progress 
was good but not outstanding, In 1796 he entered the Philciuphy Faculty in 
14 
Prague University and for four years he followed courses mainly in 
philosophy and mathematics. Although, on his own account, he found 
both subjects initially rather difficult he discovered that in pure mathem- 
atics there was ample scope for the fundamental, purely c"inceptual 
Investigations which appealed to him so strongly. Ile refers specifically 
to Kästner's important textbook (Kastner [1]) where he, 
proved what is generally passed over because everyone already 
knows it, I. e. he sought to make the reader clearly aware of the 
basis [Grund) on which his judgement3 rest. That was what I 
liked most of all. My special pleasure in mathematics rested 
therefore particularly on its purely speculative parts, in other 
words I prized only that part of mathematics which was at the 
same time philosophy. (Bolzano [2] p. 64) 
This particular interest in mathematics see-. ns to have been awakened 
soon after he started attending the mathematics class of Prof. S. Wydra. 
The first of Bolzano's mathematical works Is dcdicat-, d to Wydra (see 
Note [2]on A87). In the academic year 1799-1800 he attended two classes 
in "higher mathematics" taught by Prof. F. J. Gerstner. After an out- 
standing, performance in the examination on these course Bolzano was 
granted permission to borrow an unlimited number of books from the 
University library and a stipend of sixty Gulden a year. 
In philosophy Bolzanos first Important study was of Baumgarten's 
c 
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Metaphysik (Baumgarten Cl] ). This was a standard university text of 
the eighteenth century and was largely an exposition of Wolff's philosophy. 
Although Bolzano speaks in his autobiography of his criticisms of the work 
he remained generally sympathetic to the rationalist methods and outlook 
of Leibniz and Wolff. Many of his fellow students at this time were under 
the spell of Kant. The first 
, 
edition of the Pritik der reinen Vernunft 
(Critique of Pure Reason) (Kant[], ]) had appeared in the year of Bolzano's 
birth 1781, and during the 1790's in Prague there was a group of students 
who spent several hours each day In communal reading of Kant's works. 
Bolzano studied the Kritik in 1798 and from the outset he disagreed with 
Kant's central claims concerning knowledge. In particular he regarded 
Kant's notion of a pure a prior[ Intuition as unintelligible. In the case of 
mathematical propositions he therefore opposed the view that the synthetic 
a priori judgements of mathematics are based on the pure intuitions of 
space and time. He pointed out (presumably referring to preliminary 
work on BG) that he had already proved several synthetic propositions of 
geometry "purely from'concepts". This is discussed further in Chapter 2. 
Independence of thought was something to which Bolzano attached great 
value. It was characteristic of his work on any subject to read the works 
of his pr:, Jecessors very carefully but always to proceed with his own 
Independent (and often original) ideas. 
In the autumn of 1800 he began three years of theologici. 1 study. He 
16 
was thinking a great deal at this time of whether or not to commit himself 
to the Church and possibly to take vows in one of the religious orders in 
Prague. He even a lly decided against the exclusively religious life for at 
least two reasons. Althc:. gh he was basically a perfectly orthodox Catholic 
he did not find his rationalist inclinations fitting as comfortably as he had 
hoped with his theological studies. Secondly, he came to realise that his 
real vocation and gift was as a teacher and educator, rather than as a 
pastor. During this time he read numerous works on education, making a 
particular'_j close study of Parizek's Lehrmethode (Parizek [1] ). This 
Interest in education, in practice as well as theory, undoubtedly influenced 
all his work. For example, his general and overriding concern for the 
clarity and correct ordering of concepts is likely to have been reinforced by 
the obvious educational value of ensuring that Ideas are introduced clearly 
and systematically. There are various references, even in the mathemat- 
Ical works, to particular difficulties likely to be experienced by students 
learning about an idea for the first time. 
Education was, however, only subsidiary to the main motive force in 
Bolzano's life which was not so much a matter of religion as morality. He 
laid great emphasis on his conception of the "highest moral law" which was 
always to choose in a given situation that aý`ion which was most conducive 
to the well-being of the whole. An example of the subservience of even 
religion to morality is the remark made by his teacher and friend Prof. Mika 
I 
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(quoted in Bolzano [2] p. 67) that,. "a doctrine is justified as soon as it can 
be shown that faith in it assures us of a certaibb moral benefit". This 
principle was clearly very significant to Bolzano. I i'r example, with ref- 
erence to the concept of divine revelation he says that it was not so much a 
matter of what, "the facts actually were in themselves but rather what 
kind of ides. of them Is the most edifying for us". (Bolzano's emphasis In 
Bolzano [2] p. 67). 
There thus arises an interesting tension in Bolzano's thinking. The 
religious principle just stated seems highly pragmatic and subjective. The 
mathematical ideal of always proving and presenting the true basis or 
ground for theorems and definitions seems to be based on a desire to conform 
to an objective truth or state of affairs. It is unlikely that both principles 
could co-exist in harmony in Bolzano's thought, at least as we should under- 
stand them today. It is perhaps the second one, the objectivity and truth of 
mathematics which is likely to be misunderstood. We should not regard 
Bolzano's research in pure mathematics as ultimately boing done for the 
sake of truth or for perfecting mathematics: rather it is an interesting, but 
serious, exercise in correct thinking. This value and purpose of mathe- 
matics is stressed at the opening of the Preface to BG (A12; BG, V). At 
least part of Bolzano's motivation here was probably that correct thinking 
should promote correct morality and correct action, I p. virtue. 
While pursuing his thec'ogical studies Bolzano was also preparing his 
c 
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doctoral thesis on geometry. This was accepted and published in 1804 as 
BG. He was awarded the degree of Doctor of Philosophy on 5th April 
1804. On the 7th April he was ordained and on the 19th April he was 
appointed (provisionally) to the newly-formed professorship in theology at 
the University of Prague. Such a position had been formed at all the univer- 
sities in the Empire by the Kaiser, then Franz I, for mainly political 
reasons. The purpose was ostensibly to curtail the current wave of 
liberalism and free-thinking. In addition to courses of lectures Eolzano 
was required to give twice-weekly sermons to the students and citizens"of 
Prague. He performed these duties with great seriousness and enthusiasm 
and he soon became highly respected and popular in Prague. 
However, Bolzano's appointment was viewed from the start with 
criticism and suspicion by the authorities h Vienna, the main reasons for 
this being his relatively liberal and supposedly unorthodox views in both 
theology and politics, and his refusal to use the authorised textbook written 
by Frint, the chief Chaplain in Vienna. His appointment was eventually 
only confirmed in 1807. Ills relations with the authorities were always 
uneasy and he was finally dismissed by imperial order in 1819, and after 
much wrangling he went Into retirement from 1821 with a State pensicn but 
with orders not to teach or publish in any way. Although these publication 
restrictions were relaxed later it is true to say that the five mathematical 
e 
works published in the early period of his life (1804 - 1817) v: are the only 
e 
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mathematical works published in Bolzano's lifetime. 
We conclude these remarks on the first part of Bolzano's life with 
some comment on his personal afflictions which testify to his remarkable 
powers of concentration -. -id industry. In tae period from 1813 while his 
teaching position was in constant jeopardy, he suffered the losses of his 
fifteen-year-old sister Franziska, his father (in 1816) and his younger 
brother Peter, a successful medical student (in 1818). In the preceding 
years he had devoted much time and attention to the education of both his 
brother and sister. Franziska's death brought on tubercular attacks In 
Bolzano himself which left him unable to lecture for the years 1813 - 1816. 
It was during this same period that three of the main works discussed here, 
BL, RB and DP were written and published. This was in addition to num- 
erous other unpublished works and notes on mathematics, logic, theology, 
ethics, politics and philosophy. 
r 
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1.3 The Primary Sources 
The primary source materials for the thesis. are the five works 
listed in 1.1. In this section we shall add some background and biblio- 
graphic details on these works. It will be useful first to indicate how the 
works are related to the thesis chapters in terms of their content. 
The subjects, or problems, which ßolzano deals with divide up 
fairly clemly into three areas: the foundations of mathematics, geometry 
and analysis. Accordingly these are the subjects of our main chapters. 
All the works have some significance for Bolzano's views on foundationll 
queo ions but it is BD that is specifically devoted to this subject. The 
works RB and BL are clearly on analysts and BG Is almost entirely on 
geometry. The rectification problem, considered in DP, involves analysis 
applied to geometry and although it is therefore mainly a contribution to 
analysis Bolzano uses it as an excuse to include various geometrical 
definitions and ideas. Thus BD and BG are the main subjects of Chapters 2 
and 3 respectively. Both BL and RB are dealt with in Chapters 4 and 5 
while AP is treated in each of Chapters 3 and 5. 
In the case of each of the five works Bolzano himself believed he had 
made an important and original contribution to a contemporary problem, 
and to cciumunicate this to the academic world was the immediate purpose 
of the publication. Ills first work, BG, which must have been written while 
Bolzano was completing his theological studies, presented air original 
r 
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approach to elementary geometry in which the correct arrangement of 
concepts and theorems was all-important. On the basis of this work, which 
was warmly commAnded by Prof. Gerstner, he was awarded the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy. Th'; re were at least three quite favourable reviews 
of the work in the contemporary journals but it did not attract the attention 
for which Bolzano had hoped (see 1.4). Criticism and interest in his work 
from other mathematicians is something Bolzano particularly desired and 
never really experienced. 
On the title page of BD are the words "Erste Lieferung" ('Tirst Issue"). 
It was to be the first part of many in what Bolzaao intended as a complete 
re-organisation of all mathematical theories In accordance with his 
principles for the correct introduction of concepts and proofs. However, 
this grand project never materialised, apparently because he was so discou: '- 
aged at the poor response to BD. He explains in RB that BD, 
had the misfortune, with all the importance of its contents, of 
not even being an. iounced and reviewed in some learned journals, 
and in others only very superficially. This forced me to postpone 
the continuation of these contributions to a later time and meanwhile 
just to attempt to make myself better known to the learned world by 
publishing some papers which, by thei.: titles, would be more suited 
to arouse attention. (A455; RB, 27) 
r 
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He goes on to explain that this purpose of arousing attention to his work was 
to be served by the publication of BL, RB and "some other papers" (ho 
mentioned DP) but that these were waiting for a pubPsher. The problem 
of finding a publisher was clearly a difficult one: Bolzano ! ý. s a different 
publisher for each of the five works. Although never published (until 
recently) his manuscripts show that he had prepared drafts of the second 
issue of BD .... as early as 1810. (See Bolzano 
[1] Vol. 2A/5 Einleitung. ) 
It is difficult to date the writing of the works precisely but it is likely that 
each of the works BL, RB and DP had been prepared by about 1815. A 
footnote in BL (A312; BL, 32) refers to his discovery of a proof of the 
Intermediate value theorem, "It is already sketched out in a special paper 
and should soon be printed. " This, of course, was RB which was published 
In the Abh. - ndlungen der königlichen böhmischen Gesellschaft dc; r Wissen- 
schaften 5th Volume (Prague 1818). In 1817 it had been printed separately 
although the present author has never seen a copy of this printing. Bolzano 
was elected as ordinary member of the Royal Bohemian Society of Sciences 
in 1815. It is remarkable that though RB is brief, very well-presented and 
highly significant, as well as enjoying the circulation of the Abhandlungen..., 
there seem to be no contemporary reviews of the work. 
The work DP, which we have put last, was published in 1817 In 
Leipzig. This was the only on:; of the five not to appear in Prague and 
possibly its publication iri Leipzig contributed to its receiving at least two 
i 
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reviews in the contemporary journals. It Is Impossible to be certain, but 
it seems likely that this was written before 1816 and perhaps before RB was 
written, but published after the publication of RB. On A589; DP, 76 we read, 
"The foregoing work [i. c. DPI had been ready for printing for a long time 
when the paper of Dr. A. L. Crelle .... appeared, .... 1816, ... 
". In all 
the Prefaces of his five works Bolzano follows a methodical and character- 
istic pattern of tracing the previous work on the particular problem con- 
cerned, showing its inadequacy and outlining his own procedure. In RB 
this Is foil jived, rather conspicuously, by a personal section mentioning all 
his other four mathematical works and his hopes for recognition and critic- 
Ism (Ä451-456; RB, 23-29). It is plausible, but only a conjecture, that this 
section was added, perhaps by way of advertisement for his other works, 
when he was assured of publication in the Abhandlungen... It is in this 
section that he says DP Is still waiting for a publisher. This is the only 
evidence we have, and It Is clearly far from conclusive even if this conjec-. 
ture were -, rue, that Dp was published after th3 first appearance of RB. 
Each of the five works, except for BL, has had a second edition pro- 
duced during this century. These editioas are as follows. 
94 ya Bolzana/Oevres do BG and DP both appear in Vol. 5 of §y Bern 
Bernard Bolzano/Bernard Bolzano's Schriften (Bolzano[3]) edited with notes 
by Dr. Jan Vojtdch, Prague 1948; BG Is on pp. 5-49 and DP is on pp. 67-138. 
It should be noted that both these second editions, although much clearer and 
easier to read than the first editions, contain errors or misprints which do 
' not occur in the respective first edition,;. D: the case of EG this is 
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compensated by the greater number of first edition errors that are corrected 
by Vojtdch. The first edition of DP has very few errors and is more reliable 
than Vojt6ch's edition. However, these are almost all fairly minor mis- 
prints which are easily detectable. Vojthch's notes are particulary useful 
for tue details of all the authors mentioned by Bolzano in these works. 
BD appeared in a second edition under the title, Philosophie der 
Mathematik oder Beiträge zu einer begründeteren Darstellung der Mathem- 
atik, edited with an Introduction and notes by Dr. Heinrich Fels. This was 
published by Ferdinand SchönIngh in Paderborn In 1926. There is also , an 
unaltered reprint of the first edition, with a new introduction by Dr. Hans 
Wussing, published by Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft in Darmstadt 
in 1974. 
The second edition of RB appeared ißt the series Ostwalds Klassiker 
der exakten Wissenschaften Nr. 153 published in Leipzig in 1905. It was 
edited and supplied with notes by P. E. B. Jourdain. Again, although clearly 
laid out, ther9 are more misprints introduced in this edition than those 
corrected from the first edition. RB has been translated into French by 
J. Sebestik in Bernard Bolzano et son M6molre sur le th6orbme fonda- 
mental de l'Analyse in Revue d'histoire des Sciences 17 (1964) p. 12g. 
The authc: 's translation of RB which is given here on A430-489 has been 
published in Iiistoria Mathematica Vol. 7(2) (1980) pp. 156-185. There 
have also been translations in Czechoslovakian and Russian f6r details of 
which see f3olzano[l] Vol. E2/1p. 86. 
{ 
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1.4 Reviews of Bolzano's Works 
We shall list here the references to the contemporary reviews that 
we know about, together "ith brief summaries of their contents. 
For BG: 
(1) Neue Leipziger Literaturzeitung Dritter Band 95. Stück 
(1805) 
This is just half a page summarising the contents of BG 
with very little comment from the reviewer. 
(2) Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung (Halle and Leipzig) Erster 
Band Nr. 26 Feb. 1806. 
A very brief and rather patronising review which is unfair 
in that It fails to Indicate the contents of the work and just 
states the reviewer's lack of sympathy for studying the 
basic cov-opts of any science. He disagrees with Bolzano 
that motion Is alien to geometry since it need not presuppose 
an empirical object. 
(3) HeidelbergischeJahrbücher der Literatur Erster Jahrgang 
Vierte Abtheilung pp. 156-158. Hiidelberg 1808. 
The reviewer gives a brief but fair summary of Bolzano's 
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distinctive approach to elementary geometry but then devotes 
half the review to the difference between theorems and 
problems. He criticises Bolzano's clay? ification of theoretical 
and practical geometry and his claim that all tha problems in 
Euclid really belong to the latter. The reviewer wrongly 
regards Dolzano's proof of Pythagoras' theorem (by similarity) 
as original and fails to see the errors in what he describes as 
the "very easy" theory of parallel lines which Bolzano gives. 
He commends the work as desPr ving attention and further study. 
For BD: 
Revision der Literatur Zweyter TEeil Vierter Band p. 313 
Heidelberg 1810 
This is only one small page and does no justice to Bolzai, o's - 
work. The reviewer quotes the definition of mathematics and 
some of the subsequent classifications aid explains why he 
believes Boizano has misunderstood Kant's distinction between 
intuition and concept. 
For BL and RB: 
No reviews known. 
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For DP: 
(1) Allgemeine Literatur-Zeitung Band 3 Col. 180-184 
Jena 1819 
This is a fairly detailed summary of the method Bolzano 
adopts to prove the formula for the rectification of a simple 
curve. The reviewer's account closely follows Bolzano's 
own summary in the Preface of DP. However, the review 
concludes by denying, with virtually no argument, Bolzano's 
two principle claims for the work that he avoids the use of 
infisitesirals and that it is a perfectly strict proof. 
(2) Leipziger Literatur-Zeitung No. 175,176 Col. 1392-1403 
1822 
This review is substantial but erratic in style and most unfav- 
r 
ourable to Bolzano. It begins with a faithful summary of the 
first part of the Preface of DP but then proceeds to deal at 
length (and with obvious sarcasm) with the geometrical defint- 
tions which are really Incidental to the main purpose of the work. 
Although there are several lengthy verbatim quotations from DP 
these are mixed up with the reviewer's own summaries without 
any indication of when a passage is actually quoted f. om DP. 
:, jme of the criticismsof the procedure Bolzano adopts for the 
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main proofs are fair and useful but the sweeping conclusions 
which deny the paper any mathematical value at all are quite 
unjustified and represent either a wilful attack or else a com- 
plete failure to appreciate Bolzano's purpose. Certainly this 
review could have damaged any mathematical reputation or 
attention Bolzano might have been gaining from his recent 
publications. 
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Chapter 2: Foundations of Mathematics 
2.1 Introduct[on 
At the opening of the nineteenth century in Europe it was normal for 
anyone pursuing an academic interest in mathematics or philosophy to be 
quite well acquainted with the methods and achievements of both these . 
fields of knowledge. Philosophers have generally held mathematics and 
its methods in high regard: both as a model of argument and as a body of 
knowledge of a kind which merits particular attention. And in the wake 
of the rationalist philosophers and of KanVs Critique of Pure Reason this 
was particularly true when Bolzano was studying mathematics and phil- 
osophy at the University of Prague. However, mathematics was certainly 
not free from criticism. Bishop Berkeley's attack (The Analyst Cif 1734) 
on the use of fluxions and their ratios in the calculus was fully justified. 
Although Euler, Lagrange and the Bernoullis (among others). were producing 
a vast amount of mathematics throughout the eighteenth century it was the 
widespre :. 1, successful applications of mathematics (in mechanics, astron- 
omy, military and civil "engineering") which maintained its hign reputation 
and sense of progress, and which justified its methods. In the second half 
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of the century there were only a few significant new branches of mathematics 
emerging: the study of differential equations, differential geometry, des- 
criptive geometry and the calculus of variations. Also in this period there 
were a number of disquietingly pessimistic remarks being riade about. the 
future of mathematics. Lagrange wrote to d'Alembert in 1781, "It appears 
to me that also the mine [of mathematics] Is already very deep and that 
unless one discovers new veins it will be necessary sooner or later to 
abandon it. " (Lagrange [11p. 368) In a report on the progress of mathem- 
atics since 1789 Delambre, secretary of the mathematics section of the . 
Institut de France, was able to write In 1810, 
It would be difficult and rash to analyse the chances which the 
future offers to the advancement of mathematics; in almost all 
its branches one is blocked by insurmountable difficulties; per- 
fection of detail seems to be the only thing which remains to be 
done. (Delambre [1], translation as In Kline L1] p. 623) 
Whether establishing secure foundations for mathematics was a 
matter of the "perfection of detail" has doubtless always been a matter of 
debate among mathematicians. But in the last two centuries there are 
many examples of what were foundational studies for one generation 
becoming a well established branch of mathematics for the next generation. 
Around 1800 the status of 'Euclid's parallel postulate, the summation of 
infinite series and the nature of the continuity of a function were among 
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many "details" which had still not been properly clarified. (It Is salutary to 
consider with hindsight the power and fruitfulness that such fundamental 
clarifications would unleash in the nineteenth century. ) Now the mathematical 
and philosophical aspects of these problems could really not be separated. 
As long as there was no notion of primitive and undefined concepts governed 
only by an axiom system, the clarification and definition of the fundamental 
concepts (such as line, surface, solid, the nature of infinity or of an infinite 
sum), was something which had to be done whether it looks to us now like 
mathematics or not. Consequently the philoo. ophical remarks in a mathem- 
atical work of this period may not always be regarded merely as customary. 
reflections, or speculations, on the mathematics. They may, on occasion, 
be no more than that, but on the other hand the; ' may be intended as an 
Integral part of the work and essential both for understanding the general 
development of the theory and for following particular proofs. This --; plies .. 
very much to Bolzano's work because as we have seen from Chapter 1 he was 
especially interested in this philosophical aspect of mathematics and believed 
that it was defects in this area that were the source of the difficulties and 
confusion in the geometry and analysis of his time. His overall purpose 
was to render mathematical theories clear and correct. This was seen as 
a worth-while work in itself, an excellent exercise for the mind which 
would be of great benefit for th'dse learning mathematics and as facilitating 
the further development of the subject. 
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To achieve this aim of clarity and correctness Bolzano embarks 
in the first period of his career on working out a programme of the system- 
atic analysis of proofs and concepts. In all the five published works with 
which we are concerned here this analysis begins with the critic! sm of all the 
previQQus work on a particular problem with which Bolzano was acquainted. 
This criticism is usually against method, e. g. the choice and definition of 
the concepts used or the arrangement and status of the theorems, rather than 
against defects in logical deduction. It generally leads to a refinement and 
development of the relevant concepts, such as those of angle and congruence 
in BG (see 3.2.1,3 ), or of continuity and convergence in BL and RB (see 4.3 
and 4.4). Sometimes the analysis of concepts seems to lead Bolzano to 
entirely new definitions, for example his distinction of distance and length 
and the neighbourhood definitions of line, surface and solid in DP (see 3.4.2). 
This programme of conceptual refinement and enrichment is explained 
and applied in general terms in BD. Here Bolzano discusses the nature of 
mathematics itself, its classifications and concepts, and the general require- 
ments for a correct proof. It is therefore the first published work devoted 
to what we should now describe as foundational aspects of mathematics. 
Some of the main ideas of BD have already been expressed (albeit more 
briefly and in application to geometry) in the earlier work BG. Thus it 
will be these two works which are our main sources for describ'ag and 
assessing Bolzano's views on the foundations of mathematics. The particular 
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concepts which arose in the light of these views in geometry and analysis 
are only mentioned here by way of example and illustration; the details and 
difficulties of their use are discussed in Lice appropriate later chapter. 
i 
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2.2 The Nature of Mathematics 
2.2.1 The Science of Quantity 
Although we might describe the leading mathematicians of the 
eighteenth century as analysts, the majority of those learning mathematics 
at this time would have regarded pure mathematics as more or less identical 
with geometry. We say here "pure mathematics" because it was normal In 
the mathematics textbooks to include subjects such as mechanics, optics, 
astronomy, geography, surveying, navigation, hydrodynamics, chronology. 
gnomonics etc. There would be a little arithmetic and algebra in the pi're 
mathematics, but the great contemporary adventures in analysis would be 
incomprehensible to all but the most devoted scholars. It was therefore 
geometry that was the cornerstone of mathematics and most "applied mathe- 
matics" was really applied geometry. In France mathematicians were 
generally referred to, even in the nineteenth century, as "les-geombtres". 
Geometry had for long been regarded as the "science of magnitude" 
(Mercator [1] 1678) or of "extended quantity" (Wolff [1] 1713, Ch. 1 Def. 1). 
Thus it was natural for the mathematicians who reflected on the nature of 
their subject to believe that all its various divisions would be covered by the 
general definition of mathematics as the "science of quantity" or "science 
of quantit! ;; s". For example, J. Schultz (an author to whom Belzano made 
frequent reference, see p. 87) gives the definition: 
Die Mathesis oder Mathematik heisst die Wissenschaft der 
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Grüssen (scientia quantorum). 
(The science of quantities (scientia quantorum) is called 
mathesis or mathematics. ) (Schultz [I] p. 2) 
One of the principal German textbooks was a collection c. " ten volumes 
under the general title, Die Mathematische Anfangsgründe by A. G. K. stner, 
the first volume of which went through six editions between 1758 and 1801. 
Among the "Vorinnerungen" (Preliminaries) of this first volume we read: 
Die Mathematik enthalt eigentlich solche Lehren, vermittelst 
derer die Grossen sich durch Schlosse vergleichen lassen... 
! Mathematics properly contains those theories by means of which 
quantities can be calculated by deductions. ) (Kästner [i] p. 3) 
By far the most popular university text in French was Bezout's Cou rrs do 
mwtthdmatigue (1764 with many later editions) which opens as follows: 
1. On appelle, en g6nd'ral, guantit6, tout cc qui est susceptible 
d'augmentation ou de diminution.... Tout ce qui est quantit6 est 
de 1'objet des Mathdmatiques... 
(1. In general, everything that is capable of increase or decrease 
is called quantity.... Everything that is quantity is the object of 
mz. Thematics... ) (B6zout [1] p. 1) 
In his survey of algebra in the period 1758 - 1799 F. Cajori writes 
with regard to this kind of definition of mathematics that, "jr. ". io textbook 
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do we meet with an essentially different definition... It was almost universal 
with mathematicians"(M. Cantor [1) p. 76). 
It was thus natural that Bolzano should begin his consideration of the 
nature of mathematics with criticism of this definition. HA '; oncentrates on 
what is to be understood by the word "quantity". The distinction of discrete 
and continuous quantities, of what is countable and what is in some sense 
measurable, had already been made frequently. For example, in The Math- 
ematical Dictionary of Thomas Walter (1762) mathematics is defined as, 
"that science which considers magnitudes eitler as they are computable or 
measurable" (Walter [1] ). However, Eolzano does not discuss this distinc- 
tion nor do most of the authors from which he quotes or with which he was 
familiar. With A. G. Kästner (and, as we have seen, B6zout) quantity is 
defined abstractly as, "whatever is capable of increase or decrease" 
(Kästner [1]p. 1). In his Anfangsgrunde J. Schultz first defines quantity- as a 
kind of predicate of an object, "The determination of how many times an 
object must be combined with itself in order to prodc^e a similar object is 
called the magnitude or quantity" (Schultz [1] p. 2). Then he continues, 
"An object in which quantity occurs is called a magnitude or quantity' 
(Quantum). " In contrast to such abstract definitions there is the definition 
N 
quoted by Bolzano from an anonymous work, "A quantity is something that 
exists and can be perceived thr'. ugh some sense" (Anon. [1] ). Bolzano 
himself says he appeals to the ordinary use of language for his definition: 
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"a whole insofar as it consists of several equal parts, or still more generally, 
something which can be determined by numbers" (4111; DD, 4). This brings 
out both the substar-tive and predicative a. pects of the concept of quantity. 
It is not a predicate but, by directing our attention to a certain view-point, 
It makes way for a predicate. We shcald not speak of a "larger or smaller 
quantity", of a "known or unknown quantity" (in English or German) unless 
we had first used and understood these expressions with reference to a 
quantity of something. On the other hand, we are also in the habit of using 
such expressions abstractly, as though "something" actually was "determined 
by numbers". Bolzano finds fault with the definition of mathematics as a 
"science of quantity" on both of these interpretations of "quantity". Quantity, 
he says is considered 
in abstracto In pure general mathesis, I. e. logistics or arithmetic 
but it does not exhaust the content of even this science. The concept 
of quantity or of number does not even appear in many problems of 
the theory of combinations... For example, if one puts the question: 
which permutations - not how many - of the given things a, b, c, .. 
are possible? "(A111; BD, 4; on the terms "mathesis" and "logistics" 
see Notes[9], j101on A261, A262). 
Furthermore, in the applied parts :, 1 mathematics which consist of 
the application of quantity, for example to time and space, there will be 
axioms or theorems which concern only the object of the theory. For 
e 
38 
example, there are the propositions that all moments, or that all points, are 
similar. Perhaps then, what is really meant, or should be meant, by the 
"science of quantit; " is, "the science of those objects to which the concept 
of quantity is especially a; pllcable" (A113; BD, 6). But of course this is 
hardly satisfactory. If the criterion is simply that quantity can be applied 
to an object for the theory of that object to be part of mathematics, then 
almost everything becomes mathematics. If it Is that such applicability 
should be frequent and occur in many ways the criterion is subjective and 
vague. 
So far, Bolzano's criticisms are very reasonable and even under- 
stated with respect to 18th century mathematics. The "science of quantity" 
definition car. never in fact have been a successful way to delineate the 
domain of mathematics. (Cajori remarks on the non-quantitative Greek 
problem of determining whether four given points lie in a plane(MJantör[l] 
p. 76). It Is much more like a rough working definition supplying what Is 
given by etymology in the case of subjects like philosophy, theology and 
metaphysics, but is lacking in the case of mathematics. 
2.2.2 Bolzano and Kant 
It has in the past often been regarded as a proper task of philosophy 
to determine and distinguish the true subject-matter of the particular' 
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branches of knowledge. Bolzano certainly believed this can and should be 
done not only for mathematics (and other subjects) as a whole but also for the 
classification of its various parts. He quotes approvingly Kant's criticism 
on the contemporary custom of distinguishing mathematics from philosophy 
by making their objects quantity and quality respectively: "by this the effect 
is mistaken for the cause" (A109; BD, 2). Bolzano thus maintains that it is 
not part of the essence of mathematics that it deals with quantity, this is 
merely a cunsequence of its true nature. Although this is as far as Bolzano's 
approval of Kant goes on this matter he adds an Appendix to BD (A242; BD, 13, ) 
which is devoted to Kant's account of mathematics. ' However, it appears 
, from this more detailed study that Bolzano fundamentally misunderstood 
Kant, so we shall now give a brief outline of Kant's definition of mathematics. 
Our purpose here is not to describe the full extent of Bolzano's misunder- 
standing or account for its reasons but only to indicate the specific influence 
Kant had on Bolzano's thought on the nature of mathematics. 
Kant's account of the nature of mathematics is a highly specialised 
account in terms of the epistemology extensively elaborated in the Critique 
of Pure. Reason. Mathematics is said to be the science of the construction 
of concepts. To construct a concept means to exhibit a priori the intuition 
which corresponds to the concept. Intuitions arise through our sensibility 
and are characterised by their immediacy in relation to their object. 
They may be empirical (arising through sensation) or pure and a priori 
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(representing the form of our sensibility). Concepts, on the other hand, 
arise from the understanding and are things which are thought. Intuitions 
and concepts constitute the elements of all our knowledge, so that neither 
concepts without intuition; In some way corresponding to them, nor intui- 
tions without concepts, can yield knowledge. Both may be either pure or 
empirical. Now Kant claims that mathematics and philosophy are the two 
fields where reason achieves genuine synthetic a priori knowledge and his 
main concern (in the passages to which Bolzano refers in BD, I. §1, §5 (A109) 
Is to distiz. guish these fields of knowledge from one another rather than to 
give a complete definition of either; The distinction does not so much lie 
in their objects (these overlap to some extent) but exists by virtue of "the 
mode in which reason handles that object" (Kant (11 p. 578). Philosophy 
confines itself to universal concepts; mathematics proceeds essentially 
to Intuition in which It considers th3 concept In concreto, "in an intuition 
which it presents a priori, that is, which it has constructed, and in which 
whatever fellows : Mom the universal conditions of the construction must 
be universally valid of the object of the concept thus constructed" (Kant [1) 
p. 578). 
Bolzano rejects the Kantian definition of mathematics on the 
grounds that he believes the concept of a p''re a priori intuition is con- 
tradictory (A116; BD, 9). But he nowhere explains why he believes this. 
It might be reasonable to doubt the existence of pure intuitions In Kant's 
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sense (he himself, of course, argued that there are two such, space and 
time), but to claim that they are contradictory suggests either a wilful mis- 
interpretation or cn1y a cursory study of Kant's work. It is extraordinary 
that in BD Appendix 02 (A'1145) Bolzano writes: 
If we then ask what a pure intuition is meant to be, then it seems 
to me at least that no other answer is possible than: an intuition 
which is combined with the necessity that it must be so and not 
otherwise. 
This is aa invention of Bolzano's and it does not, as suggested, arise from 
an omission on Kant's part. On the contrary, Kant repeatedly offers in 
the Critique of Pure Reason the explanation that a pure intuition is the form 
of our sensibility by virtue of which appearances (I. e. empirical intuitions 
arising through sensation) can be ordered in certain relations, for example, 
in spatial and temporal relations (Kant [i] p. 66,67,92). However, the 
source of Bolzano's misunderstanding in this respect seems to be in the 
basic idea of an intuition. Again in BD Appendix §2, (A245), he answers 
the question of what intuitions are by quoting the distinction made in the 
Logik (Kant, [2] (1800)p. 96) between intuitions and concepts; these are con- 
trasted as singular ideas (repraesentio sin lams and general or discursive 
Ideas (repraesentio discursiva). This is simply a logical distinction with 
respect to quantity and, though it may also be found implicitly in the other 
main passages describing intuitions and concepts in the Critique of Pure 
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Reason, It Is completely Inadequate as a proper characterisation of these 
central kinds of Ideas. A contemporary reviewer of BD (see 1.4 for 
reference) made the point (perhaps with considerable restraint) that Bolzano 
would not have mistaken the intuitive nature of mathematical knowledge if 
he had considered not just one of Kant's explanations of the difference 
between int'zition and concept but had taken all his references on this matter 
into account. Indeed to interpret an intuition simply as a singular idea or 
an idea of an Individual is fraught with confusion. This is explained with 
specific reference to mathematics by Hartmann and Schwarz in the Intro-' 
duction to their translation of the Logik. They write as follows: 
In general the uniqueness or singularity of the object of a con- 
struction has nothing whatsoever to do with the singular or 
particular aspect of an abstracted or analytic concept; .... 
It is thus false to say, as It is sometimes done, that the 
individual In a mathematical Intuition has anything to do with 
the individual of an abstract concept.... or that, 'in a math- 
ematical argument general concepts are considered by means 
of their representatives. ' For what Kant does say is that to 
construct a concept is the same as to exhibit, that is, show up 
in space and time, darstellen, a priori an intuition which 
corresponds to the concept; that this is the construction of a 
schema.... (Kant [2] n, ci. ). 
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It seems to have been exactly the confusion referred to here that Bolzano 
makes when he disputes that the certainty of mathematical knowledge can 
possibly be based on Intuitions. He writes in BD Appendix 07 (A251): 
Kant seems to want to say, If I combine the general concc; nt, 
e. g. of a pointy or of a direction or distance, with an Intuition, 
I. e. present to myself a single point, a single direction or 
distance, then I find that this or that predicate belongs to these 
single objects and feel at the same time that this is also th3 
case with all other objects which belong under this concept. 
Bolzann then claims that this feeling cannot arise from what is single and 
individual in the object (the intuition) but from what is general in it (the 
concept). Possibly this is why he claims at BD, I§6 (A116) that the concept 
of a pure a priori intuition is contradictory: that it purports to give univer- 
sal and necessary knowledge on the basis of an individual. However, it is 
sufficiently proved that this is based on an inadequate understanding of 
Kant's notion of intuition from the quotation from the Critique of -ure 
Reason given on p. 40 and from the quotation of Hartmann and Schwarz above. 
In spite of this somewhat cavalier treatment of Kant, it is clear that 
In composing BD Bolzano was often influenced by him and that this was not 
always In tVrms of opposition. The two examples which are most relevant 
here are the problem of explaining the certainty of mathematical knowledge 
and the task of correctly separating mathematics from philoso; )hy. It is 
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quite clear even in the earlier work BG that for Bolzano the purpose or 
existence of a proof of a proposition is not to assure as of the certainly of 
that proposition. We do not (or should not) become --V more sure of the 
truth of a proposition the "better" It Is proved. There are %any elementary 
propositions for which we are certain of their truth before we consider how, 
if at all, they may be- proved. It is reasonable to expect some explanation of 
such unusual certainty In our knowledge. Kant had this explanation available 
in the a priori nature of the intuitions used in the construction of concepts in 
mathematics. But since this had been misunderstood and rejected by Bolzano 
he had to seek elsewhere. Instead of resorting, like Descartes, to the 
clarity and distinctness of mathematical ideas, he appeals to our (supposed) 
capacity to test mathematics. Fie says that certainty and obviousness arise 
because one can very easily test the results of mathematics by 
intuition and experience. For example, that the straight line 
really is the shortest one between two points is proved by every- 
body by innumerable experiments a long time before we can prove 
it by deductions. Also the well-known obviousness of mathematics 
gradually disappears where the experience Is lacking. (A257; BD, 150). 
This makes It sound as though there is no difference In kind between math- 
erratical knowledge and that of the natural sciences, that it Is just a matter 
of degree and that mathematics has been particularly well confirmed. The 
certainty of pure or abstract mathematics seems to derive from its 
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applications or "results" being confirmed. But it would be an anachronism 
to make Bolzano a thorough-going inductive empiricist. He did not believe 
the truth of a mathematical proposition is established by any sort of induction, 
though our confidence In such a proposition may be strengthened by wide- 
spread and frequent confirmation. Nor did he regard the "experience" by 
which mathematical results can be tested to be confined to sense experience. 
He speaks of "intuition and experience" and by "intuition" Bolzano means (at 
this stage in his thought, see A255; BD, 148) something like a mental 
image (albeit of an individual) which need not have its origin in sensation. 
In principle an a priori "thought experiment" could falsify a mathematicd 
1. result . 
Bolzano agrees with Kant that mathematics and philosophy (or, for 
Bolzano metaphysics) are the "two main parts of our a priori knowledge" 
(A120; BD, 13). It Is therefore important in defining mathematics to disting- 
uish it as carefully as possible from philosophy. In doing so Bolzano Is 
led to develop his definition into an original and logical characterisation 
of mathematics which is the forerunner of modern views on mathematics. 
We shall now consider Bolzano's own definition of mathematics which he 
presents and discusses in BD, I3§7-10(A117-123). 
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2.2.3 Bolzano's Definition of Mathematics 
Bolzano claims that the main outline of his definition and the sub- 
sequent classification of mathematics is original but he acknowledges the 
influence of a review which he quotes from as follows: 
Quantity is only an. object of mathematics because it is the most 
general form, to be finite, but in its nature mathematics is a 
general theory of forms. Thus, for ; xample, is arithmetic, ' 
insofar as it considers quantity as the general form of finite 
-things; geometry insofar as it considers space as the general ' 
form of Nature; the theory of time insofar as it considers the 
general theory of forces; the theory of motion Insofar as It 
considers the general form of forces acting in space. (A117; BD, 10) 
(The reference Bolzano gives for this review is "Leipz. Litteratur-Zeitung 
(1808 Jul. St. 81)" but the title of th' journal should be, Neue Leipziger 
Literatur-Zeitung. It Is a vigorous and interesting review but there is no 
indication of the iden4lty of the author. ) Bolzano's definition of mathem-, 
atics is: "a science which deals with the general laws (forms) according to 
which things are regulated in their existence" (A118; BD, 11). By "things" 
he includes anything "which can be an object of our perception" and he 
explains in the same passage that this reftrs to intuitions and concepts as 
well as things with "objective existence". In speaking of "the laws regulating 
their existence " he means to Indicate that it Is not for mathematics to prove 
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the actual existence of anything, it is only concerned with "the conditions 
of the possibility" (A119; BD, 12) of anything. Such laws are general because 
t 
they always concern whole classes of things and never particular individuals. 
Thus there emerges her_, with the reviewer quoted above and with Bolzano, 
possibly the first printed statement of something like the modern conception 
of mathematics as being primarily concerned with structure, with the most 
general features that hold for classes of possible entities. 
It is too wide a definition because although recognising that math- 
ematics caamot be confined to quantity Bolzaao has admitted, quite deliber- 
atcly, subjects (such as the theory of causation) which have never been 
generally accepted as part of mathematics. We must agree with Menninger 
that this concept of mathematics takes the subject "into the areas of phil- 
osophy, metaphysics or epistemology according to our interpretation of the 
expression 'conditions of the possitflity'. " (Menninger [11 p. 8). The 
weakness of the definition, and indeed his whole philosophy of mathematics 
is traced by MennLiger to two main sources (Ibid pp. 7-15). Firstly, Menninger 
says that the boundaries of mathematics can only been seen clearly and 
defined from within mathematics itself; r3olzano's view and definition of 
mathematics were "from outside". This Is obscure. Secondly, he claims 
it is the lack of attention on Bolzano's part to any proper consideration of 
epistemology that leads to his various errors. This is surely a sound and 
important criticism. Bolzano avoids most of the problems Kant is seeking 
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to answer in his Critique of Pure Reason by assuming our knowledge 
a. priori of conceptual truths which describe the logical structure governing 
the reality of things outside us. However, Bolzano was not purporting to 
write a treatise on philosophy in BD and Menninger is wrong to attribute to 
him the idea that our knowledge of these conceptual truths is "beyond question". 
The task of proving, from a priori concepts the real existence of cer- 
tain objects is relegated by Bolzano to metaphysics. He makes the distinction 
clear: 
mathematics concerns itself with the question, how must things 
be made in order that they should be possible? Metaphysics 
raises the question, which things are real - and indeed (because 
it is to be answered a priori) - necessarily real? Or still more 
briefly, mathematics would deal with hypothetical necessity, 
metaphysics with absolute necessity (A121; BD, 14). 
It is explained that this hypothetical form Is not always conspicuous because 
the premisses, or conditions, are often common to the whole subject - for 
example in geometry - and they are "tacitly assumed". Here then Is a 
logical counterpart of the "structural" definition of mathematics. We are 
reminded of Benjamin Peirce's definition, "mathematics is the science 
which dra;; s necessary conclusions" (Peirce [1] ), and Russell's definition, 
"pure mathematics is the class of all propositions of the form, 'p implies 
q'. " (Russell, [11 ) 
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Ironically Bolzano now includes Kant among those whose views 
support and confirm this account of mathematics. He quotes Kant's definition 
of pure natural science as a science of the laws which govern the existence 
of things (phenomena); and claims that this easily leads to h'. s definition of 
mathematics. The point is that pure natural science Is virtually mechanics, 
or at least, as Kant used to call it, "pure mechanics", and this is a part of 
mathematics. Now if we treat the other parts of mathematics as Kant here 
treats mechanics, the general features of the resulting definitions are 
summed up in Bolzano's first definition, thii-j: 
Time and space are also two conditions which govern the existence 
of appearances, chronometry and geometry which consider the 
properties of these two forms in 6bstra3to deal likewise, though 
only indirectly, with the laws which govern the existence of things 
(I. e. things perceivable by the senses). Finally arithmetic, which 
deals with the laws of countability, thereby develops the most 
general laws according to which things must bA regulated in their 
existence, even in their ideal existence. (A122; BD, 15). 
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2.3 The Classification of Mathematics 
As th; subject has developed the classification of the various branches 
of mathematics has ; become increasingly difficult and intractable and yet it is 
not regarded today as a serious problem, except possibly by librarians and 
publishers. It is a matter of practical, rather than theoretical, significance. 
However, for Bolzano and many of his contemporaries such as KRstner and 
Schultz it was a central Issue. For they regarded it as the business of 
science, and mathematics in particular, not only to discover new truths but 
to arrange them in a "true and natural order". This classification was not 
simply a matter of organising existing mathematical theories, rather It' was 
to represent faithfully the true divisions of mathematics. A definition which 
Is intended to express the essential nature of mathematics now assumes an 
important and determinative role in that It can be used to produce a sort of 
"ideal" or theoretical classification with which existing theories should 
match, at least approximately. 
The obvious response to an attempted definition of mathematics is 
to look at various branches of mathematics and their theories to see In 
what way, and how closely, they conform to the given definition. This is 
what, the reviewer quoted above (from BD, I, 
§7(A117))attempts to do, albeit 
In a very rough and ready way. It Is an apps each which starts from the 
actual parts of mathematics and compares them with the definition. 
Bolzano's approach is in the opposite direction; starting from the general 
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definition he applies subsidiary concepts and logical processes to descend 
to what the particular branches of mathematics should be. 
He first distinguishes between classifications which are made on 
"a scientific basis" and those which are simply practical or conventional. 
Also there is the distinction to be made between a classification of math- 
ematics as a whole and the classification of a particular discipline such as 
geometry. It is with the latter in mind that he explains in BD, II, §9(A120) 
what he means by a "proper classification", but there Is no reason to 
suppose that there is any difference in princi? le between the two kinds of 
classification. He claims that every genuine classification is a dichotomy. 
So for a classification of a concept A we require some concept B which can 
be consistently adjoined to, or excluded from, A to produce a classification 
of the form (IA cum B), (A sine B)]. 
The use of classification is one means to aid the achievement of 
Bolzano's [deal of each part of mathematics being presented in its correct 
order. He remarks that this is particularly difficult because for a proper 
classification it is necessary to be clear about the simple concepts and 
axioms for each part of mathematics. 
To obtain the first two main divisions of mathematics Bolzano does 
proceed exactly as described above by means of dichotomies. However, 
this is not made very clear In b. s account in BD, I, §11-13(A123-129) and so 
we shall summarise It here from this point of view. 
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Mathematics is the science of the laws which govern the existence 
of things. The laws which apply to all things of whatever sort will form 
general mathesis (and Include arithmetic, theory of combinations etc. ). 
Those laws which apply nn'. y to some things will then be gathered together 
into appropriate classes according to the kinds of things to which they apply. 
These theories are parts of particular mathesis and are all subordinate (as 
species to genus) to the general mathesis. The next division is between 
things which are necessary in their existence or being and those that are 
not (I. e. tP ose which are free and not subject to the laws of causality). The 
latter sort of thing produces no new parts of mathematics because they are 
subject to no laws except the most general, e. g. concerning number, which 
are already L-icluded in the general mathesis. The things which are nec- 
essary maybe so simply and In themselves (I. e. God, a. subject of meta- 
physics), or conditionally, presupposing something else (e. g. the speed of 
a moving body). This conditional, or hypothetical necessity is the occasion 
for the introductiofl of Bolzano's very general concept of a "ground" (Grund). 
A cause (Ursache) Is a ground which acts in time. The objective relation- 
ship of ground and consequence (Grund und Folge) is one holding between 
(timeless) propositions. (See later 2.4.2. ) The general conditions govern- 
Ing the becoming or being of everything which Is produced through some 
ground is the first part of particular mathesis and Is called the theory of 
grounds or aetiology. (See Bolzano [1] Vol. 2A/5 (1977) for the previously 
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unpublished work on thispart of mathematics which Bolzano intended for the 
second instalment of BD. ) 
At this stage Boizano breaks off the sequence of dichotomies concern- 
Ing things considered objectively and introduces the notion 4 our perception 
of things. Anything we perceive as real is perceived in time and if it is also 
perceived a. s outside ourselves It is perceived In space. Time and space are 
conditions governing all appearances of things, and therefore, says Bolzano, 
indirectly governing things themselves. Their properties when they are con- 
sidered in abstracto produce the second ar_%, third parts of particular mathe- 
sis, chronometry and geometry. When considered not in abstracto but as 
containing actual things their properties give rise to the theory of causes 
(temporal aetiology) and mechanics respectively. The resulting classifica- 
tion appears in a table on BD, 37(A144) which may be summarised as follows. 
We have added the subjects corresponding to each division In square brackets. 
A. General mathesis (things In general) 
arithmetic, 
combinations, 
algebra, analysl3 
B. Particular mathesis (particular things) 
I. Aetiology (necessary things) [probability] 
H. (necessary things perceivable by the 
senses) 
a. (their form in ibstracto) 
a. theory of time ß. theory of space 
[geometry] 
b. (things perceivable by the sense in concreto 
a. temporal aetiology ß. pure natural science mechanics] 
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The Introduction of time and space as the forms or conditions of 
appearances might seem to be taken over from Kant but the origin of intro- 
ducing time and space in this way goes back at least to Leibniz (for example, 
in his Metaphysical Foundations of Mathematics, Leibniz ft]). Under 
general mathesis Bolzano himself only specifies "arithmetic, theory of 
combinations and several other branches", presumably algebra and analysis 
should also be included here. 
This classification hardly seems to have been a great success. It 
falls to distinguish - In the general mathesIR - between major areas of 
mathematics which, while perhaps not distinct are regarded as distinguish- 
able, and it introduces subjects such as aetiology and the theory of time 
which have not yet contributed very significantij to mathematics. There 
seems little advantage here and considerable complication, compared with 
the classification of quantity into discrete and continous, producing ai ith- 
metic and allied subjects from the former and geometry and analysis from 
the latter. Thus it can hardly be claimed (as Bolzana suggests, A123; BD, 16) 
that his classification of mathematics vindicates his definition. 
Finally Bolzano considers various other proposals for classifying 
mathematics. One of his most interesting suggestions here is that the best 
procedure to distinguish an elementary mathematics from a higher math- 
ematics might be to Include In tae latter the theories containing the concept 
of infinity (whether great or small) or that of a differential. These were, 
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of course, concepts which were then ill-defined and poorly understood. 
Bolzano explains, 
If in the future it should be decided that the i'finite or the 
differential is nothing bißt a symbolic expression ju°'. like 
and such like, and if also it turns out that the method 
of proving truths by merely symbolic inventions is a method 
of proof which (although quite special) Is always correct and 
logically admissable, then I believe It would be most 
expedient to continue to include the c )ncept of Infinity and- 
other equally symbolic concepts In the domain of higher 
mathematics. Elementary mathesis would then be that which 
accepts only real concepts or express cs In its exposition - 
higher mathesis that which also accepts merely symboli3 
ones. (A137, BD, 30). 
Here for the first time a definite procedure is suggested for just- 
ifying the inclusion in a mathemtical theory of symbols which could not be 
interpreted as denoting. It bears a striking similarity to Hilbert's pro- 
gramme for dealing with infinite number symbols as ideal elements in 
theories whose consistency would be-proved by means of strictly finite 
methods. 
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2.4 The Concepts and Proofs of Mathematics 
2.4.1 Conceptual Correctness 
In spite of the prevailing interest in the classification of the various 
branches of mathematics its effect was to be seen mainly in the organisation 
of the many branches of applied mathematics. For example, Montucla lists 
about twenty topics under the general division of "physico-mathematics" In 
his Histoire des math6matiques (Montucla [1] ). Classification in this context 
was essentially a cataloguing exercise which was carried out successfully 
when theorems and results could be grouped according to their "object"' 
e. g. optics, astronomy, hydrodynamics etc. In pure mathematics this was 
not so easy and only geometry could clearly be distinguished from the 
"arithmetic family". Now Bolzano's chief concern and criticism of the pure 
mathematics of his time was its disorder and confusion. This was not a 
matter which simply required a better sorting of results into compartments. 
Bolzano believed that a mathematical theory was not just a collection of 
associated theorems, it was the representation of "hypothetical necessity". 
That is, every theorem or true proposition should be presented with its 
correct ground , which may itself consist of a finite sequence'(or 
"tree") 
of ground-consequence relations. Therefore a theory consisted essentially 
of finite praof-sequences which could be broken off at any point to produce 
theorems. The disorder and confusion referred to above was in these 
proof-sequences; concepts and methods from one theory were äeing employed 
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in another theory. The obvious and most far-reaching example of this was 
the use of geometrical ideas in analysis. Certainly with Newton, and then 
for much of the eighteenth century, a function of one variable was Identified 
with a plane curve. The concept of motion, often used in arometry at. this 
time, produced what might be called aNdynamic limit concept which did . iot 
favour the development of an arithmetic concept of limit. Ever since Euclid 
many algebraic results had been interpreted, proved and developed in purely 
geometrical terms. Such confusions could, of course, never occur in a 
formal system or even such a system consI tently interpreted according to 
given rules. But such an idea was not clear to Bolzano, however much we 
can now, with hindsight, see It Inherent in the notion of "hypothetical 
necessity". For Bolzano the starting points, cr axioms, of the proof- 
sequences in a theory are the propositions containing simple, but always 
meaningful, concepts. And they are true by virtue of these meanings. In 
order to claim that the disorder of proofs was not just an aesthetic dcstre 
for the uniformity of proof and conclusion, It was th'refore necessary to 
assume that there are genuine conceptual divisions of knowledge, or of 
truths, rather like the sharp divisions into species that were believed to 
exist in the organic world. This assumption was central and essential to 
Bolzano's early mathematical work. The Immediate consequence for 
mathematics was summed up early in the first work, BG, as follows: 
I could not be satisfied with a completely strict proof if it were 
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not even derived from concepts which the thesis to be proved 
contained, but rather made use of some fortuitous, alien, 
Intermediate concept [Mittelbegriff], which Is always an 
erroneous /Aezaßacts Ecs äo ao Yevos [transition to 
another genus) (A15, BG, VIII) 
Thf re are really two ideas conflated here: that of a correct proof and 
that of a correct concept, the correctness in each case being relative to a 
given conclusion or theory. The correctness of a concept therefore depends 
on its context which is often a proof, and the correctness of a proof tray 
depend on the concepts it involves. We shall therefore discuss these Ideas 
together. 
According to Bolzano logical or formal correctness is not the sole 
criterion of an adequate or correct proof: the concepts involved in the 
deduction are to be appropriate, in some sense, to the conclusion. For 
example, with respect to the elementary theory of the triangle and parallel 
lines the concepts of straight lino and direction are appropriate, while those 
of motion and the plane are deemed inappropriate. By considering these 
last two examples we can distinguish several ways in which concepts can be 
inappropriate. First, the concept of motion essentially belongs to a 
different subject from geometry; It requires the empirical concept of an 
object which occupies different positions in space and this is alien to the 
science which only studies space. To-employ the idea of motion Ina 
4' 
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geometry proof Is an example of a Eta ßa ots Et,; -A\ o yevoc 
(transition to another genus). Bolzano uses tL e phrase again in RB(A434; RB, 6) 
when distinguishing within mathematics between geowctry and analysis. But 
in the present case of the concept of motion there Is a further, related reaso"L 
for its rejection in geometry: It is conceptually out of order. We are not here 
concerned with a deductive or logical ordering of propositions but rather an 
ordering of concepts whereby, if on analysis of concept A It is found to con- 
taro a concept B as an essential Component, then B is prior to A. This 
relationship of containment between concepts is metaphorical and ambiguous, 
we discuss it further later in this section (p. 6 7). But in the sense evidently 
intended here the concept of space is prior to that of motion and so the use 
of motion is not merely out of place in geometry In the sense of being alien, 
it is strictly circular. Any attempt to prove a geometrical proposition In 
this way requires a proof of the possibility of a suitable motion and this in 
turn will depend on the truth of the original geometrical proposition to be 
proved. Now it may be asked here,, why should the proof of the possibility 
of a certain motion motion be required? It is not (at least in many cases) 
that intuitive clarity is lacking, nor even that intuition Is inadmissable In 
geometry; rather it Is that where-ever possible it is the mathematician's 
duty to uncover the basis or ground for every judgement occurring in a 
proof. In this case, it would be claimed, the true ground for the possibility 
of the motion lies not in the :. -ituition, but in the geometrical proposition. 
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Bolzann is primarily concerned in BG to find, as he believesfor the first 
time, the correct proofs for elementary geometry, and it is a necessary 
condition for such proofs that they employ only concepts which are appro- 
priate to the theorems concerned. 
The other concept which is rejected as inappropriate is that of the, 
plane. This may appear surprising when nanny of the results which Bolzano 
proves are found gathered together into a subject which has usually been 
referred to as "plane geometry". It is not, of course, that the plane is not 
a geometric concept; It is just that it is premature to employ the concept of 
plane when proving theorems which only concern angles, straight lines, 
triangles and parallels. The claim this time is not that a logical circularity 
would be involved in using the notion of plane but that- through analysis of 
these concepts and their development from the simpler to the more complex, 
the plane comes later than all those others just mentioned. Bolzano seems 
to have in mind here a kind of hierarchy of concepts which proceeds from the, 
simpler to the more complex and whose structure is reflected in the defini- 
tions. Then the principle being used here is that for the proof of a result 
involving concepts at a certain level in the hierarchy we should not pre- 
suppose any concepts from a higher level in the hierarchy. To presuppose 
a concept :, i a proof or method means to proceed In any way which requires 
us to think, or to have, the given concept. For example, the use of Euclid's 
parallel postulate presupposes the plane and so does the trea: nent of angle 
I 
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as a quantity (see 3. Z. 1 ). It may be noted that while a system of two 
intersecting straight lines, required for the concept of angle itself, undoubt- 
edly determines a plane this fact is irrelevant to the question of the priority 
of the concepts. It is unnecessary to have or to use the concept of the plane 
in order to understand what is meant by the system of lines. There are, 
for example, many surfaces other than the. 'lane which pass through, though 
are not determined by, a pair of intersecting lines. 
Proofs which ignore this hierarchical principle will, of coarse, often 
succeed in the sense that they are logically correct and perfectly convincing, 
but the point of adhering to this principle is that the proof should then follow 
and reflect the objective dependence between truths. It is this purpose which 
is Bolzano's central motive in the early mathematical works. 
Thus to summarise what we might call the "principle of conceptual 
correctness", there are three ways in which the introduction of a concept 
into a proof may be Incorrect. Firstly, it may be of an alien kind not belong- 
ing to the subject concerned and not being involved in the conclusi"cn to be 
proved, e. g. motion In geometry. Secondly, it may be "out of order" and 
this itself can occur in two ways. The introduction of the concept may lead 
to a proof which is logically circular (again motion is an example). Or the 
concept rMy have been drawn from a higher level than any concepts in the 
conclusion (according to some hierarchical development of concepts in order 
of increasing complexity), and thus it would be premature, e.:,,. the plane 
in elementary geometry. 
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2.4.2. Ground and Consequence 
Now we shall consider in more detail the nature of the "objective 
dependence" which, according to Bolzano, mathematical proofs should 
follow and . epresent. The crucial idea is the relationship of gruund and 
consequence Grund und FolgeJalready mentioned briefly in Sec. 2.3. 
Bolzano does not argue for the existence or need of such a relationship. 
He writes at the beginning of the second main section of BD: 
this much seems to me certain: in the realm of truth, i. e. in the 
sum total of all true judgements, a certain objective connection 
prevails which is Independent of our accidental and subjective 
recognition of it. As a consequence of this some of these 
judgements are the grounds of others and the latter are the 
consequences of the former. To represent this objective 
connection of judgements, I. e. to choose a set of judgements 
and arrange them one after another so that a consequence is 
represented as such and conversely, seems to me the proper 
purpose to pursue in a scientific exposition. (A146; BD, 39) 
Throughout BD Bolzano says very little about the nature of this 
objective connection between truths. Possibly he thought it obvious and 
generally acknowledged. In the Wissenschaftslehre of 1837 he remarks 
in a note (Bolzano[4], Vol. 11,95198) that he was confirmed in this view of, the 
existence of a real relationship of consequence between truth because. 11 so 
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many others had been of the same opinion". He mentions there also the 
Aristotelian distinction between truths which show that something Is the case, 
and those that show why it Is the case. However, the distinction made by 
Aristotle, and what would be "generally acknowledged; is that w"a can 
, 
recognise 
,a 
difference between a fact and an explanation for that fact. 
Bolzano's claim regarding an objective com. ection between truths or judge- 
ments seems more like a theory to account for this general recognition, 
much as we might postulate physical objects to account for certain groups of 
sensations. It is not at all clear that we have any direct apprehension of 
such an "objective connection" or "objective dependence" between truths. 
Furthermore, an important criticism which Bolzano nowhere deals with 
would be that even :, what Is recognised in the above distinctions of "that" and 
"why", or a fact and Its explanation, is not so much a connection between 
truths but rather a connection between the circumstances or objects referred 
to by those truths. The only answer we can give to this is to consider now 
Bolzano's remarks on the difference between the ground-consequence 
relation and a cause. 
The standard example used in the Wissenschaftslehre to explain the 
ground-consequence relation is the following. Consider the propositions: 
(1) It is warmer at X than at Y. 
(2) The thermometer Is higher at X than at Y. 
If we know either (1) or (2) then we also know the other, or at least it Is a 
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basis for knowing [Erkenntnisgrund) the other. But objectively (1) is the 
ground for the consequence. (2) and not conversely. We have already men- 
tioned Bolzano's explanation of a cause as a ground which acts in time. It 
appears that he intends a ground as a kind of propositional counterpart of a 
cause in the material realm. Now we are quite accustomed to saying with 
regard to the above propositions, "{1) is the cause of (2)" when what we 
really mean is that the circumstance described by (1) is the cause of the cir- 
cumstance c escribed by (2). There is therefore a kind of derived connection 
between the propositions (1) and (2) by virtue of the connection between the 
circumstances to which they refer and which Is objective in the same de.: Ivcd 
sense. It might even be useful to give this secondary connection a name like 
"ground". However, this was certainly not how Bolzano was thinking. His 
claim is that the ground-consequence relation Is a relation sui generis which 
holds objectively between truths, i. e. it holds whether or not we happen to 
recognise it, though in at least some instanceswe do recognise it. It might 
be thought that a much better example than that given above by Bolzano in 
J 
the Wissenschaftslehre would be the connection which we apprehend easily 
enough between the premisses of a valid syllogism and its conclusion. It is 
true that this is anexample of ground (the two premisses) and consequence 
(the conclusion), but we now have to be very careful to distinguish this from 
the formal relationship between propositions of derivability [Abl eitbarkeit] 
which also holds here. The latter consists in the fact that every substitution 
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for the terms involved which yields true premisses will also yield a true 
conclusion. The ground-consequence relation is one which is more substan- 
tial than the purely formal relation of derivability br+. Is less substantial or 
"material" than that of a cause. Thus it is hardly someth! n,; which should 
have been passed over as being well known or beyond doubt as Bolzano seems 
to do in BD. However, it must be remembered that in order to gain a better 
understanding of Bolzano's intention we have used a source (the Wissenschafts- 
lehre) that only appeared twenty-seven years later than BD. At the time of 
BD, In the draft for the second Issue of the }, eyträge..., Bolzano could do 
no more to explain the terms "ground" and "consequence" than to declare 
they were Incapable of-definition and to state four axioms which they would 
satisfy (see Bolzano [1] Vol. 2A 5, p. 78). 
The relationship of ground to consequence does make more sense In 
the overall context of the later "an sich" realm: that is, the collection of 
objective propositions, truths and ideas in themselves tan sich] which is 
elaborated in the Wissenschaftslehre. There is how^ver no mention of the 
an sich realm in Bolzano's writing up to 1817. So It is the ground-consequ- 
ence relation that takes priority in Bolzano's thought and it may have been to 
give a better account of this relation that the an sich objects were eventually 
postulated. 
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2.4.3. The Nature of Proof 
In describing proofs Bolzano often uses the term "wissenschaftlich" 
(or "unwissenschaftlich") which we have translated "scientific" in concession 
to modern usage but it does not imply a special kind of proof for "scientific" 
statements. It would probably be more accurately rendered "rigorous" or 
"rational". The nature of a proof is stated very clearly in BD, If, §12(A171): 
by the scientific proof of a truth we understand the represen- 
tation of the objective dependence of tt on other truths, i. e. the 
derivation of it from such truths which are to be considered as 
the grounds for it - not fortuitously - but in themselves and 
necessarily, while the truth itself must be considered as the 
consequence. 
Now even if the nature of this dependence is difficult to explain, in order to 
recognise it and use it, it must be possible to characterise its occurrence 
among propositions In some way. The question Is r'L. sed in the same para-- 
graph as before as to, "how many simple, and essentially different, kinds 
of inference (Schlussarten) there are, i. e. how many ways there are that 
a truth can be dependent on other truths. " This is answered immediately in 
terms of four purely formal proof patterns and then in later sections there 
are four conceptual criteria for a correct proof. 
The first formal proof structure is the Barbara form of syllogism: 
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All men are mortal. 
Calus is a man. 
Therefore, Caius is mortal. 
Bolzano remarks that he would prefer to interchange the pr; misses so that the 
terms proceeded from the particular to the general in their order of introduc- 
tion. And'he claims, as was quite usual, that every other figure and form of 
syllogism is either not essentially different from Barbara or else is not simple. 
The other kinds of proof which Bolzano lists are given in terms of pro- 
positions of the form, "A is (or contains) R". -The expression "A contains B" 
needs some explanation. In a note to BD, II§29(A217) he admits that the state- 
ment, "a concept A is contained in another concept B" is ambiguous and can 
mean that either A or B is the narrower of the two. (The terms "narrower" 
and wider" are used In their natural extensional sense as applied to concepts) 
Thus In the active form "A contains B", A is the wider when understood exten- 
sionally (the extension of concept A contains the ext 3nsion of concept B), but A is 
the narrower if it is Interpreted intensionally (the concept B Is either part of 
the meaning of the concept A or as a matter fact belon; s to concept A). It is 
clear from BT. II@26(A208 211) that Bolzano uses the expression to the latter 
Intensional sense. We shall here abbreviate "A is (or contains) B" to "A is B". 
The following three schemas are given as valid patterns of proof: 
(a) AIsB 
A Is C 
A is (B et C) 
(b) A Is M 
B Is M 
(A et B) Is M 
(c) A Is M 
(A cum B) is possible 
(A cum B) is M 
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For further clarification of the ground-consequence relation it is worth con- 
sidering a case where it does not occur. The suggestion of another schema: 
A Is (B cum C) 
A Is B 
A Is C 
is rejected by Bolzano because although we can recognise the truth of the two 
conclusions from the truth of the premiss, th3 latter cannot objectively be 
the ground for the former. This is not explained at the time, but in a later 
section Bolzano says that, "in the proposition, S contains (P cumlr), the 
proposition, S contains P, is presupposed In such a way that one definitely 
has to think the latter before the former" (A211; BD, 105). A similar kind 
of argument would show that in each of the cases (a), (b), (c) above the con- 
verse inferences from conclusion to premisses, though possible subjectively, 
(i. e. as grounds for knowledge) could not be objective. It is evidently 
regarded as a necessary condition of the ground-consequence relation that 
it should not be symmetric. All correct proofs are therefore regarded as 
being formed from combinations of the four simple types of inference listed 
above. 
In BD, U 26-29(A208-225) there are four conceptual criteria enunciated 
which are to apply to all proofs occurring .ua "scientific system". In fact 
the first two do not just apply to proofs but to the general organisation of all 
C, 
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propositions in a theory. They are not original but are put forward because - 
Bolzano regards them as not being sufficiently carefully followed. The first 
Is the principle that one should always proceed from the general to the part- 
icular. Or more formally, "If several propositions ..... have the same 
predi.; ate, then the proposition with the narrower subject must follow that with a 
wider subject, and not conversely" (A209 ; B. 7), 102). The second criterion 
(A211-213; BD, 104-106) has already been mentioned and is to the effect that 
among propositions with the same subject one with a more compound pre- 
dicate should follow one with a simpler predicate, and not conversely. This 
can be expressed Informally by saying that in a scientific exposition one 
should prove more, not less, as one proceeds. Here the criterion has 
deliberately been put in terms of the complexity of the predicate (more 
compound or simpler) rather than its extension (wider or narrower). It 
would not work in terms of extension because in the syllogism: S contains 
M, M contains P, therefore S contains P, M must be narrower than P for 
otherwise, "M contains P' could not be true. 
The other two rules are specifically for proofs and are still useful 
today for improving the economy and strength of mathematical theorems. 
They are: 
1. If the subject of a proposition Is as wide as it can be so that. 
the predicate can be applied to it, then all characteristics 
of the subject must be used in any correct proof (A213-217; BD, 
106-110). 
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2. For an affirmative proposition any Intermediate concepts 
which are introduced, apart from characteristics of the 
subject, sh^uld not be narrower than the subject and not be 
wider than the pr-r`icate. For a negative proposition they 
should only be wider than the eabject or wider than the predicate 
(A217-255; BD, 110-118). 
To illustrate the use and importance of the first of these criteria 
Bolzano mentions that sometimes a proof is sought without looking for how 
all the conditions of the conclusion will be used. For example, the parallel 
postulate only holds If both lines lie in the same plane but, Bolzano adds, 
few people have considered how this condition Is to be used In the proof. 
And he quotes a proof of K'astner's about the lever which seems to succeed 
without making use of an essential condition for the conclusion (Kästner E2ý 
I. Abth. (16) and (18)). The proof is therefore clearly false, Bolzano says, 
because it proves too much. 
The second criterion is demonstrated exhaustively by considering 
each of the four possible simple inferences which could give rise to the 
conclusion and analysing the relative extents of the intermediate concepts 
(A217-255; BD, 110-118). Thus it is shown that any proof that is formally 
correct will also satisfy this conceptual crit 3rion. These forms and 
criteria for correct proofs are therefore not Independent, nor are they 
sufficient conditions for correctness, but they are necessary conditions and 
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can easily be used to indicate incorrect proofs. Many proofs ruled out 
by the principle of conceptual correctness described earlier (p. 61) would. _. 
also be ruled out by the last-mentioned criterion. For example, an analytic 
result whose subject would concern all quantities in general should not have a 
geometric concept, such as a curve, introduced in its proof because this 
concerns only quantities occurring in space and is therefore narrower than 
the subject of the conclusion. Generally, though, this sort of diagnosis caz 
only be made after a detailed analysis of the whole proof into its simple 
Inferences and by dividing all Its concepts into their simple components. 
The notion of a simple concept is important so we shall now summarise 
Bolzarto's remarks on it. 
2.4.4 Simple Concepts and the Nature of Definition 
The distinction of simple and compound concepts is discussed In 
the context of explaining what a definition should be in BD, 1193-5 (A149-157). 
By a simple concept Bolzano means one which is incapable of further 
analysis, or as a result, It is one which cannot be produced by combining 
any two other concepts. A definition is an analysis of a concept, "a state- 
ment of t: 41. most immediate components out of which a given concept is 
compounded" (A149; BD, 42). We come to know which concepts are simple 
and which are compound through the result of our attempt to , nalyse them. 
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If when we think of an object e inevitably think of it as compound, then it is so. 
Thus the concepts of the straight line and the plane cannot be simple - we are 
Immediately aware of the multiplicity of points In these objects and their 
special arrangement. It is a matter of experience however, that not all con- 
cepts are compound, for example the concept of a point is simple. 
In Ws later work Bolzano clearly distinguishes the idea-in-itself 
(an objective concept existing independently of our thinking it) and the idea 
which Is present in someone's mind at a given time (e. g. Bolzano[4]I, 
§48). 
Although it is not clearly formulated here in 3D this distinction seems . 
essential to Bolzano's understanding of simple concepts and his subsequent 
arguments for unique definitions and unique proofs. Simply because we can, 
or cannot, analyse a given concept into compon3nts does not thereby make, it 
compound or simple, this is only how we come to know its nature, and we can 
make mistakes. Bolzano evidently believes that our apprehension mid 
analysis of concepts will enjoy the same sort of widespread agreement that 
generally holds for our perception of physical. object:. The result of ana- 
lysing a compound concept Is embodied in Its definition: 
In general If one wishes to ascertain whether a certain concept 
Is simple or divisible then one assumes a genus proximum for 
it and tries to think of some differentia spec [flea to add to it 
which is not Itself already identical with the concept to be 
defined. If this cannot be done in any way, the concept con- 
cerned is a simple one. (A155; BD, 48). 
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Furthermore, If the analysis of a compound concept is continued until all Its 
components are simple then these ultimate components and their relationship 
in the given compound concept are uniquely determined. "Really nothing is 
arbitrary in definitions but the word which le chosen for the denotation of the 
new compound concept. " (A159; BD, 52). Thus a correct definition Is a true 
proposition which is not simply about the meanings of words, it describes 
the structure of a conceptual reality. A mathematical work should not 
begin with definitions (Euclid is mentioned here as being in error) because 
they must bs seen as introducing "new and genuine concepts" (A160; BD, 53). 
What needs to come first is the indication of the meaning of the simple con- 
cepts of a theory. This is to be done by giving various statements which 
implicitly def. -ne the simple concept by showing its characteristic usago. 
For example: 
from the propositions: the point Is the simple object in space, 
It is the boundary of a line and itself no part of the line, It has 
neither extension to length, breadth, nor depth, etc. anyone 
can derive which concept is denoted by the word "point". " 
(A162; BD, 55) 
To distinguish this way of indicating the meaning of a concept from a proper 
definition Boizano calls these statements den)tations or descriptions: they 
may or may not happen to be axioms, they belong to what we should now 
call the informal metatheory of a particular theory. 
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2.4.5. Axioms and a Theory of Judgements 
It waz normal in the eighteenth century to regard as an axiom any 
proposition which w&s so intuitively clear or obvious as not to require a 
proof. Of course, the failure to find a proof, would sometimes lead to finding 
quite obscure propositions. "intuitively clear". This attitude was convenient, 
(even if abused) and it was consiztent with the view that the purpose of proof 
was to convince or persuade of the truth of a proposition. Where the truth 
of a proposition could be recognised immediately from its meaning, a proof 
would be redundant and to seek one simply pedantic. However, what Is 
regarded as intuitive, obvious or clear is to a large extent subjective and 
dependent on experience and insight. If a proof is to represent some kind 
of reality in the structure of concepts or things then its starting point, an 
axiom, should represent some objectively fundamental state of affairs. This 
was ßolzano's position. An axiom is not an axiom because we. cannot prove 
it, nor because we see no need to prove it, it is so because it is absolutely 
unprovable. The point had already been made emphatically at the beginning 
of BG: 
Firstly, I stipulate the rule that the obviousness of a proposition 
does not absolve me from the obligation still to look for a proof 
of it, at least until I clearly realise v by absolutely no proof 
could ever be required. (A13; BG, VI) 
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It is claimed that for every simple concept there is an axiom con- 
taining that concept (A196; BD, 89) but the arguments for the existence of 
axioms in his sense are notably unsuccessful (A176; BD, 69). Instead of 
saying, as in the mediev-1 theological arguments, that an infinite regress of 
causes or explanations is impossible (which has a certain plausibility) he 
says, quite wrongly, that assuming an infinite series does not remove the 
contradiction that there Is in denying a first term to a finite series. He backs 
this up with some play on the words "ground" and "consequence" and a com- 
pletely Irrolevant allusion to the paradox of Achilles and the tortoise! 
The major problem now arises of how we can recognise whether a 
particular proposition really is unprovable. In order to state the character- 
istics of an axiom Bolzano first gives, in BD, II, 
§§14-19(A178-193), a 
summary of his theory of propositions or judgements. (The word "judgement" 
[Urteil] begins to be used at §13 where previously "proposition" [Satz] had 
been used. It Is the word Kant used, but In BD, If, F18(A183) Boizano says a 
judgement Is a proposition which teaches us something new, I. e. a synthetic 
judgement In Kant's sense. ) There is a basic, undefinaI le act of the mind 
by which two concepts can be combined to form a compound concept. It is 
another, different, kind of such act which combines two concepts, a subject 
and predicate, to yield knowledge in the form of a judgement. In Aristotelian 
logic this combination was expressed by the copula"is" or "are". Bolzano 
regards the manner of combining the subject and predicate to be "the most 
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substantial distinction between judgements" (A180; BD, 73) and accordingly 
he classifies judgements by means of five possible kinds of combination. 
These are: 
1. Necessity judgements. This is the inclusion of a th; '. g as 
individual or kind in a genus. They have the form: 
"S Is a kind of P; or what amounts to the same "S contains 
the concept P or the concept P belongs to the thing S. " 
(A181; BU, 74). Most mathematical propositions are of this 
type, an example given is: two lines which cut the arms of an 
angle in disproportional parts meet when sufficiently pro- 
duced. This is interpreted as: the concept of two lines which 
cut the arms of an angle in disproporticnal parts (=S), is a 
kind of the concept of two lines which have a point in common 
(=P). 
2. Possibility judgements, with the form: "A can be a kind of B". 
Bolzano gives the example: "There are equilcteral triangles. " 
This isproperly expressed, he says, as: "The concept of a 
triangle (=A) can be a kind of the concept of a figure with equal 
sides (=B). " (A182; BD, 75). 
3. Practical judgements of duty or obligation, with the form: 
"N should do X. " 
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4. Empirical judgements, with the form: "I perceive X. " 
5. Probability judgements, for which no examples are given; Bolzano 
says he is not clear about their proper nature. 
The purpose of classifying judgements in terms of five kinds of 
copula or ways of combining subject with predicate (each presumably corres- 
ponding to primitive modes of combination b- the mind) is to avoid the 
necessity of compound concepts in the subject or predicäte in, for example, 
possibility judgements. In BD, II, §20(A193-199) Bolzano shows that all 
judgements with compound subject or predicate are provable, but since he 
is convinced that there are unprovable judgements of possibility and oblig- 
ation (on the grounds of avoiding an infinite . regress within each 
type) he 
believesit to be more correct to reorganise a proposition like "(A cum B) is 
possible" with compound subject into, "A can be a kind of B". 
The proof given in BD, If, §20(A193-196) is to the effect that if either 
the subject or predicate of a judgement are compound then its truth will 
depend on judgements Involving the simple components of that compound and 
will therefore be derivable or provable. This means that no analytic judge- 
ment in Kant's sense can be an axiom because the subject must be a compound 
concept. 
We row reach an answer to the question of how we can recognise an 
axiom. It is a necessary condition that an axiom should contain only simple 
concepts (A195; BD, 88). It is a sufficient condition for a propo:: ition "A Is B", 
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with A, B simple, to be an axiom that there are no two propositions of thr" 
form "A Is X" and "X Is B" from which it couli be inferred. (This essential 
sufficient condition Is over-looked by Bergmann in hin detailed discussion of 
this part of BD, see Bergmann [? ] p. 165). Now to show that this Is the case 
for any particular proposition will require what Bolzano calls, 
a special consideration to which, to distinguish it from a 
proper proof (or a demonstration)I give the definite name of 
a derivation (or deduction . Axioms will therefore not be 
rp oved, but they will be deduced and these deductions are 
an essential part of a scientific exposition because without 
them we should never be certain whether those propositions 
which are used as axioms really are axioms. (A200; BD, 93) 
Unfortunately Bolzano gives no examples (at least in BD) of how these 
deductions could ever be made. 
There Is a clear analogy In Bolzano's thought between simple con- 
cepts and definable compound concepts on the one hand, and axioms and 
provable propositions on the other hand. "The domain of the axioms 
stretches as far as that of the pure simple concepts: where the latter ends 
and the definitions begin, there also the axioms cease and the theorems 
begin" '(A203; BD, 96). There Is an obvious similarity between the role of 
simple concepts in Bolzano's axioms and primitive concepts in a formal 
logical theory. However, a pr; mitive concept In the modern sense Is a 
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somewhat arbitrary thing; a simple concept for Bolzano was not arbitrary 
at all. It was determined, In some sense, by reality and its meaning 
determined the course of proofs in which it was invc: -'ed. For an interesting 
discussion of the relationship between simple and primitive zoncepts see 
Bergmann [1] p. 174. 
2.4. G. The Uniqueness of Proof 
The objectivity throughout Bolzano's approach raises the interesting 
question of whether there can be essentially different, correct proofs of a. 
theorem. This was first mentioned in analogy with definable concepts: 
The question arises here of whether one and the same concept 
may admit of several definitions. We believe this must be 
denied in the same way as we deny below (§30) the similar 
question of whether there are several proofs for one truth. 
(A156; BD, 49) 
Naturally proofs may differ In the precise order of premisses and 
even in which premisses are explicitly expressed. These are not "the , 
essential matter" of a proof. The essence of a proof for a certain theorem 
consists In which judgements the conclusion Is based on, In the sense that a 
consequence is based on Its ground. Though there may be several different 
ways we can come to know a certain truth, there Is objectively only one 
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unique ground for that truth and so essentially only a single unique proof. 
(This is the answer given in the discussion beg inning on A225; BD, 113) 
Yet It has often been characteristic of mathematiciz: i that they have sought 
to find different proofs of a particular (especially a major) - esult. The 
enormous variety of proofs for Pythagoras' theorem or the law of quadratic 
reciprocity are well known... Sometimes the reasons for producing such 
different proofs are clear (economy, greater generality, or to avoid some 
"suspect" principle); sometimes it just seems to be satisfying that a major 
result may be reached by many different pat!. ways and from intuitively 
different starting-points. The status of many proofs and what exactly con- 
stitutes "different" proofs are still matters of debate. 
Bolzano's claim is however quite clear, there are unique grounds, 
and there ore proofs, for mathematical theorems and so it is the mathemat- 
Iclan's duty not only to prove new theorems but also to critically exai--ine 
established proofs and bring them ever closer to their true pattern, i. e. 
to correspond exactly with the objective, conceptual reality. This Is not 
just a matter of re-arranging previous proofs: It acts as a programme for 
new mathematics and was the inspiration and motive behind the works BG 
and RB. Euclidean geometry needed complete re-organisation and this 
produced the fruitful refinement and development of the fundamental con- 
cepts of distance and equality. Analysis required putting on its own feet 
rather than continuing to lean on geometric Intuitions for support. This 
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demand was substantially satisfied by the Important new clarifications given 
by Bolzano of the concepts of function, convergence and continuity. 
An obvious problem with the Idea of an objective ground for all math- 
ematical theorems is the rrevalence of the method of reductio ad absurdum 
or indirect proof. Is there to be an objective, universal contradiction as 
ground for all such results? Bclzano takes the standard indirect proof, 
or "apogogic proof" as it used to be called, to be of the following form. To 
prove that A Is B, assume A Is not B and derive from this a contradiction 
with a proposition A Is C which has already been proved. Now It Is claimed 
(A230; BD, 123) that for affirmative propositions this Indirect method can 
always be avoided by rearranging the argument thus: whatever Is C is 
always B, A :sC so therefore A is B. But of course this analysis breaks 
down when C is actually the same as B, and why should the contradiction be 
made with a proposition of the form A Is C? In many actual proofs the 
argument is not of this form nor Is It easily reducible to this form. For 
example, c'. )nstder'he Euclidean proof that a tangent to a circle Is perpen- 
dicular to the radius. Only negative propositions are regarded as essentially 
requiring an Indirect proof. This is because their direct formulation 
involves premisses of the form, "what Is not M is not N" and Bolzano seems 
to regard these as peculiarly intractable sir. ^e they are not' the same as, 
nor derivable from (in the ground-consequence sense) their converse "N is 
M". It Is a major omission In any such objective theory as Bolzano's not 
to give some special account of negative propositions. 
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2.4.7. A Note on the Analogy between Concepts and Propositions 
Theras are numerous scattered remarks In BD on the analogy In 
development betwee1i concepts and a certain class of propositions (namely, 
in a mathematical theory, the axioms and theorems). We gather these 
together as follows (the paragraph numbers refer to Part II of BD): 
Concepts 
May be simple (undefinable) 
or compound (definable). 
(34, A150) 
Propositions 
There are axioms (umprovablo) 
and theorems (provable). 
(§11,4159). 
The simple concepts may not The axioms may not be the most 
be the most vivid or clear ones, obvious or Intuitive propositions. 
(98, A161) (921 Note, A200) 
Definitions represent. the true Proofs represent the true pos- 
analysis of a concept into Its Ition of a theorem as based on 
proper simpler parts. Its proper grounds. 
(§3, A149) (§512, A170) 
Definitions are essentially unique. Proofs are essentially unique. 
(§95, A151) (930, A225) 
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2.5 The Origins and Significance of Bolzano's Views 
In Chapter 1 we referred to the Important general influence in the 
academic world during the eighteenth century of the Leibniz-Wolff school of 
philosophy. The rigorous and rationalist outlook of this suiiool was by no 
means universally accepted; it was often the subject of virulent theological 
attack. H.. wever, for one who admired mathematics there was an inevitable 
attraction in a philosophy which prized this discipline so highly and had been 
developed by men who in many c«ses had been very able mathematicians. 
Rationalism focussed such great attention-6 I.: mathematics not so much for 
the sake of the subject itself as for its method. Mathematics was seen to be 
successfully producing certain knowledge by a method so general that it 
invited universal application to all areas of knowledge. (See BD, II, §1(A145)). 
For Wolft the goal of mathematics was the cultivation of*the intellect and the 
preparation of the mind for the study of all other sciences. Each of the 
great rationalist philosophers modelled at least parts of their philosophy on 
mathematics. For example, consider Spinoza's Ethºc_developed in iinita- 
tion of Euclid's Elements, and Leibniz's impossibly ambitious plan for a 
universal characteristic whereby concepts would be association with charac- 
teristic numbers and all argument reduced to computation. 
It Is hard to point to direct influences on Bolzano's early work from 
the writings of Leibniz. These writings are notoriously fragmentary with 
remarks on all sorts of subJects scattered throughout his papers and ' 
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correspondence. It is therefore difficult to know to what extent Bolzano 
had access to these sources. Furthermore, most of the important phil- 
osophical work of Leibniz was published posthumously and a substantial 
amount was still unpublished when Bolzano was writing. There are no ref- 
erencesto Leibniz in the five mathematical works up to 1817. (Though there 
are many such references in the Wissenschaftslehre 1837) 
On the other hand, it is clear from the references in BG that Bolzano 
had read the most important mathematical and philosophical works of 
Christian Wolff (1679-1754). Wolff was a disciple of Leibniz and had 
extensive correspondence with him over the last twelve years of Leibnib's 
life. We shall mention here two themes which were likely to have influenced 
Bolzano directly. They occur repeatedly in the works of Leibniz and were 
certainly espoused by Wolff. 
Firstly there Is the emphasis on logic and foundational studies. If 
mathematical method Is so fruitful then it becomes essential to understand 
It and its application thoroughly and correctly. Where better to start than 
in mathematics itself? Thus Leibniz writes: 
But It is very Important to make explicit all the assumptions 
which are needed without taking the liberty of accepting them 
tacitly for granted on the excuse that the thing Is self-evident 
just by an Inspection of the diagram or by the contemplation of 
the Idea. In this respect I find that Euclid with all his exactness 
has sometimes been deficient... " (Leibniz [21) 
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And again on the question of axioms:. 
The late Roberval planned a new Elements of Geometry in 
which he was going to demonstrate rigorously several prop- 
ositions which Euclid took or assumed without proof.... I 
know that many people ridiculed it, if they had known Its 
Importance they would have judged otherwise...... In order 
to advance the sciences and to pass beyond the columns of 
Hercules, there is nothing more necessary. (Leibniz [3] ). 
Thus mathematics should not only be developed deductively by enlarging 
the theories from appropriate axioms but the foundations should also be 
developed by analysing and refining the basic concepts and axioms Into 
absolutely simple forms. This was clearly one of Bolzano's chief alms. 
We see it in practice In BG where having reorganised elementary geometry 
on the basis only of the properties of the straight line, he proceeds in the 
second part to attempt to deduce the theory of the straight line from even 
simpler concepts such as distance and direction. 
Secondly, and related to this theme of foundational study, Is the 
principle of systematically analysing compound concepts into simple con- 
cepts on which an entire theory can then be based. . 
To some extent sich 
analysis wIs, of course, nothing new. It Is inherent in the Aristotelian 
theory of definition in terms of genus and species. What Leibniz brought 
to the idea was (a) the combinatorial aspect, that all combinations of 
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concepts are permissible subject only to the resulting compound being 
possible, 1. e. not logically contradictory; and (b) that there are naturally 
occurring irreducible simple concepts (these are likened to prime numbers, 
the compound concepts to composite numbers). Both these features are 
important to Bolzano's account of mathematical method: the first in the 
systematic hierarchy of concepts presupposed in the principle of conceptual' 
correctness, and in Bolzano's requirement of every defined concept that it 
should be proved to be possible; the second because all and only simple 
concepts are components of true axioms. 
It is perhaps tempting to suggest a connection between Bolzano's 
ground-consequence relation and the Leibnizian principle of sufficient 
reason. They are not, in fact, directly comparable but to maintain any 
kind of direct influence of the one notion on the other would be misguided. 
For Bolzano the ground-consequence relation pervades all mathematical and 
scientific theories. Leibniz specifically says that his principle of sufficient 
reason is not required in arithmetic or geometry (Leibniz[4] ). Then 
again the principle of sufficient reason depends on the predicate-In-notion 
principle that even In a contingent truth. such as, " Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon", the predicate "crossed the Rubican" is actually contained in the 
complete notion of the subject "Caesar". This is explicitly denied in 
Bolzano'b theory of judgement In BD, 11f15(A180-183). The underlying 
reason for this lack of contact between these notions is a fundamental 
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difference In the account of mathematical truth. For Bolzano a theorem 
is true because it represents an objective dependenceor state of affairs 
correctly. For Leibniz it is true because its denial is contradictory. 
Wolff developed Le, bniz's philosophy into a more coherent and 
systematic form but there does not seem to be anything In his writing which 
corresponds clearly to Bolzano's relation of ground-consequence. Perhaps 
the best we can say is that it was a relationship developed In the spirit of 
rationalism but original to Bolzano and pri:: arily in response to the peculiar- 
ly object! -. -., - nature of mathematical truth. 
Some remarks have already been made (1.2) on three works which 
it Is known that Bolzano studied particularly carefully. These were Baum- 
garten's Netaphysica (Baumgarten [1] ) which he read critically at the age 
of sixteen and which must have been his first serious introduction to the 
Leibniz-Wolff philosophy. Then there was Kastner's great compendium of 
ten volumes Die mathematische Anfangsgrinde (K . stner 
[1] ) which Bolzano 
annotated extensively and which clearly Inspired his Interest In method and 
rigour. While agrec. ng with Kdstner's -intention Boizano soon believed he 
had surpassed him since most of the references in our five worksare critical 
of Kastner for not being sufficiently rigorous. Finally there was the ped- 
agogic work Parizek El]. 
An author whose influence has been rather neglected so far in the 
literature on Bolzano Is Johann Schultz (1739-1805). In some of his works 
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there are some striking parallels to be found with Bolzano's foundational 
aims. Schultz was a Professor of mathematics at Königsberg and a friend 
of Kant. His large work on pure mathematics, the Anfangsgrunde der 
reinen Mathesis (published 1790), was written "in response '. o the needs 
of our critical-philosophical age" (Schultz [1] Preface). He is intent on 
being as systematic, general and rigorous as possible and his model Is 
Euclid's Elements In that definitions are duly followed by axioms, postulates, 
theorems and problems. We quote here some passages from the Preface: 
Therefore I have nottreated arithmetic merely as the science 
of numbers but, as its status re4utres, as the foundation of 
all special mathesis, also as a general theory of quantity. 
Geometry I have treated according to the strict Euclidean method 
purified from all alien concepts and presented In its character- 
istic form. 
In a science which is to be completely demonstrative the demon- 
strations must proceed with as much Strictness as possible. 
The eye has no voice here. A proposition may already appear 
very clear in itself but as long as a higher reason [Grund] for 
Its correctness can be conceived this must be sought out and 
stated. This is not pedantry or empty conceit but a considered 
necessity because the kr. owledge of mathematical propositions 
Is not a mere mechanism but actual Insight. 
........... 0 
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It seems to me that great care is required in the correcting 
of the basic concepts. It is clear how detrimental any con- 
fusions in these are for science. 
............ 
Finally one of my most desirable, and most difficult, efforts 
has been to present the material In Its true natural order. 
Pure mathematics has always been criticised because theories 
of completely different kinds are mixed up with one another 
and it therefore does not seem capably of any orderly class- 
ification. I hope this objection has now been fully removed so 
making the study of mathematics easier. (Schultz [la ; Preface) 
Most of the basic aims of Bolzano's foundational work are expressed 
In these extracts. There Is the importance of a proper classification, the 
fundamental nature of arithmetic, the need to remove alien concepts and In 
the interests of absolute strictness the need to avoid empirical Intuition 
("The eye has no voice here. "). Then, most typical of Bolzano himself, 
there Is the emphasis on correcting the basic concepts and presenting math- 
ematics In Its true natural order. 
Instead of developing these id3as theoretically as Bolzano does, 
Schultz says no more about them and seeks, in the main work, to put them 
into practice immediately. We do not know when Bolzano first read Schultz's 
work but it was presumably ; ion after he entered Prague University in 1796. 
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His several references in BG to the geometrical work of the Anfangsgrünc1e 
show he was certainly familiar with it by 1804. In BD, I§5(A116) he says 
that Schultz, "deserves much credit for the foundat: c: i of pure mathematics 
in his Anfangsgrunde". 
We have emphasised this work of Schultz not to suggest that Boizano 
borrowed his ideas from it (in fact there is little more in Schultz's brief 
Preface than the bald statements we have quoted), but rather to point out 
that though Bolzano was rather Isolated In Prague he was certainly not alone 
in the spirit and aims of his foundational wo! k. 
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that the views outlined in this 
chapter were not simply a static description of an ideal of mathematics. 
They represented In Bolzano's mind a practical programme for the trans- 
formation and redevelopment of all mathematical theories. The works 
considered In this thesis are only a fragment of what he hoped and Intended 
to produce. They can only be understood properly In the light of this larger 
project to which they belong and as products of the a, tcmpt to approach more 
closely to Bolzano's Idea of the uniquely correct definitions and proofs of 
mathematics. 
In the paper Johnson [1] (wh[rh contains an excellent survey of Bol- 
zano's early geometric work) there is clear: y a tension felt between "Bolzac: 's 
old-fashioned essentialist theory of definition" and the fruitfulness of many of 
his ideas. In reference to the geometrical definitions of DP he writes: 
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The surprising feature of Bolzano's work is that he was 
able to obtain topologically interesting Insights and results 
inspite of his restrictive theory of definitions. 
(Original emphasis in Johnson [1] p. 295). 
It Is part of the purpose of this thesis to discuss how surprising (if 
at all) we should find this feature of Bolzanc's work. On the one hand there 
are many rnmarkably good mathematical Ideas (especially in analysis) 
worked out In detail by someone who was never professionally a mathematician. 
On the other hand he whole-heartedly espoused a philosophy which emphasised 
the static and unchangeable aspects of conceptual knowledge. Many of' 
Bolzano's views were restrictive but this Is not Incompatible with insight and 
progress. Restricting development in many directions may be highly con- 
ducive to development in the few remaining directions. It all depends on a 
wise choice of restrictions. 
Naturally Bolzano himself found his "success" (the little that he knew 
of it) to be entirely expected since it followed from the working out of what 
he regarded as true and essential general principles. The cynic will say he 
was just very lucky. It would be foolish to isolate any one factor (such as a 
philosophy) in the manifold of contributions to Intellectual creativity in an 
individual is the cause of his success. Nevertheless, what we hope to show 
in the next three chapters is that the general views outlined here actually 
contributed to his various specific mathematical achievements rather than 
detracting from them or being Irrelevant. 
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Cb ter 3: Geometry 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1. Outline of the Geometrical Work 
The geometrical work of the early period of Bolzano's life was pub- 
lashed in BG (1804) and DP (1817). The former Is entirely concerned with 
geometry although It contains a fair amount of what would nowbe regarded as 
philosophical remarks on the kinds of concepts and proofs to be permitted in 
geometry. The latter work has the purpose of giving strict proofs for the 
analytic formulae for the three general mensuration problems of length, area 
and volume. The geometrical material in DP (which mainly consists of 
definitions) appears it rather disjointed instalments which are logically un- 
necessary to the proofs but are nonetheless relevant to the main subject. 
These two published works span the period covered by this thesis but they by 
no means represent the total of Bolzano's work on geometry at that time. 
From the mathematical diaries which havc been published in Bolzano [1] 
(Vol. 2B 2/1,2 which cover the years 1803-1811) It is clear that he was 
giving considerable attention to geometry throughout this period. There is 
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extensive detailed revision and development of material in BG as well as 
preliminary Ideas for DP. But It Is also fair to say the main outlines and 
achievements of thA. early work are contained in the contemporary publications 
which are our primary snu': ces for this chapter. Our purpose here Is to 
present the broad themes of Bolzano's general views and geometrical achieve- 
ments with due regard to their historical context. 
Geometry was a natural subject for Bolzano's first study. Many of 
the concepts were difficult and easily susceptible to philosophical discussion 
and criticia m. But the structure of proofs was relatively simple, so it was 
a good area for seeking perfectly rigorous proofs. Moreover, Euclid's 
parallel postulate had defied all attempts at proof so what better way to 
vindicate a ncwv approach to geometry than by showing that it led to a "com- 
plete theory of parallels" (A35; BG, 13)? 
It is clear from the first few pages of BG that, whatever other reasons 
there may have been, Bolzano's primary purpose is methodological. We have 
already see. a in 2.4 that Bolzano excluded the concept of motion altogether 
and, more dramatically, he postponed the use of the plane for all the elem- 
entary results on triangles and parallels. 
The material of BG is divided into two parts. Part I Is a complete 
reorganisation of Euclidean geometry. Most of the main theorems of Book I 
of the Elements are proved, but the definitions, axioms and proofs are in 
most cases changed out of all recognition. These changes arise chiefly, as 
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we shall show In detail in 3.2, from various requirements and refinements of 
geometrical concepts. Part II is logically presupposed for Part I and con- 
tains the "theory of the straight line"; It Is very incomplete but contains some 
Interesting Ideas on defining a straight line rnd the concept of distance which 
are developed further in the results of DP. From the point of view of the 
geometry the main content of DP Is a remarkable series of set-theoretic 
definitions of line, surface and solid which pre-figure the recursive definitions 
of dimension given very much later in the century by Polncare and Brouwer. 
As F. prelude to assessing the achievements of BG, and to provide 
some perspective from which to judge the radical conceptual requirements 
made there, we shall consider the treatment in geometry of the concepts of 
motion. and of the plane by authors before and after Bolzano. Far from 
attempting a comprehensive survey of the subjects the intention here Is 
simply to provide sufficient historical context to understand clearly what 
Bolzano achieved in BG. Consequently our references are mainly to authors 
quoted or studied by Bolzano himself and to those authors mentioned In 
Heath [1] and Enriques [1] as having made major contributions to the sub- 
sequent history of the concepts of motion and the plane., 
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3.1.2. The Concept of Motion 
Although the concept of motion has been an ever-present component 
of geometrical thoughtthere seems to have been no time at which Its use 
has gained universal approval. It was accepted, perhaps reluctaitly, by 
Euclid In his method of superposition while It was rejected by Aristotle as 
having nothing to do with mathematical objects (Aristotle [1] ). Throughout 
the nineteenth century It was still being accepted by some authors and 
rejected by others. Helmholtz regarded it as essential to geometry (Helm- 
holtz [1]) which for him thereby became dependent on mechanics, and it 
was adopted in Peano (1] as a primitive notion in Peano's axiomatic geometry, 
On the other hand, Veronese gives clear and conclusive objections to the 
intuitive use of "motion without deformation" in elementary geometry (Veron- 
ese[1]). 
Euclid's method of superposition is well known. It arises from his 
common notion 4: Things which coincide with one another are equal to one 
another. The phrase, "things which coincide" seems to mean, "things which 
can be moved so as to coincide". Thus the two notions of motion and coin- 
cidence are at the basis of the fundamental criterion of equality between 
geometric objects. It is fundamental because It Is used to prove Elements 
I, 4) that triangles with two sides and their included angles equal, are them- 
selves equal. This proposition Is referred to frequently for proofs In the 
remainder of Book I. It is Heath's view that Euclid disliked the method and 
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avoided it when possible (Heath, [1] p. 225). Be that as it may, we have no 
knowledge of why he may have disliked it, nor has there survived any doubt 
In the writings of ancient geometers as to its legitimacy. The precise and 
substantial objection to thiF use of the concept of motion is clearly formulated 
by Veronese, but we shall quote here from Heath's summary of the argument: 
We must distinguish the Intuitive principle of motion in itself 
from that of motion without deformation. Every point of a 
figure which moves is transferred to another point in space. 
"W&`hout deformation" means that the mutual relations between 
the points of the figure do not change, but the relations between 
0 
them and other figures do change (for if they did not the figure 
could not move). Now consider what we mean by saying that, 
when the figure A has moved from the position A1 to the pos- 
ition A2 the relations between the points of A in the position 
A2 are unaltered from what they were in the position Al, 
are the same in fact as if A had not moved but remained at 
Al. We can only say that judging of the figure (or the body with 
its physical qualities eliminated) by the Impressions It produces 
in us during this movement, the Impressions produced in us in 
the two different positions (which are distinct In time) are egualt. 
In fact, we are making use of the notion of equality between two 
distinct figures. Thus, if we say that two bodies are equal when 
c, 
97 
they can be superposed by means of motion without deformation, 
we are committing a petitio principii. The notion of the equality 
of spaces is really prior to that of rigid bodies or of motion without 
deformation.... The method of superposition, depending on motion 
without deformation, Is only of use as a practical test; it has 
nothing to do with the theory of geometry. (original emphasis 
In Heath [1] p. 227) 
This expresses, though more clearly and to greater detail, one of 
Bolzano's objections to the use of motion in proving a geometrical theorem: 
... If. one 
had to prove the possibility of a certain motion which 
had been assumed with reference to a geometrical theorem, 
then one would have to have recourse to just this geometrical 
proposition. (A18; BG, X'I). 
If the notions of congruence or coincidence are to be used to a 
criterion of equality for geometric objections they can only be justified by 
an Implicit appeal to some kind of motion. In this connection Heath des- 
cribes the following as an "acute observation" of Schopenhauer: 
I am surprised that, Instead of the eleventh axiom, the- Parallel 
Postulate, the eighth is not rather attacked: Figures which coincide 
(sicli decken) are equal to one another. For coincidence (das 
Sichdecken) Is either mere tautology or something entirely empir- 
ical, which belong not to pure intuition (Anschauung), bit to 
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external sensuous experience. It presupposes In fact the mobility 
of figures; but that which is movable In space is matter and nothing 
else. Thus this appeal to coincidence means leaving pure space, the 
sole element of geometry, in order to pass over to the material and 
empirical. (Schopenhauer[1]). 
How strikingly similar this is to what Bolzen had said regarding congru- 
ence exactly forty years earlier: 
... the concept of congruence Itself is both empirical and superfluous. 
Empirical: for if I say A is congruent to B, I think of A as an object, 
which I distinguish from B by the space which it occupies. Super- 
fluous: one uses the concept of covering (Decken) to deduce the 
equality of two things if they are shown to cover each other (sich 
decken) in a certain position, according to the axiom, "spatial things 
which cover each other are equal to each other" .... Now one could 
never conclude that-two things are congruent, I. e. that their bound- 
aries are Identical, until one had shown that all their determining 
pieces are Identical. But if one proves this, one can also deduce 
without covering that these determining things are identical. 
(A51; BG, 29). 
- This concept of motion has been used In geometry In many ways and 
for several purposes. So far we have considered its most important role: 
In relation to congruence for the establishment+of a criterion of equality. It 
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was also used in definitions of geometric objects such as the line and angle. 
For example, Christian Wolff In 1717 defines a line thus: 
If a point A moves to another B, It describes a line. (Wolff [1] Def. 5). 
In his discussion of angle Bolzano quotes from an anonymous work of 1796 as 
follows: 
Angle is the concept of the relationship of a uniform motion of a 
straight line about one of Its points to a complete turn. (Anon. [2]), 
In 1812 Bezout defines an angle as: 
The amount of rotation which brings one of its arms into the position 
of the other. (Bezout [11) 
Naturally Bolzano's strictures on what concepts are allowed in a 
theory would prohibit such definitions from appearing in geometry. But 
many mathematicians of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries clearly 
preferred a "physical" approach and supplied definitions which are primarily 
guides to the Intuition rather than logical compositions of primitive concepts 
or analyses of the essence of the object concerned. These three views of a 
definition are not of course mutually exclusive and although Bolzano constant- 
ly sought for the "essential" definition of all mathematical concepts, he 
thoroughly approved of providing (for heuristic and illustrative reasons) 
guidance fer the intuition and he certainly acknowledged that one had to 
adopt some concepts as undefined (the simple concepts of 2.4.4). The 
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modern axiomatic geometries dating from the late nineteenth century with 
their success, efficiency and invulnerability have perhaps madcus unduly sat- 
Isfied with the conceptual agnosticism in which they rejoice. With regard to 
the concept of motion we can hardly Imagine Bolzano's purism allowing him 
to do anything but condemn the adoption by Peano (1889) of motion as a prim- 
itive concept in his axiomatic presentation of Euclidean geometry. On the 
other hand, a modern view of this Is that of Kline: 
The Inclusion of motion seems somewhat surprising In view of the 
criticism of Euclid's use of superposition: however, the basic objec- 
tion Is not to the concept of motion but to the lack of a proper axiom- 
atic basis if it is to be used. (Kline [1] p. 1010). 
Bolzano would doubtless have wanted to object to both the concept of motion 
and to any lack of a proper basis. The modern view, so often associated 
with the axiomatic method, but certainly no part of that method, is that it 
is largely a matter of taste, or at best expediency, which concepts are 
chosen as primitive. But because two concepts cannot be distinguished 
within a theory (e, g. ordinary straight lines and great circles of a sphere 
In the theory determined by Euclid's axioms 1- 4), this does not mean there 
may be no good reasons for preferring one to the other. 
,, 
As , ar as the Influences on Bolzano are concerned In respect of his 
repudiation of motion in geometry, we must first consider those authors 
whom Bolzano refers to himself in BG. Among these, Johann Schultz is 
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perhaps the most significant. His Anfangsgründe der reinen Mathesis (Schultz, 
[1]) Is referred to three times (A18,26,52; BG, XI, 4,30); and his Entdekto 
der Theorie Parallellinienen ... (Schultz 
[2]) is mentioned on A64; BG, 42. , 
In addition there are references to Gensichen [1] , Bestätigung der Schultz- 
fischen Theorie ... and the anonymous work, Bemerkungen 
über die Theorien 
der Parallelen des Hr. Hofpr. Schultz ... (1796) . Although the works by 
Schultz follow the Euclidean model of definitions being followed by axioms, 
postulates, theorems and problems, we have seen in 2.5 that he shared many 
of the genes al views and principles adopted by Bolzano. But the Interpret- 
ation of these principles is widely different in the two authors, at least in 
geometry. For example, Schultz adopts the use of the plane at the outset 
and defines azg1e in terms of the infinite surface between two intersecting 
lines (see 3.2.1). Even when Bolzano appeals to Schultz as being in support 
of some of his Ideas he seems apt tc overstate the case. This Is true In part- 
Icular of his views on motion and congruence. 
In he Preface to BG Bolzano claims (Al8; BG, XI) that Schultz must 
have agreed with the repudiation of motion because he assumes no idea of 
motion in the Anfangsgründe. It Is true that motion Is not involved at all In 
the definitions of line or angle where they were, as we have seen, not un- 
common at this time. But in a Note Anfangs rüg nde p. 246) we read: 
The solid things which occur in space can, as experience shows, 
change their place in space, 1. e. move, but not the space itself In 
ý. 
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which they are. If one therefore thinks of a part or boundary of space 
as movable this Is merely something Imaginary. 
It is not clear whether the consideration of such "imaginary motion" Is to be 
allowed in geometry or not. Such motion would be similar to the sort of 
motion implied by the common use of congruence mentioned earlier. Bolzano 
is wrong in BG I§49(A52) to say the concept of "covering" is omitted through- 
out the Anfangsgründe. In fact, Schultz ackrowledges that the usual German 
expression for congruence is in terms of "covering" or "fitting" and he does 
not, like Lolzano, condemn such terms. Whether his understanding of them 
implies motion of any sort is left obscure by the explanation: "congruent 
extended quantities ... are different merely In their place, so If one wanted 
to Imagine them In the same place at the same time they would be one and 
the same thing. " (Schultz[1] p. 251), 
We conclude that although Schultz makes little or no use of the con- 
cept of motion and that this seems to be deliberate restraint on his part, 
there is not the categorical exclusion of the concept that we find in Bolzano's 
geometrical work (3.2.3). 
In the Anfangsgründe of A. G. K'Astner which, as mentioned in Chapter 
1, was a major influence on Bolzano, we again find considerable reserve in 
the use or implication of motion In geometry. He gives the "boundary" 
definitions of solid, surface and line (see next section) which he attributes 
to Occam, but seems to tolerate the expression "a line arises from the 
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motion of a point" as an appropriate facon de parler to the effect that a line 
does not consist of points next to one another but that everywhere on a line 
there is a point (Kastner[1] p. 347). However, he does not escape Bolzano's 
criticism (A18; BG, XI) which Is directed to his use of rotation in the following 
axiom: 
Axiom of the plane. A straight line of which two points are in a plane, 
is completely in this plane .... But since the plane which contains 
the 
straight line can turn about It as an axis, three points determine the 
position of a plane; and therefore every triangle and every plane 
angle is in a plane. (Kastner [11 p. 350) 
The other two authors mentioned by Bolzano in connection with the use 
of motion are N. Mercator and Kant. For Mercator (whose work, Mercatoif i] 
is not specified but certainly Intended), geometry is the study of magnitude 
abstracted from all matter. The three principles which constitute magnitude 
are infinity, point and motion. A point which is set in motion describes a 
line, and similarly a line in motion describes a surface. Now the motion 
which Mercator refers to here is perhaps not the motion of physical matter, 
I, e. not empirical. It Is motion apprehended by the mind, motion abstracted 
from that of a physical particle. If a concept of point can be formed from 
the spatial material approximations which we call particles, then a concept 
of motion (of a point) can be formed from the spatio-temporal approximation. 
we call the motion of a particle. This motion has no separate word for its"'_ 
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designation but its distinction from empirical motion corresponds exactly to 
(and may be understood by means of) the distinction of point and particle. 
Certainly it is correct to say that Mercator took motion as "an 
essential concept" (A16; Br, IX) but since Bo! zano's objection to motion is 
partly based on the empirical nature of the concept it appears that it may, to 
this extent, be misplaced. We are not concerned here with whether Mercator 
had such a non-empirical concept of motion as we have outlined above, but 
only whether such a concept makes sense. If It does, then the wholesale 
rejection of motion in geometry is misguided, at least the rejection on 
empirical grounds. 
In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant makes the following distinction: 
Motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science and con- 
sequently not to geometry. For the fact that something is movable 
cannot be known a priori, but only through experience. Motion, how- 
ever, considered as the describing of a space, is a pure act of the 
succassive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition, in general by 
means of the productive Imagination, and belongs not only to geom- 
ctry, but even to transcendental philosophy. (Kant [1] p. 167 note). 
Without knowing precisely what Kant meant by "a pure act of the 
successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition", it is at least clear 
that he believed in the possibility of motion as a pure concept free of 
empirical characteristics and so properly belonging to geometry. However, 
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although Bolzano actually refers to the note just quoted, he has no patience 
with the alleged distinction and insists that all motion either presupposes an 
empirical object distinguished from space, or at least, "a thing distinguished, 
from space", and this Is "alien to a subject which merely deals with space 
Itself" (A17; BG, X), 
It would be rash to conclude that In these various criticisms Bolzano 
was simply being naive or obstinate. He may even have acknowledged the 
soundness of an abstract concept of motion and of its possible use !n geometry. 
We have already seen (2.4 and earlier this section) Bolzano'. rejection of 
motion in geometry was actually based on two claims: (1) It was empirical; 
(i[) it was logically out of place because any use of motion In a proof would 
require a proof of the possibility of the motion. The second of these object- 
ions Is the more fundamental: it Is independent of whether the motion concern-. 
ed Is empirical or not. It is also narrower because It really only applies to 
axioms. It offers no objection to first proving (without motion) the possibility 
of a certain motion and then using this motion later on for proving some other 
theorem. An example of such a legitimate introduction of motion might be 
the definition of a curve (having proved Its possibility) by means of the class- 
[cal notion of locus: the motion of a point following a specified (conceptual) 
rule. The Lise of motion here evidently has no empirical implication so long 
as It is strictly equivalent to the definition as a set of points which satisfy the 
rule. However, although the introduction of an abstract, concPotual kind of 
S 
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motion may be logically permissible the danger is obvious. Our mind may 
revert to interpreting such motion as empirical motion and make inferences 
relying on experience since our intuition of such motion Is much stronger and 
more accessible than that of the conceptual variety. This is surely exactly 
what happens in the process of understanding and giving our assent to Kästner 's 
"Axiom of the plane" which we quoted above. In this situation it is entirely 
consistent with Bolzano's heuristic and pedagogic interests that he condemns, 
on empirical grounds, these various uses of motion in geometry by previous 
authors. It does not mean he believed all motion to be empirical, it only 
means he condemns the empirical misuse of motion In geometry. Some : nath- 
emati, --I=s of the late eighteenth century, like Kästner and Schultz, had, out. 
of concern for the strictness of proofs, been showing a marked restraint In 
their use of motion In geometry. But perhaps no one before Bolzano had shown 
such exceptional thoroughness in searching out, removing and replacing 
every instance and implication of motion in elementary geometry. 
/7 
3.1.3. The Concept of the Plane 
It seems to have been an original idea of Bolzano's to develop the 
elementary geometry of triangles and parallels without any use of the concept 
of the plane. His reasons for doing so have already been explained In 2.4.1. 
It is a bold Idea because It prevents him adding or subtracting angles which 
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naturally causes fundamental changes from the Euclidean methods. In fact, 
Bolzano denies that angle is a quantity at all and so angles cannot be greater 
than each other, or even equal in a quantitative sense. Heath points out that 
there has always been great difficulty with the definition and development of 
the plane and Its properties (Heath [1] p. 172,173). Bolzano and Euclid 
avoided this difficulty in almost opposite ways. While Euclid assumes the 
existence of the plane from the outset of the Elements, along with points and 
lines, Bolza. no puts his definition of the plane as the final paragraph in 
BG(A85; BG, 53), The only other published work which seems to have anything 
in common with Bolzano's approach is Ingrami[i]in which the theory of the 
plane is developed from that of a triangle considered simply as a "frame" 
or "3-side". 
The postponement of the concept of plane as this is done in BG raises 
several questions. In what sense is the concept of surface (in particular, the 
plane) "higher" or more complex than that of line or curve (in particular, 
straight line)? In order to treat angle as a quantity is it in fact necessary to 
presuppose the concept of plane? What exactly is meant by "presupposing" 
the concept of plane? 
We have considered the third of these questions to some extent in 
2.4.1 and the second question is dealt with in 3.2.1. It is the first question 
that Is really central to the organisation of BG. We have referrfd to an 
ordering of concepts through their analysis and development from the simpler 
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to the more complex (2.4). Bolzano seems to have had in mind a hierarchical 
arrangement of concepts partly described by his definitions. In this ordering 
the concept of space. for example, is prior to that of motion because it is 
contained in the latter as ar. essential compcnent. It Is by no means clear 
that the concept of a straight line is an essential component of the concept of 
the plane. This would be the case if a plane is defined as a surface generated 
by the uniform motion of a straight line but this was not an option for Bolzano. 
In the Preface to BG(A20; BG, XIII) he says that if the plane is used for the 
elementary theory of triangles It will require axioms of the plane, and as he 
quaintly puts It, "if one had to prove them [it] would require just that theory 
of triangles". (Regarding the "proof" of an axiom see 2.4.5). So to be precise 
It is not the theory of the straight line but'the theory of triangles that Bolzano 
claims to have priority over that of the plane. 
The definitions of straight line and plane are given in terms of certain 
collections of points: 
The plane of the an lg e ras is that object which contains all and only 
those points which can be determined by their relationship (their 
angles and distances) to the two directions R, S. (A85; BG, 63) 
An object which contains all and only those points which are between 
the two points a and b Is called a straight line between a and b. 
(A79; BG, 57) 
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A point m has been defined to be between a and b if the directions ma, 
mb are opposite directions, a term which again has been defined in an earlier 
paragraph (see 3.3.1). Hence the definition of plane does not explicitly con- 
tatn the concept of straight line but it contains the same components of point 
and direction as the straight line. Thus there is certainly a partial ordering 
of the concepts in which point and direction are each prior to plane and 
straight line. But merely on this criterion of "containment in definition" it 
is not conclusive how the straight line and the plane should themselves be 
related, If at all. The development of Part B of BG suggests, however, that 
increasing complexity of definition corr:; sponds to increasing dimension. 
(This becomes perfectly clear in the recursive and general definitions ci DP. 
see section 3.4.2). Possibly the Increase In dimension was sufficient In 
Bolzano's view to ensure the priority of line over surface. This ordering of 
the geometric objects was perhaps not so natural In Bolzano's time as It is 
today. It was a common practice then to define the notions of solid, surface, 
line and point in that order, each being the boundary of the previous one, 
I 
except for solid which was given to the intuition in material objects. Priority 
was therefore given to sensory perception, the geometrical point being the 
ultimate abstract concept. For example, Klstner gives the mediaeval 
definitions: 
a geometrical solid (solidum, corpus) is an extension that exists 
Inside Its boundaries, surrounded on all sides. The extension of a 
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solid at its boundaries is called a surface (superficies), and the extension of 
a surface at its boundaries is a line (linea). (Kästner [1] p. 178) 
The same, or similar, definitions are given i. n Schultz [1] p. 246. 
Bolzano says they are improper because we can, and do, prrfectly well 
imagine a surface, line or point without a solid which they bound. Noncthe- 
less he retains the idea that the concept of a solid is special because it can 
be "given adequately" as something In Intuition; lines and surfaces are both 
"pure objects of thought". (A70; BG, 48) 
It is worth noting that at this stage [r Boizano's work lie makes no 
attempt to give general definitions of line and surface. In BG he only defines 
straight line and plane. It is with the later general definitions in DP that 
there is clear justification, on the grounds of the definitions, for the priority 
of the theory of straight lines and triangles over the concept of the plane. 
3.1.4 Summary of BG Part I 
Part I of BG contains the elementary results about triangles and 
parallel lines; it is intended to presuppose only one axiom (A32; Bq§19) and 
the "theory of the straight line". In the second part there is an attempt to 
derive this theory of the straight line from simpler concepts such as point, 
distance and direction. 'This part is tentative and unfinished; Bolzano 
says of it that he has not reached "the proper basis" and that he regards 
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this as the most difficult part of geometry. 
The general development of Part I may be seen from the following 
summary: 
Paragraphs of BG Part I Contents 
01-6 (A23-27) Definition of angle, principle that 
things which are determined In the 
same way are equal. Adjacent and 
vertically opposite angles. Errors of 
Euclid and discussion of angle as 
quantity. 
07-15 (A27-31) Definition of triangle, equality of 
triangles. Equality and Identity. SAS 
determines a triangle. 
9916-24 (A31-39) Similarity of triangles. Things which 
are determined by similar parts are 
similar. Axiom about distance. Two 
proportional sides with equal included 
angles give similar triangles. Dis- 
cussion of Wolff and Kant on similarity 
and the motivation for the axiom. 
f, 
,ý 
112 
X25-49 (A39-52) Isosceles triangles. Possibility of 
right angles. Existence and construc- 
tion. Perpendiculars in isosceles 
triangles. ASA determines triangle. 
Equal angles simply similar triangles, 
Pythagoras' theorem, SSS determines 
triangle, discussion of coincidence and 
congruence. 
§50-67 (A52-65) Intercepts, rectangles, parallels, 
corresponding and alternate angles. 
The parallel postulate, parallelograms, 
discussion of various geometers. 
We have seen that Bolzano rejects, for various reasons, the introduc- 
tion of the concept: of motion and of the plane into elementary geometry. 
This has far-reaching consequences for his treatment of the subject. The 
concept of angle is completely revised; - congruence is replaced by a general 
concept of equality between geometric objects based on the Lclbnizian notion 
of "determination" which also serves to support a generalisation of the con- 
cept of similarity; finally. there is a proof of the parallel postulate. We shall 
now discuss these geometric consequences in detail. 
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3.2 Main Topics of BG Part I 
3.2.1. The Concept of Angle 
Where definitions of the concept of angle have not h:. en tautologous 
they have generally involved the concepts of the plane or of motion. 
According to Schotten (Schotten, [1] p. 94ff) the definitions of angle may be 
divided, with few exceptions, into three groups: 
(i) angle is the difference of direction between two straight 
lines. 
(it) angle is the quantity or amount (cr measure) of the rotation 
necessary to bring one of Its aides from Its own position 
to that of the other side without Its moving out of the plane 
containing both, 
(iii) angle Is the portion of the plane Included between two 
straight lines in the plane which meet in a point (or two 
rays Issuing from the point). 
c 
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We shall give some examples of these t-. 'pes of definition. The def- 
initionealready quoted on p. 99 are obviously of type (ii). 
Euclid: A plane angle is the inclination of two lines 
to one another in a plane which meet together 
but are- not in the same direction. (Elements I 
Def. 8). (This is exactly the definition given in 
Kästner Cl]). 
Legendre: Lorsque deux lines droites AB, AC, so 
(1794) 
rencontrent, la quantite plus ou moins grande 
dont alles sont cartes Puna de lautre, s'appeile 
angle. [28 ý. 
(When two straight lines AB, AC meet each other, 
the quantity, of greater or lesser magnitude, by 
which they are spread apart, the one from the 
other, is called the angle). (Legendro 
[1] 
Def. IX). 
f'' 
its 
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The ideas of "inclination" and "spread" either already contain the concept 
of angle making the definitions tautologous, or else they Indicate the difference 
of direction of Schotten's group (i). As an example of the group (iii) there is: 
Bertrand: C. 'aand deux droites AB, CD so coupent un plan, elles 
(1778) 
le partagent : es quatre parties ASD, DSB, BSC, 
CSA dont chacune s'appelle un angle: Enforte qu'un 
angle est une portion de superficle plane contenue 
entre deux lignes droites qui se coupent, et sont 
terminees a leur point de section. 
(When two straight lines AB, CD cut each other on 
the plane, they divide it into four parts ASD, DSB, 
BSC, CSA each of which is called an angle: more 
precisely an angle is a region of the plane surface 
contained between two straight lines which inter- 
sect and which end at their point of intersection. ) 
(Bertrand. [1] ) 
The discussion by Heath on the concept of angle is impressively com- 
prehensive but contains a strange comment on Schotten's classification. On 
p. 179 of Heath[1]he says that when a definition Is given which does not come 
under the group (Ii) mentioned above some nc. te is usually added to Indicate 
the connection between angle and rotation. This Is claimed to be "remarkable" 
and a "striking indication that the essential nature of angle is closely 
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connected with rotation". (It would surely be remarkable if this obvious 
and natural connection was not usually pointed out. ) But why should such a 
connection be an indication of the essential nature of angle rather than that 
of rotat[on? For Bolzano it would be the case that to unders' and or use the 
concept of rotation we must already have the concept of angle, and not con- 
versely. 
Naturally the definitions of both groups (ii) and (ii[) Involving the 
notions of the plane and motion are rejected by Boizano. In a note toBG, 
IO6(A25-27) he explains what he regards as ti. e two major defects In the trad- 
itional Euclidean treatment of angle. Firstly, angles can only be added on the 
assumption that they are in the same plane, so the concept of plane Is I; npitc- 
itly required for this operation. Secondly, such arithmetic operations also 
make the assumption that angles are quantities. A quantity is understood to 
be something measurable by a number of units. The objection to angles as 
quantities is itself twofold. It again requires the concept of the plane for the 
addition of single unit angles. Also Bolzano tteems to believe that the con- 
cept of angle as quantity involves the concept of the area between the arms of 
the angle. This is a somewhat confused section (A26; BG, 4) and there follows 
a comment that, "the true origin of all Ideas of angles as quantities is the 
empirical concept of motion". However, though he may not be clear exactly 
why angle Is not a quantity there; Is no doubt at all In his mind that, "angle 
In Its essence Is not a quantity" (A27, BG, 5). This seems ultimately to be 
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based on the fact that we can conceive a system of two intersecting lines 
without necessarily Involving or assuming any other concept at all. 
Accordingly Bolzano begins BG with his own original definition: 
Angle is that predicate of two straight lines ca, cb (Fig. 1) which 
have one of their extreme points c in common, which belongs jointly 
to every other system of two lines ct , cß which are parts of the 
former with the same initial point c. (A23; BG, 1, Fig. 1 Is on A86). 
In Part II the definition Is refined In two ways: (i) angle is said to be really 
a predicate of the directions of two lines, (ii) angle is identified with the 
system of intersecting directions (A74; BGH§12). Thus the definition becomes 
remarkably sophisticated for the time. It Is very similar to the one in 
Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie nearly one hundred years later: 
Definition: Let a be a plane and h, k 
. 
any two distinct rays emanating 
from 0 Ina and lying on distinct lines. The pair of rays h, k is 
called an angle and is denoted by 4 (h, k) or by 4(k, h). (Hilbert[1] p. 11). 
In Hilbert's work this is soon followed by a theorem to establish the quantita- 
tive comparison of angles. But this Is not, of course, ' done by Bolzano who 
Is deliberately avoiding the quantitative aspect. Naturally such a procedure 
Involves fundamental changes in the usual development of geometry. Angles 
can be equal or unequal but not greater or smaller. And here uiuality cannot 
be determined numerically as quantities but requires a new criterion. This 
appears in the following form: "Things which are determined in the same 
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way are equal. "(A25; BG, 3). This is simply quoted as though it was a well 
known and self-evident principle. It is rather similar to the Leibnizlan 
criterion for congruent structures (see the next two cnctions). It is applied 
throughout BG to various geometrical objects but particular! j to angles and 
triangles. As an example of its use, and as introduction to the next section 
on the concept of "determination", we shall consider the proof that vertically 
opposite angles are equal (IG5, A25). It is first proved as follows that any 
angle determines Its adjacent angle (A24B G, 2). From the definition, an 
angle Is determined when Its arms are deter nined and the arms of an adja- 
cent angle consist of one of the arms of the given angle and an extension of 
the other arm of the given angle. Thus assuming, from what Bolzano would 
call "the theory of the straight line" that every straight line can be extended 
uniquely, then certainly any angle determines Its adjacent angle. 
Then acA is an adjacent angle to acb 
and bca is an ac;; a: ent angle to boa. 
So if acb = boa then acß _ boo(. 
Bolzano himself was dissatisfied at 
not having a proof that acb bca, 
see II§14(A75). 
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In IJ6(A25) it is said that the "usual" way of proving the equality of two 
things is to deduce from the given information the equality of their "determ- 
fining pieces". It fig clearly regarded as a major defect in method that Euclid 
does not do so to his prop; of this theorem (Elements I Prop. 15). The 
Euclidean proof is as follows (using the lettering of the above diagram). The 
angles acA and acb are equal to two right angles (I, 13), also angle acb and 
bca are equal to two right angles. So ac(! and acb are equal to acb and bca , 
(Post. 4 and Common notion 1), subtract acb from each and the remaining 
angles acE. and bca are equal (Common notion 3). 
In Euclid's proof, treating angles as quantities has led to a kind of 
"arithmetisation" of the argument which Bolzano wholly rejects. He avoids 
It by means of his purely conceptual use of "determination". If we were to 
say that vertically opposite angles are equal because they are both equal to 
(180 - 0) where 0 Is one of the other angles, this would be more in the spirit 
of Bolzano's method than that of Euclid but with the notion of determination 
translated into arithmetic terms. 
3.2.2. Determination 
From the comparison of the methow of proof indicated at the end of 
the previous section we can make two observations which will help to analyse 
Bolzano's method In the later work. Using the notion of "determining pieces" 
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or "determining parts" can contribute to our understanding of a result. We 
are forced, in the above, to think of how the vertically opposite angles arise 
and we thereby gain insight into the structure of their relationship. To be 
precise, Instead of simply finding by arithmetical manipulation that two 
quantities are numerically equal, we ire led to understand how this equality 
arises from having a common adjacent angle, which in turn arises from the 
particular arrangement of angles, L. c. that each arm of each angle is an 
extension of an arm of the other angle. 
On the other hand the use of "determine" in a non-quantitative sense 
raises considerable problems. In Bolzano's principle, "things which are 
determined In the same way are equal' it Is not clear what "in the same way" 
means. The ' omparable principle for Leibniz raises the same problem: "if 
the determining elements are congruent then also the things determined from 
them in the same way will be congruent. 11 (Si determinantia sunt congrua, talcs 
erunt etiam determinata posito scilicet codem determinandi modo. ) The 
phrase "in . he saris way" could refer to the sources, the manner, or the 
result of the determination. If it Is the result.. the principle is a tautology. 
If the same components can determine (c ijects) In different ways, I. e. the 
determining process can take place to different ways with different results, 
either all the components (determining pieces) have not been given or else 
"determine" is being used In such a peculiar sense that It is not the correct 
word. Also it seems clear that unequal objects, e. g. straight lines of 
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different lengths, are-determined In the same sort of way. This leaves the 
conclusion that "in the same way" refers to the equality (or identity) of the 
determining pieces. Equality In this respect would then have to be taken as 
a primitive or "given" con : ept. 
In the geometrical example abrve the vertically opposite angles are 
Indeed determined by the angle acb between them. But It is not so clear that 
they are determined in the same way. Bolzano believed that he should prove 
that acb and bca are equal but he could surety not have been pressed far on 
what equality means in this context. The angles have Identical parts but are 
"thought of" differently. However,. since the angle definition of I§1 (A23) 
takes no account of the order of spe cification of the two arms we shall regard 
their equality as part of the definition and the proof as sound. We shall here 
regard equality as an undefined relation and being determined In the same 
way as meaning being determined by equal parts. 
The idea of determination can be interpreted in a logical way as a 
uniqueness statement. So to say that SAS determines a triangle means that 
given a certain SAS there Is a unique triangle containing that data. This Is 
how the Idea or the term Is usually used now and It Is at least Implied by any 
reasonable meaning. However, when we consider some other Important 
occurrences such as the principles that the equality of determining parts 
Implies equality of objects (A25; BG, I§6), and the similarity of determining 
parts Implies the similarity of objects (A31; BG, I317 ), It appears that the 
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Intention is to identify components which are essential to the existence or 
being of the total object in a sense which other components are not. I`. is 
this essential, or existential, sense of determine which was likely to be most 
Important to Leibniz and Bolzano and which is perhaps moat difficult for us to 
grasp today. The Idea Is not that the components will, in themselves, ciet- 
ermine a particular object of a particular kind. The kind of object to be 
determined must already be known and specified. Two points determine a 
straight line but they also determine a parabola through a third given point 
and infinitely many other totalities or kinds cf object. Furthermore, there 
is no question of the determining parts being unique to a particular object; - 
there are many sets of determining parts for a particular triangle. So the 
determining parts are not special in themselves, but only a combination of 
two or more parts may have this property of determining a whole of some 
kind. 
Determination may thus be considered in a dynamic sense as an act 
which, like cause and effect in thephysical world, Inc-Atably reaches a con- 
elusion whether we happen to consider the result or not. For example, the 
two-point system can be considered, as Bolzano does in II§6(A70), in Itself 
alone with its properties of distance and direction. Now in this dynamic 
sense determine means something like "produce". A certain line can be 
produced or generated in this w'. y. It does not depend however, for Us 
existence on those points. The "movement" In this sense of determine Is 
i 
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psychological: the two points indicate a possible route for our minds to reach 
the concept of a particular line. But the determining is not a psychological 
matter because there Is at the same time a static sense of determine which 
concerns both existence and uniqueness. There actually is, as a matter of 
fact, a unique straight line through the two points. These geometric objects 
are, for Aolzano, neither physical representations, nor mind-dependent 
ideas, nor abstractions. They have an objective existence as conceptual 1 
objects. The relation of determining is sui generis, a relation between con- 
ceptual obi ; cts, It may be compared to the relation of ground to consequence 
betwean propositions in themselves developed in BD and in much greater 
detail in Bolzano [4] . The logical consequence of a statement 
Involving 
"determine" Is a uniqueness statement, but it is at the same time more than 
that. It tells us about the composition and existence of the whole being dot- 
ermined. And we have already Indicated (p. 120) how this kind of information 
can be valuable In mathematical proof, both for discovering a proof and for 
making it clear. 
3.2,3. Equality and Congruence 
In the Elements Euclid used the not; cn of equality in a quantitative 
sense; (I, 4) Is exceptional for the phrase, "the triangles are equal". Only 
in the solid geometry of Books XII and XIII did he use the expression "equal 
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and similar" for congruent structures, I. e. ones which would occupy the 
same space. This term "equal and similar" is used for congruence in the 
eighteenth century German writings (for example in Schultz [11 p. 251 and 
Kästner [1lp. 177). The verb "sich decken" (literally "to cover itself") was 
still used for congruence well Into the nineteenth century (see BG I§49(A51) 
and the quotation of Schopenhauer above (p. 97 ). In Latin works "congruere" 
was used, and "Kongruenz" and cognates became common in German in the 
early nineteenth century. 
The basic congruence theorems are usually expressed in terms of 
two triangles each with sufficient data respectively equal for the concluzton 
to be drawn that the remaining sides or angles are equal. This use of con- 
gruence has doubtless been strongly influenced by the superposition method 
of Euclid adopted by him for I, 4 In the case of two triangles with two sides 
and their included angles equal (SAS). The corresponding sides are placed 
over each other and then the other parts of the triangles "must" also coincide 
and so be equal. But this Is a theoretical "must" which would not be refuted 
by the failure of any practical test. The claim that they must coincide vit- 
Tates the need for any superposition. The point Is that the data given In 
either triangle is sufficient to determine its other sides and angles. Both 
the method of superposition and the notion of congruence arc redundant for 
the proof of the conclusion: they merely illustrate the conclusIor: with ref- 
orence to two triangles. Now it is entirely consistent with Bolzano's views 
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on geometry considered so far that he should regard the concept of congru- 
ence, and the various associated terms and methods, as alien and superfluous. 
(We have already quoted the passage in I§49 (A51) rejecting congruence on 
p. 98. ), His own proof of . he SAS criterion for equality is obtained by proving 
that the data are sufficient to determine a triangle (A30: BG, I§12). This comes 
directly from the definitions (A23; BG, 191) and (A27; BG, I37). The "congru- 
ence" theorem (A30; BG, I§14) then follows since two triangles with SAS equal 
have equal determining parts. This is surcLy the essence of the purely geo- 
metrical result concerned here: that certain.. conceptual objects determine, 
through their relationships, certain other conceptual objects. For Bolzano 
then the crucial relationship Is the many-one relation of determination between 
several instances of physical or conceptual triangles and their one abstract 
counterpart. This is in contrast to the view of congruence as a binary relation 
on the field of physical or conceptual triangles. 
In reference to the use made of the Leibnizian criterion for the 
equality of geometric objects Vojt'ch suggests that it represents a purely 
logical standpoint add is therefore insufficient (Vojthch [1] p. 188, Note 11), 
By "Insufficient" Vojtdch was evidently meaning "lacking in modern axiom-, 
atic rigour" and in this sense he is certainly right. But two points need to 
be made in this connection, On the one hand we must remember Bolzano's 
purpose - to provide conceptually correct and correctly ordered proofs of 
elementary geometry, The axiomatic model of the time was still the 
Elements and this work was, in Bolzano's view, conceptually chaotic and 
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Insufficient to provide a sound foundation for geometry. Equally Insufficient 
to him would appear the clinical modern ideal of a complete and consistent 
theory with minimal Independent sets of axioms and primitive concepts. The 
meaning of "sufficiency"-with regard to a mathematical principle or theory 
has changed profoundly since Boizano's time. 
On the other hand (and now as a corollary to the above) It would be a 
complete mistake to regard Bolzano's use of the equality criterion, things 
whose determining pieces are equal are themselves equal, as representing 
a purely "logical standpoint". It could be no such thing. The concepts of 
"determining pieces" and "equality" may be undefined butthey have a geo- 
metrical significance. The objects of geometry are viewed as laid out in a 
definite progression of complexity: points, the straight line, configurations 
of lines (triangles and parallels), the plane. For each stage correct defin- 
Itions are sought which to some extent take the place of axioms. When the 
terms "determine" and "equal" occur in such definitions or axioms they are 
to be understood b; their geometrical context. It is contrary to the whole 
spirit of Bolzano's approach to regard these terms as entirely formal or 
logical. They would have a different meaning and role when used In analysis. 
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3.2.4. Similarity 
Similarity is a weaker or restricted form of equality which has been 
used in geometry to Identify properties of shape and ratio In contrast to prop- 
ertles of magnitude, Equality is a general relationship which was taken into 
elementary geometry through the notion of congruence and applied to objects 
such as triangles. Bolzano believed that such a transition, or special applic- 
ation, of a general concept to a particular subject was necessary and useful, 
but he objected fundamentally, for the varioaa reasons we have examined, to 
how this rad been achieved in the Euclidean trandition. It is not hard to see 
why B: )lzano would also be dissatisfied with Euclid's treatment of similarity. 
It is defined in Book 6 of the Elements (Definitionl): 
Similar rectilinear figures are such as have their angles severally 
equal and the sides about the equal angles proportional. 
Apart from using equality of angles in a quantitative sense this has simply [so- 
lated, in an ad hoc manner, sufficient properties to ensure that geometrical 
figures satisfying the definition will be similar in the general sense of having 
the same shape, Arid mathematically this is perfectly adequate and is justified 
by its usefulness. However, Bolzano prefers to try and embed the mathematical 
notion of similarity directly into a more general notion of similarity. This 
Is not just to satisfy some metaphysical principle, he believes the definition 
will thereby be more useful because It will have greater mathematical gen- 
erality (see end of A38; BG. I§24). Also, being more "correct" It should 
render the elementary theory more complete; in particular his hope is 
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"to complete the known gaps in the theory of parallels by means of the theory 
of the similarity of triangles" (A35; BG, 13 . ). Bolzano's definition Is as 
follows : 
Two spatial things ire called similar if all characteristics which 
arise from the comparison among themselves of the parts of each 
one of them, are equal In both, or If by every possible comparison 
among themselves of the parts of each, no unequal characteristic can 
be observed. (A31; BG, 016) 
The princirle (A31; BG, 017) that, "objects whose determining pieces are 
similar are themselves similar" is "proved" by use of the meaning of the 
word "determining", and so should better be regarded as an axiom governing 
the use of this concept. The Idea is to relate similarity and determination In 
the natural way and to provide an analogy with the equality principle (I34; A24). 
The definition itself is a kind of compromise between the specific proportion- 
ality of sides in Euclid, and the very general intrinsic quality defined by 
Leibniz: those things are similar In which it is not possible to discover, by 
consideration of themselves alone, whether they are to be distinguished 
(similia sunt, In quibus per se singulatim consideratis inveniri non potest, 
quo discernantur). In BG, I§24(A34) Bolzano comments at length on his work 
on similarity. He feels obliged to stress th;, originality of his treatment 
because he says Wolff "already sets forth in detail the same theory in his 
Philosophia prima seu Ontologia Sect. III Cap. I de Identitate et Similitudine. 
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and also In the Elementfis Matheseos Universae". This is rather an 
exaggeration. Wolff Is definition of similarity In the Philosophia Is almost 
the same as that of Leibniz; "those things are similar in which the things by 
which they should be distinguished from one another are equal... " (Wolff [2] 
3195). He makes no mathematical application of the concept but elsewhere 
he says it "conforms to the practice of mathematicians, ' (Wolff [310222). In 
the Elementas again there is little that could be called a theory of similarity. 
There Is the general definition in the Elementa Arith. (Definition 12) and 
then its application in the Elements Geometriae where he ac: laims "the 
most ingenious Leibniz" for using the notion of similarity to facilitate many 
proofs for which Euclid used only congruence. However, there are very few 
examples of such mathematical Improvements actually produced; the proofs 
are mostly very crude. For example, for the congruence of triangles the 
SAS condition is deduced as a corollary to the corresponding construction 
problem and the proof of the SSS condition consists of the comment, "one 
being laid on another, they will perfectly agree" (Wolff [1] ). Bolzano's 
treatment Is vastly superior from a modern (and from a Greek) point of view. 
The references to Wolff may be therefor two reasons. He was a well-known 
and respected scholar in the eighteenth century German-speaking world 
with whom it might be beneficial to be associated and Bolzano was particul- 
any attracted by the idea that two or more Independent discoveries of a 
theory was strong evidence for its veracity. (See DP§31, A55F. ) Secondly, 
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"however insubstantial the mathematical resemblance of their work Bolzano 
was undoubtedly strongly influenced by the general ideas about similarity 
originating from Leibniz and Wolff. 
We shall give one further definition of similarity, due to Wolff, which 
while not quoted in I§24(A34) would probably be known to Bolzano and Is part- 
Icularly helpful for understanding his axiom I§19(A32). It is to be found In 
Wolff's Anfangsgründe aller mathematischen Wissenschaften: 
Similarity Is the correspondence by wnich things are distinguished 
froil one another by the mind, and further, similar things cannot be 
distinguished from one another without, for example, the help of a 
measure. (Wolff [3] ) 
The ona explicit axiom of BG appears near the beginning of the section 
on similarity, I§19(A32), and is as follows: 
There is no special Idea-given to us a priori of any determinate dist- 
ance or absolute length of a line), i. e. of a determinate kind of 
separation u_° two points. 
This Is the beginning of a closely connected sequence of five paragraphs 
ending with the important result (A34; BG, I§23) that In similar triangles 
corresponding angles are equal. The Immediate use of the axiom Is to 
prove that all straight lines are similar and +rom this that triangles with 
proportional sides around equal included angles are also similar. One might 
attempt to prove that all straight lines are similar directly from the definition 
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as follows. The two end-points are determining parts of a straight line and 
these afford no comparison between them so no "unequal characteristics" 
can arise and so, by I§17(A31), the straight lines themselves are similar. 
It depends on what is to be counted as a "comparison" of "parts". If it simply 
refers to ratios of distances then our direct proof without the axiom would 
surely hold. This is evidently too much of a modern and technical interpret- 
ation of "comparison". By simply comparing the two points of a two-point 
system the only characteristic that can arise, or that the mind can perceive, 
Is that of apartness or separation. And although we understand that separate- 
ness admits of degrees, greater or less, the mind alone cannot distinguish 
or compare degrees of separateness. This is what the axiom says. " Another 
way to put the matter would be to say that the distance associated with a 
two-point system is not an intrinsic property of the system, I. e. there Is no 
way to measure or compare it without going outside the system. This Is 
perhaps even clearer If we compare distance with angle In the usual quantit- 
ative sense. There Is a natural "absolute" it easure of angle, namely a 
complete revolution, to which there is nothing comparable for distance. 
It is clear from the quotations above that by the term "similar" the 
Leibniz-Wolff school wished to indicate the equality of the Intrinsic, struc- 
tural properties of any system. The concept of distance can be understood 
a priori, but the comparison of arbitrary distances Is an essentially empir- 
Ical matter and not part of pure geometry. Thus Bolzano's axiom is being 
I 
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applied here to supplement his definition of similarity and to preserve Its 
domain among those things which can be known a priori. Indeed, rather than 
an axiom in the modern sense It is more like a principle that prescribes the 
a priori character of geometrical knowledge. It is not Inclaued in the def- 
Inition of similarity because, "it applies usefully In all parts of mathematics" 
(A38; BG, 16). In this section its function is to make a very general concept 
of similarity applicable to geometry. 
These philosophical surroundings to the concept of similarity should 
not obscure the considerable significance of i; s early introduction In this 
account of elementary geometry. From a modern point of view this is perhaps 
the most worthwhile and lasting achievement of BG Part I. One of Bolzano's 
pupils, R. Zimmermann, points out that this is what makes Bolzano's presen- 
tation of geometry so very different from the usual ones: 
The Important concept of the similarity of spatial figures appears, tn. 
Euclid's exposition, much later than the theory of parallels, but In 
Bolzano's exposition it Is among the first concepts of geometry. 
(Zimmermann [11 p. 170) 
From a pedagogic point of view this change certainly makes for. an easier 
grasp of the main outlines of the subject (e. g. the similarity proof of Pythag- 
oras' Theorem (A48; BG, I§45) is simple and instructive). This aspect of 
Bolzano's reorganisation of Euclid is still vindicated by the way elementary 
geometry Is taught today. 
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3.2.5. The Theory of Parallels 
There is some confusion in the literature on the significance of 
Bolzano's work on parallels in BG. In BG, IJ59(A57) there occurs the. theorený 
"Through Vie same point o outside the straight line xy there is only one para- 
llel to xy. 11 This has the appearance of the Playfair equivalent of Euclid's 
fifth postulate, the parallel postulate, and has led some writers to claim that 
Bol zano had erroneously proved this postulate while not realising (like Wallis) 
that It was equivalent to his earlier assumption of the existence of unequal 
similar figures. (Examples of this are found In Folta [1]p. 93, Folta [2] and 
Kolmari [i] p. 44, ) Others deem the proof a highly significant application of 
Bolzano's concept of similarity and recount It in detail (e. g. Bergmann [1] 
p. 190). Perhaps the most appropriate reaction (as we shall show In this 
section) Is that of van Rootselaar In his excellent detailed commentary on BG 
In the Introduction to Bolzano [1] Vol. 2B 2/2(p. 13) where he makes little 
more comment than "that Bolzano, almost Incidentally, proved the parallel 
axiom". 
There can be no doubt that Bolzano never intended to "prove" Euclid's 
parallel postulate In the sense that this is usually meant, 1. e. to prove it 
from the other four postulates. As we have already sufficiently shown, 
Bolzano's whole approach to elementary geometry was totally different from 
that of Euclid. There Is no reference anywhere in BG to Euclid's form of 
his fifth postulate. When Bolzano does refer to it In BD, 108(, N. 215) he says 
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that, "it only holds under the condition that both lines lie in the same plane". 
His final comment on his own work (A63; BG, 41) is that, "These are perhaps 
the most important propositions of the theory of parallels which are here 
expressed without the concept of the plane, " Thus Bolzano did not intend in 
BG, ut any stage, to solve this rather notorious problem of Euclidean geom- 
etry although it was topical at this time. The answer to Folta's question of 
"Why Bolzano did not try to get acquainted with Klügel's thesis ?" (Folta [1] 
p. 96 referring to the important work KlUgel [1] which had been Inspired by 
Kästner) is that he was probably just not Interested In Investigating further 
a system in which he believed he had diagnosed far deeper errors than this 
mere symptom of the unproved parallel postulate. Bolzano was busy devel- 
oping his own kind of "non-Euclidean" geometry for which he could deduce 
the theory of parallels which appears in BG, I§§50-66(A52-65). 
In another sense, however, Bolzano's BG was more "Euclidean" 
than Euclid's Elements. And this was because of the assumptions made in 
BG Part II on the "theory of the straight line" on which Part I of BG was 
based. In Part I Bolzano assumes several results which are equivalent, In 
the plane, to Euclid's parallel postulate. For example, In BG, I§22(A34) 
there is the existence of similar unequal triangles, and In the definition of 
parallel lines (A55; BG, I§34) there is the assumption that all points equid- 
istant from the straight line do themselves form a straight line. Now it 
would be Bolzano's claim that these can all be proved from his definition and 
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theory of the straight line In Part U. This is a deeper reason why EG cannot 
be compared with the Elements. Euclid did not incorporate the Intuitive idea 
of the "straightness" of his straight lines into his first four postulates. Nor is 
his attempted definition of straight line used anywhere in a. cºaal proofs. Eol- 
zano's definition of straight line in BG, II§26(A79) is stronger than Euclid's 
postulatesl and 2 and could, if developed further, have been axiomatised to 
provide a rigorous foundation for BG Part I, If not, with suitable modification, 
for most of Euclidean geometry. In fact, van Rootselaar has shown in some 
detail how this might have been done in the aanove-mentioned Introduction . 
(Bolzano [1] Vol. 2B, 2/2) where there Is also detailed reference to the various 
revisions and further efforts to complete work started In BG which are con- 
tained In the volume Itself. 
Bolzano's references to the theory of parallels are rather obscure, 
they are to Schultz, Gensichen, Bendavid and Langsdorf (A64; BG, 42). 
Schultz seemed to believe he was the first to prove the postulate in Schultz [21 
where he mentioned the work Klügel[11. Tb ere is ro mention In BG of 
Important contributions such as those of Saccheri, Klügel and Lambert but 
this Is possibly because of their Euclidean stand-point. 
There is an interesting connection between Lambert's work on para- 
llels and Bolzano's axiom I§19(A32). In the main work Lambert[l]he uses 
a quadrilateral with three. right angles and considers the three hypotheses on 
the nature of the fourth angle, it may be: (L) a right angle, (ii) an obtuse 
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angle, or (iii) an acute angle. Assuming the infinite extent of the straight 
line disproves (ii). But on (iii) we can consistently adopt an absolute measure 
for line segments*. Consequently if we deny the existence of an absolute unit 
for distance we can reject the third hypothesis. Now Bolzan3 does assume the 
Infinite extent of the straight line (e. g. I§30(A41)- and I@39(A46)) and in the 
axiom I§19(A32) he denies, for philosophical reasons, the existence of an 
absolute measure. (Evidently in the belief that a priori knowledge of spatial 
things requires this denial) So the way would have been open to him, had he 
wished, to deduce the parallel postulate In aclidean terms. Legecidre g(ves 
a proof of the postulate much later using this discovery by Lambert (see 
Legendre[2] } Lambert himself did not deny an absolute measure and pro- 
ceeded further to seek a contradiction. 
The theory of parallels which appears in BG remained very important 
in Bolzano's estimation throughout this early period. Given the assumptions 
% of BG Part I the main results are correctly deduced and, because of the 
originality of his approach, it represents ac rnsiderable achievement. On 
BD, XIV(A105) he explains why he feels BG received such little attention, 
the small extent of the pamphlet, its uninformative title, the far too 
laconic style, the anonymity of the author and many other circum- 
stances were certainly not favourable for securing attention. 
He also refers on the same page to, "an obvious mistake in the theory of 
parallels". As we say In Note[4]on A260 this probably refers to the 
. *For details of this see Bonola 
[1] 
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theorem BG, IS30 (A41) where "gleich" (equal) occurs instead of "ähnlich" 
(similar). Although it isnatin the main body of results on parallels It is an 
Important theorem used for those results. A further reason for supposing 
he was referring to such a trivial error is that in a later reference to BG In 
RB, 22(A455) he claims that one reason why his "new theory of parallels" 
deserves attention is precisely that, "no obvious error has been detected" 
The second reason given there for the Importance of his theory is that he 
regards Legendre (in Legendre [1]) as having "hit upon just the same view 
of things quite independently of me". And'it is true that in Book I of that 
work Legendre develops a thory of parallels on the basis of similarity but 
he assumes the plane and Is very much is the Euclidean tradition. (See 
further on this Zimmermann [1] and Bergmann [1] p. 196. ) Also relevant 
here Is a short fragment written by Bolzano In 1813 entitled Neue Theorie dAr 
Parallelen (New Theory of Parallels) which Is reproduced In Bolzano 
[1] 
Vol. 2A5, p. 135. 
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3.3. BG Part Ti and Assumptions of BG 
3.3.1. General Outline of BG Part U 
The title of BG Part II is an accurate description: Thoughts concerning 
a prospective theory of the Straight Line. It is a rather disorganised jumble 
of ideas about the assumptions made in Part I concerning the properties of 
the straight line. It is incomplete and tentative - just a sketch put forward, 
"to find out whether I should continue on this path" (A21; BG, XV). The 
quality and significance of these ideas are very mixed but there are some 
which make Important distinctions and are üeveloped usefully later In DP. 
The material divides roughly into the following three sections: 
Identity and equality. Determination 
(A66 - 70) and possibility. Definitions and nature 
of geometric objects. _ 
§6- 24 The system of two points, distance and 
(A70 - 79) direction. Various properties, concept 
of opposite direction. 
§ 25 - 43 Definition of straight line. Relations of 
(A79 - 85) order. Mid-point and definition of plane. 
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We shall comment on the first of these sections here and on the re- 
mainder in 3.3.2. It is inthese paragraphs *1 -5 that Bolzano most justifies 
the title "champion of rationalism In geometry" which Kerry confers equally 
on Bolzano and Leibniz (Kerry [1Ip. 476). He discusses the purely concep- 
tual nature of geometric objects, emphasises the necessity of proving tho 
possibility of any spatial object (in contrast to proving constructibility in 
Euclid), and rejects the traditional definition of geometric objects which gives 
priority to the concept of solid. 
The Msumption that points exist, or ihat they are possible is not 
considered. The concept of point is said to be indispensable to geometry and 
Is defined as a "characteristic of space (aJ, me . ov 
) that is itself no part of 
space" (A69; BG, 47). In the same passage we read that a point Is "a purely 
imaginary object" (ein bloss imaginärer Gegenstand). Presumably this 
means it is an object which can be conceived by the mind but of which wo 
have no direct intuition or sense experience. This does not Imply that it is 
an abstraction constructed by the mind but rather, to be consistent with 
Bolzano's outlook, it is an objective entity apprehended by the mind. Possibly- 
he thought of such objects as constituting an intelligible realm similar to the 
propositions and ideas "an-sich" (in themselves) described later In the 
Wissenschaftslehre (Bolzano [41). Lines, surfaces and geometrical solids 
would be of the same sort, but the last is distinguished as being adequately 
presented "in intuition". Bolzano concludes: 
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Accordingly every pure intuition of lines and surfaces which Is 
attempted (e. g. by the motion of a point) must be impossible. The 
definitions in this paper of the straight line, §26, and the plane, §43, 
are made on the assumption that both are pure object;: of thought 
(Gedankendinge). (A69; BG, 47) 
Because of this purely conceptual nature of spatial objects Bolzano seems to 
regard their possibility as a sufficient criterion for their existence, or at 
least for their use in geometry. It is not always clear whether possibility 
meant more for Bolzano than consistency of '; efinition, he certainly did not 
require actual construction. He says that one of the purposes of thcoretical 
geometry is to show the possibility of this or that spatial thing (A40; BG, I27). 
To quote from that paragraph: "the theoretician must be allowed to assume 
certain spatial objects without' showing the method of their actual construe- 
tion, provided he has proved their possibility". 
Such possibility is also to be proved of relations before they can be 
applied to spatial things. In BG, 11§3(A68) he suggests that the possibility of 
equal things could be demonstrated from the axiom BG, I§19(A32) since it 
states (in full generality) that we have no a priori Idea of any determinate 
spatial thing and so mbre than one equal spatial thing of any kind must be 
possible. But at the introduction to the axiom and at I§24, EG, (A34) "deter- 
minate" had the meaning "determinate size" so that we could conclude pre- 
cisely that there is more than one spatial thing possible of different (unequal) 
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sizes and so unequal to each other. But "determinate" now appears to be 
interpreted as "determinate position" for in the last sentence of BG, 1I§3(AG3) 
we read: "If therefore any spatial thing A is possible at a point a, then also 
an equal spatial thing B (=A) must be; possible at the different point V. 
One further point arises on this matter of proving the possibility of 
certain objects. Vojthch suggests that Bolzano "forgot" to require the poss- 
ibility of similar structures or to derive it from other postulates (Vojt9ch[1; 
p. 190 Note i6). It is more likely that he regarded his axiom in I§t9; BG, (A32) 
as specifically postulating similar spatial objects and so their possibility 
needed no demonstration. The denial of a special idea or concept does seem 
to have implied for Bolzano that the whole range of possible concepts (i. e. 
possible to be thought) would correspond to "objects".. This Is confirmed by 
the attempted use of the axiom described above where "determinate" means . 
"determinate position". 
3.3.2. Definition of Straight Line 
A relatively systematic sequence of Ideas now leads up to the definition 
of straight line In BG, II §2,6(A79). This begins with the important analysis of 
the simplect-non-trivial geometric structure, a system of two points. The 
concept of the relation between the two points a and b Is divided Into the two 
components of distance and direction as follows: 
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I. That which so belongs to point b in relation to a that it is indepen- 
dent of the definite point a (which is precisely this one and not another), 
and which consequently can be present equally in relation to another 
point, e. g. a; Thi; is called the distance of point b from a. 
H. That which so belongs to point b in relation to a that it Is depend- 
ent solely on the definite point a where we have now separated off 
what already lies in the concept of diftance, i, e. what can belong to 
point b in respect of another point. This is called the direction in 
which b lies from a. (A70; BG, 48). 
As far as being a correct (or "essential") definition of the relation of 
I 
a tob or of the components of this relation, this is obviously unsatisfactory. 
Distance Is no more "Independent" than direction. The two concepts could 
have been interchanged without making any difference to this definition. 
The paragraph H§7(A71) Is intended to show the possibility of both concepts 
but it is hopelessly' confused because in the proof for each concept he requires 
the possibility of the other. Instead of "possibility" he actually shows the 
necessity of each concept by showing that neither concept, of itself, exhausts 
the content of the relation. This is hardly surprising since the first com- 
ponent of the relation (distance) Is something Independent of the particular 
point a. Even here there is confusion: "independent" (unabhängig) does not 
seem the appropriate term; what is evidently meant Is, "that which Is not 
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uniquely determined by the particular point all. Inspite of these muddles the 
analysis does yield something positive which is summarised in II§8(A72), 
namely that the relation of two different points a and b can be divided into two 
primary concepts, distance and direction, such that neither of these alone 
determines one from the other. Given both the distance and direction of b 
from a they determine the point b, and given two points they determine a 
distance and direction. 
No such systematic analysis of these relations had been given before 
and it shos how the concept of determination can be used to define the 
simplfst geometric object - the two point system - in terms of distance and 
direction. Next, a triangle is defined as a three point system (A76; BG, II§18). 
no mention need to be made of lines (which are as yet undefined). It is re- 
garded as being only a concession to convenience, in Part I, to use the hetero- 
geneous concept of straight line in reference to triangles. 
The concept of opposite direction is then defined as follows. Rem- 
embering that Bolzano is working in space rather than the plane there is 
a whole "cone" of directions which form a given angle with a given direction 
R. But there is a certain value of this angle (namely 180°) such that this 
cone degenerates to a single direction, this is the opposite direction to R 
(A75; BG, II315). Bolzano points out that from his definition It neither follows 
that there exists such an opposite direction nor that it is unique (A75,78; BG, 
II§16, @24). Now a point m is defined to be between a and b If the directions 
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ma, mb are opposite, so finally, 
An object which contains all and only those points which are between 
the two points a and b is called a straight line between 'a and b. 
(A79; BG, II926). 
It has generally been easier in mathematics to develop a theory deduc- 
tively from intuitive concepts rather then to work in the other direction and 
attempt a logical analysis by which to define and give a foundation for our 
first concepts. To see the significance of Boizano's definition here of the 
straight line let us compare it with those de, 'initions given in the two major 
eighteenth century works with which Bolzano was certainly familiar. First, 
that of Baumgarten in his Metaphysik: 
A line (linea) is a series of points which are between separate points 
and which are uninterruptedly next to one another. 
That line in which there are as few points as possible between the 
fixed separate points Is the shortest line between those points or 
the straight line, 
(Baumgarten [l] p. 83) 
Then from K'astner's Die mathematische Angangsgründe: 
An extension which Is such that It Is surrounded on all sides and Is 
entirely contained within Its boundaries Is called a solid extension 
or a geometrical solid. The extension of a solid at Its boundaries 
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is called a surface (superficies) and the extension of a surface at 
its boundaries is called a line (linea) ...... a straight 
line is one 
whose points all lie evenly [nach einer Gegend] . 
(Kästner [i1 p. 178) 
In this passage Kästner specifically rejects the idea in Baumgarten's def- 
inition that a line consists of points next to one another. 
Bolzano's contribution to the problem was clearly much more precise 
and subtle than these efforts. His achievement was impressive, original 
and important for his later work. Yet from a modern point of view Johnson 
is quite right to say of BG Part II that, "we would judge Bolzano's theory of 
the straight line to be all but worthless. It was the result of investigating a 
pseudoprobleri. " (Johnson [1] p. 288). It would be useless for anyone now to 
take over Bolzano's problem cr method. Simply because the logical poss- 
ibilities in the intuitive concept of line have been thoroughly explored 
axiomatically. But it was highly Important In Bolzano's time to begin such 
an exploration, albeit In terms of definitions. It Is clear from our account 
above that it was his general views about the nature of mathematics and the 
need for purely conceptual foundations that led Bolzano to see the problem of 
the definition of the straight line as significant and to deal with it in such an 
abstract manner. His deliberate distinction between distance and direction 
leads Folta to make a rather- exaggerated claim, "Bolzano' s ideas are the 
basis on which linear vector algebra Is built up In a purely synthetic, 
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geometrical form. " (Folta[2]p. 227). Though this is certainly not histor- 
Ically accurate It Is quite true that the abstract concept of a free vector, 
developed much later In the century by Grassmann,. requires the distinctions 
that were first made In BG by Bolzano. 
3.3.3. The Assumptions of BG 
In Part I of BG there is only the one explicit axiom at BQ, If 19(A32) 
to which reference has been made several times. Most of the other assump- 
tions in Part I are said to be derived from the "theory of the straight line". 
It may well have been part of Bolzano's ambitious and rationalist hopes that 
he would be able to prove all these assumptions from-the correct definition 
of the straight line in Part If, thus leaving only one true axiom in his geom- 
etry. This does not, of course, happen and Bolzano is quite candid about the 
problems. In BG, II§24 he lists the assumptions which he is still unable to 
prove, even from his analysis of distance and direction. These are as 
follows: 
(i) that the distances ab and ba are equal (A73; BG, 1011); 
(ti) that the angles. ras and sar. are equal (A75; BG, tI 14); 
. (W) to a given direction there Is a unique opposite direction 
(A75; BG, 016); 
(Iv) In a system of three points consider the relations of the 
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direction In which every two lie from the third: if these 
directions are the same or opposite at one point then they are 
the same at two points and opposite at one point. (A78; BG, II§24). 
The assumption most frequently used in Part I is that two given points 
determine the straight line which lies between them. This follows from the 
definition of a straight line and the assumption (iii) above. The existence of - 
a mid-point is assumed at I§26(A39) and I358(A57), and this Is proved at 
II§30(A80). At I§39(A46) and I§57(A56) there are various assumptions about 
the order of points on a line and these all follow from assumption (iv) above 
which foreshadows the axioms of order put forward later by Pasch. At sev- 
eral places the unique and Indefinite extension of a straight line is required 
(e. g. I33(A24), 930(A41). It Is even quoted ipi the Preface as an example of a 
proposition in the theory of the straightlInc, but It Is not mentioned In Part 11. 
Ho; vever, assuming arbitrary distances (as mere numbers of units) are 
possible it could, rather loosely, be deduced from the fact that (I1339, A84) 
a point, distance and direction determine another point. For a detailed dis- 
cussion of possible axiomatisatLons of BG we refer again to van Rootselaar's 
Introduction in Bolzano [1] Vol. 2B2/2. 
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3.4. The Geometrical Work in DP 
3.4.1.. Summary of Main Topics 
The principle theme of DP Is the provision of what is regarded as a 
proper proof of the correctness of the usual formulae for t. length of a line, 
the area of a surface and the volume of a solid. Consequently we would 
expect it to be a mainly analytic work and it does involve the use of Taylor's 
theorem expansions for functions of one or more variables and the determ- 
[nation of functions by a general kind of similarity principle. But this is 
interspersed with various paragraphs concerning pure geometry. In part= 
icular there appear here for the firsttime "topological" definitions of line, 
surface and solid. There are also various conceptual distinctions such as 
those between length and distance, and space acid position, and also some 
applications of the general notion of similarity established in BG. Bolzano 
himself admits (A534; DP, 21) that most of this geometric work is logically 
unnecessary for the theory and results of DP: it was a convenient place to 
record some relevant results of his "reorganisation of geometry" at which 
he had now been working for many years. 
Thus it will not be Inappropriate'here to consider the purely geo- 
metric work In Isolation from the context of the rectification problems and 
Instead to regard it as Illustration and development of the ideas In BG. This 
Is further justified by the fact trat Bolzano seems to have regarded the. 
geometry in DP as of at least as much significance as the analysis. It is 
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reported in Berg [1] p. 27 that, 
It Is a curious fact that the copy of Bolzano (6) (= DP] extant in the 
University Library of Göttingen (sign. "Mathemat. III, 8973") contains 
a commentary in B )lzano's hand written on two empty pages after the 
printed text and emphasising these definitions: 
There then follows a summary In German by Boizano of the geometrical 
results that occur in DP. We shall give an English translation here of the 
German quotation in Berg [ 1) as it provides a convenient summary of the 
geometricU. l work of DP. , Bolzano's page numbers correspond to our DP 
pagination and we have added the relevant Appendix page numbers as usual. 
In this paper the following are comprehensible even for a beginner: 
a) tho definitions of line, surface and solid which appear on p. 20ff. 
(A533), p. 51ff. (A564) and p. 66(A579). 
b) the definitions of a straight line p. 29(A542), of a plane surface 
p. 53(A566), and several other definitions which appear on p. 53, 
54,67 etc. (A566,567,580). 
c) the definition of the concept of the length of a line p. 34(A547), 
of the area of a surface p. 57(A570) and volume of a solid p. 68 (A581). 
d) the definition of the concept of space p. 41(A554). 
e) of similarity p. 38 (A551).. 
f) of geometrical equality p. 37,38(A550,551). 
g) the proof of the theorem that the lengths of similar lines are in 
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proportion to the lengths of other lines derived from them in a 
similar way, p. 41(A554), cQS49,160. 
h) the definitions of the concepts of a simple line, of a self-returning 
line, of a bounded line, of a boundary point p. 21(A534); of a simple 
surface, a self-returning surface, a bounded surface p. 52(A565); 
of a point which is enclosed by a line on a surface p. 53(A566); of a 
surface figure p. 54(A567); of a connected solid, of inner or bound-- 
ary points on a solid p. 66(A579); of a prism p. 67(A580); etc. 
i) Preface p. I- VI (A492-495). 
k) Criticism of various proofs that the straight line is the shortest, 
etc. Preface p. Xlff. (A500). 
1) the Appendix p. 76ff. (A589). 
m) the definitions of the concepts of speed and force p. 16ff. (A529). 
n) the proof of the theorem that every particle whose speed does not 
alter describes a straight line p. 26(A539). 
o) something about my theory of parallel lines p. 43,44(A556) etc. 
3.4.2. The Geometrical Definitions 
In. the Preface to BD Bolzano complains that "precise definitions are 
still lacking for the Important concepts of line, surface and soll. " and that 
there was still not even agreement on the definition of a straight line, "which 
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could perhaps be given before the concept of a line in general" (A97; BD, VI). 
(Bol'zano had, of course, as described in 3.3.2, produced such a definition 
of the straight line: It re-appears substantially unaltered In DP§15, A542) 
Now beginning at §11(A53s) we find one of Bolzano's most Interesting con- 
ceptual achievements: the definitions of these geometrical objects In terms 
of point sets and neighbourhoods. First there is the definition of the concept 
of line in general, then its various subsidiary concepts: connected, simple, 
closed and bounded lines. 
The main definition is as follows: 
A spatial object at every point of which, beginning from a certain 
distance and for all smaller distances, there is atleast one, and at 
most only a finite set of points as neighbours, is called a line In gen- 
eral. (Fig. 1-7)(A533; DP, 20) 
A spatial object, it is explained In a footnote, is a system or collection, 
finite or Infinite, of points. Bolzano Is well aware that examples can be 
constructed (e. g. containing circular arcs) In which for certain points and 
for a certain distance there are infinitely many neighbours. So the phrase :- 
"beginning from a certain distance" does not mean one such distance can 
necessarily be specified for all points of the line, but that for each point 
of the, line a suitable "initial" distance can be found. The Idea of using 
neighbouring points, determined by distance, In order to define a geometric 
object appears here In the mathematical literature for the first time. The 
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property of possessing neighbours at arbitrarily small distancesfrom any 
given member point is described in the classical terminology as the genus 
proximum of all three geometric extensions, line, s rface and solid. The 
differenta specifics for the general line is the property that a distance can 
always be found for which there are only a finite number of neighbours at 
each smaller distance (A535; DP, 22). 
Some indications of how Bolzano arrived at this definition and why he 
regarded it as more correct than others are suggested by the, way he deals 
with two possible objections. These are: 
(i) that by this definition the line is reduced to a mere composition 
of points; 
(ii) the definition must really be a'theoram, it makes no reference to 
the original (or intuitive) meaning of the word "line" as a spatial 
thing described by the motion of a material point. 
The second of these objections is easily dealt with: no concept of motion or a 
material particle can have any part in pure geometry. It Is, instead, this 
usual empirical definition of a line (which Bolzano calls the "mechanical" 
concept of a line) which is the theorem provable from the more primitive and 
properly geometrical definition Bolzano has given. He attempts to illustrate 
this claim with a proof (A539; DP, 26) that the path of a particle in which "the 
cause of Its motion does not change" Is actually a straight line. (The phrase 
"the cause , 
of its motion" meafis for Eolzano, "the velocity throughout the 
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motion") . 
But the supposed proof succeeds. neither in supporting nor Illustra- 
ting this claim because instead of showing that the locus of such a particle 
" satisfies his geometric definition of a straight line, Bolzano shows it is a 
spatial object such that "ei ery part of it is similar to the whole". It Is 
claimed then that "geometers know" that only the straight line has this prop- 
erty. It is trivial from the straight line definition (e. g. A542; DP, 29) that it 
will have the property that every part Is similar to the whole because every 
(connected) part of a straight line will continue to satisfy the definition of a 
straight lii. s, and (A32; BG, I§20) all straight lines are similar to one another. 
But It Is the converse proposition that Is required here and not only is it not 
proved, It Is not clear that It can be proved using Bolzano's notion of similar- 
Ity. However, this is not to say that the mechanical concept of a straight line 
may not be proved to satisfy the geometrical definition of DP§11(A533) In 
some other way. Our main concern here is the appearance and origin of 
this definition. 
The first point to emerge unaffected by the above problem Is the 
familiar prohibition of the empirical concept of motion from geometry and 
the reversal of the intuitive order of dependence. Mechanics depends, as 
far as proof is concerned, on geometry, never vice versa. This negative 
principle only leads to the rejection of possible definitions and concepts 
without any indication of the existence or source of -a replacement. 
Bolzano's comment in response to the first objection, (that the 
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definition reduces a line to a mere composition of points) is much more 
suggestive of the positive considerations. leading to his definition. He does 
not deny that the line is composed of points but he is at pains to avoid this 
Idea being misinterpreted, Three such misinterpretations which he rejects 
are: (I) that the line Is the arithmetic sum of Its points (Instead "we must 
look not only at the set of points but also at the way they are put together" 
A536; DP, 23); (II) that a finite set of points might be sufficient for a line; 
(iii) that each point of a line borders directly on the next one. The Ideas of 
(i) and (ii) are related. In BG, II§27(A79) Bolzano said, with reference to 
the straight line, that "this object contains an Infinite number of points, 
therefore it must be something qualitatively different from a mere system of 
points". He seems to have believed that moving from the finite to the Infinite 
(in any collection of objects) inevitably Involves (or reveals) relationships 
between the objects which do not exist in the finite case. It is the description 
of these relationships that causes the difficulty in reducing an object to Its 
elements o': constructing It out of these elements. For the definition of a 
line, the Ideas rejected In (I), (Ii), (III) above can be summed up by saying 
that while a line is an infinite set of points It cannot simply be viewed as a 
concatenation or "string" of points. (Compare Baumgarten's definition in 
3.3.2) However, how else could we think of it? These considerations 
reveal the inadequacy of our "constructive" intuition in this case, (and 
Incidentally the prevalence of the definition of a line via the concept of 
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motion). Consequently it is reasonable to suppose that it was in this way that 
Bolzano was led to abandon the attempt to construct the geometrical continua 
out of sets of points. Instead he seeks an essential characteristic of such 
continua in terms of their constituent points. And here the fact that there is 
to be no "next" in a continuous extension can quite naturally be expressed by 
requiring for each point that there are other points at arbitrarily small dist- 
ances. The fact that the line is, as we should say, one-dimensional, is then 
guaranteed by requiring that there are only a finite number of neighbouring 
points at arbitrarily small distances. The concepts of surface and solid 
are then defined recursively as follows: 
A spatial object at each point of which, beginning from a certain 
distance and for all smaller distances, there Is at least one and 
at most only a finite set of separate lines full of points is called a. 
surface in general (A564; DP, 51). 
A spatial object at each point of which, starting from a certain dist- 
ante and for all smaller distances, there exists at least ol. e absolute- 
ly connected surface full of points, Is called a solid In general. 
0 (A579; DP, 66) 
By "an absolutely connected surface" Bolzano means a surface each . 
part of w. ".: ch that is Itself a surface has at least one line in common with the 
other parts that are surfaces, For a close comparison of these definitions 
with the work of Menger in the 1920's see Johnson [1] p. 29Eff. 
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3,4.3. The Origin of the Definitions 
In order to understand the emergence of this sequence of definitions 
there are two considerations which seem to be of fun amental importance. The 
definitions have a logical form which was unusual at this time, and they make 
use of a rather abstract concept of distance. The usual form of mathematical 
definition (of an object rather than relation) was as an abbreviation; the applic- 
ation of a symbol, word or phrase to a new combination of known objects (or 
symbols). In this sense it is the naming of the result of a construction. For 
example, there is the definition of a triangle as a construction from three 
straight lines (A27; BG. I§7) or the definition of straight line in terms of points 
(A79; BG, II§2G). The existence of the new object defined thus depends on the 
existence of the known constituent objects and the possibility of the construction. 
In the case of the line, however, no construction or relationship on a set of 
points seemed to be successful. Instead the definition proceeds by regarding 
the line as a completed entity (which is composed of points but wo cannot 
say how), and stating a property of It which acts as a defining character- 
Istic, This approach is logically distinct from the former because now 
the existence of an entity satisfying the'definition requires a new assumption 
or insight, It is a simple kind of implicit definition and could be regarded 
from a modern point of view as an axiom governing the primitive terms 
"point" and "line". Unfortanately Bolzano does not seem to realise 
the existence problem which such a definition raises. . 
At least he 
nowhere mentions the need to assume that such an object as he defines a 
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line to be does actually exist. It is not altogether clear (see remarks in.. 
2.4.4 and p. 123 ) whether or not he believed we have a kind of direct appre- 
hension of such conceptual objects as lines which might obviate the need for 
such assumptions. (The same distinctions in form, and criticisms over exist- 
ence, apply also to the definitions of surface and solid as well as to their 
subsidiary types). The use Bolzano made in the definitions of the classical ' 
terms "genus proximum", "differentia specifics" seems to have been rather 
artificial and conventional. The terminology Is certainly compatible with 
both sorts of definition mentioned here and does not seem to have motivated 
the one chosen. 
The development of Implicit definitions was highly important In the 
subsequent history of mathematics. Consider the, definition of a topology as 
a set of sets with certain properties, or even the algebraic definitions of 
group, field etc. now more conveniently expressed In terms of sets of axioms. 
The progression from implicit definition to the more flexible schema of 
primitive terms and axioms Is quite natural. The crL cial logical (and psycho- 
logical) distinction was the move from the simple, constructive definition. to ' 
the more abstract Implicit definition. 7 us the transition made by Bolzano 
from his definition of the straightline in BG to the general geometric defin- 
Mons in DP is a development of considerable historical signficance. Van 
Rootselaar says In Bolzano [1] ; Vol. 2B 2/1, p. 14) that although the definition 
of line In general is usually considered an original achievement of L3olzano, 
"I have reason to suppose the definition was then fairly common. " But he does 
not say where It is to be found. 
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3.4.4. Concept of Distance 
It Is reasonable to suppose that such implicit definitions arise from 
some insight or abstraction which produces a new concept or the refinement 
of an old concept. This Is then used in the formulation of the Wining charac- 
teristics. In the present case of Bolzano's definitions of geometric objects 
It Is the refinement of the concept of distance which Is fundamental to their 
formulation. At DP§20(A547) he distinguishes, in reference to his definition 
of length in the previous paragraph, between distance and length saying that 
the former is simpler than the latter because any system of two points has 
distance associated with it, while we need to consider a line joining the points 
before we can apply the concept of length. Of course, the Idea of a distance 
between two points Is easy and familiar but we can see how, having separated 
this concept from that of length, it would be much easier to arrive at the more 
abstract viewpoint by which one can consider the class of points (finite or in- 
finite) at a certain distance from 'a given point, I. e. what we now call a 
spherical neighbourhood. This concept of a neighbourhood defined by a 
distance, and subsequently an arbitrarily small distance, is the central 
component in all these definitions in DP. The definitions themselves rep - 
resent the first major insight into the nature of abstract continuous e:. tension. 
It. Is an inzight which has been generalised and shown itself to be enormously 
fruitful in the subjects of topology and functional analysis. It Is not claimed 
here that there is any psychological (or other) priority between the appearance 
C 
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of the neighbourhood concept and the gaining of the insight expressed In 
the definitions. It is sufficient for our purpose only to point out the un- 
deniable positive contribution to this insight that was made by Bolzano's 
refinement and use of the concept of distance. 
/ 
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Cater 4; Analysis I 
4.1. General Introduction 
4.1.1. The Meaning of "Analysis" 
The word "analysis" is used today as a generic term to denote several 
branches of mathematics which have In common their use of Ideas and methods 
based on the concept of limit. For thQ proper exploitation of this limit con- 
cept a suitable domain for the values of the variables needs to have been 
specified and defined (e. g. real or complex numbers). Thus the simplest 
kind of modern analysis (that of a real variable) would not have been ; possible 
or even comprehensible at the outset of the 19th century; its two fundamental 
concepts had not been properly established. The limit concept was still 
highly controversial and often Ill-formulated, and the construction or defin- 
ition of the real numbers was not to begin for'at least another thirty years. 
Nevertheless the term "analysis" was widely used in European 
mathematics throughout the 17th and 18th centuries. Its mathematical . 
meaning early in the 17th century derived from two main. sources: (i) 
the original Greek usage as part of a technique* for finding proofs or sol- 
utions (usually for. geometrical problems), and ([! ) the particular success 
at that time of algebraic methods applied to geometrical problems 
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(for example, by Vieta and Descartes). In Greek mathematics the term 
"analysis" referred to the process of working backwards deductively from a 
theorem until something known or assumed to be treu e was reached, and then 
(the synthesis) trying to work forwards along the same path. (See, for example, 
the description in Pappus Ill ,) Algebra was well, suited to this method 
for, if 
a problem could be expressed by means of an equation, the deduction of a sol-' 
ution or an identity from the equation could often successfully be reversed. 
Vieta was deliberately reviving the Greek term when he called his algebra 
textbook (1591) In Artem Analyticam Isagoge (Introduction to the analytic art). 
Algebra was typically an "art" at this time, it was a procedure for dis- -. " 
covery and an aid to doing geometry which was still the main substance of 
mathematics. Although Vieta's example of rei2rring to algebra as the "ana- 
lytic art" or as "analysis" was not generally followed in the 17th century these 
terms were increasingly used in mathematics (In the general sense of, a 
"method') and were associated with algebra, especially the use of equations. 
An example is in the title of the first formulation of Newton's discovery of 
the calculus (written 1671, published 1711), De Analyst per Aequationes 
Numero Terminorum Infinitas (On Analysis by means of equations with an 
Infinite number of terms). 
The family of problems which were ancestral to what became known 
simply as "calculus" consisted of geometrical problems: for example, 
finding tangents and areas associated with various curves. Many of these 
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problems had already been solved (in some cases with'the aid of the new 
co-ordinate geometry) by men such as Wallis, Barrow, Fermat and Huygens. 
But with the general methods and the direct relationship of the tangent and 
area problems discovered by Newton and Leibniz the techniques of algebra 
(not only equations but the development of expressions in infinite series', 
began to take on a new status. Algebra was no longer simply a means to an 
end (the solution of geometric problems), it was becoming established as an 
end In Itself. Accordingly the status of analysis was enhanced, associated 
as it was with the success of the algebraic msthods in resolving the tangent 
and quadrature problems. 
In the 18th century the word "analysis" was in common use in Engiish, 
German, Latin and French mathematical writirgs though its meaning varied 
considerably during the century and from one country or langua; o to another. 
The Important new factor in the use of the word was the Impact and develop-.. 
ment of calculus. From Its origins It was natural that calculus was regarded 
as an extension of algebra, or at least of "algebraic" geometry, a kind of 
"algebra of the Infinite" as It has been described (Kline 
[1] p. 324). In works 
written in English, following Newton's Methodus Fluxionum... (Newton [1] 
1671, published 1736), the calculus was usually just referred to as the 
"method of fluxions". In Latin and French however, the three components 
of being a powerful mathematic-il method, being algebraic, and seeming to 
require Infinitesimals, made the use of some equivalent to "infinitesimal 
I 
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analysis" most appropriate. For example, there were the works by L'HSpital, 
Analyse des infiniments petits (1691) and by Euler, Introductio in Analysln 
Infinitorum (1748). 
The several meanings of the word "analysis" In English are Illustrated 
by the entries in Thomas Walter's Mathematical Dictionary (Walter [1] 1762). 
There are five such entries. First there is the quite general sense of "res- 
olving a thing Into its component principles, in order to discover the nature of 
the thing"; then as a mathematical method in the Greek sense mentioned above; 
then "analysis of infinities" with the instruu%,. on to see "Fluxions"; then the 
"analysis of powers" meaning the extraction of roots. Finally there is the 
entry "Analytics" defined as "algebra, ' or the doctrine of analysis". Concerning 
this last identification Kline says, "In the famous eighteenth century Encyclopedie, 
d'Alembert used algebra and analysis as synonyms" (Kline [11p. 323). Apart 
from the existence of the several senses of "analysis" already mentioned such 
a straightforward Identification could only be made in a rather loose sense. 
D'Alembert actually writes as follows: 
Analyse...... est proprement la methode de vesoudre les problemes 
mathematiques, en les reduisant a des equations. 
L'Analyse, par resoudre les probt mes, employe lo secours de 
1'Algebre, ou calcul des grandeurs en general: Aussi ces deux mots, 
Analyse, A1_ fiebre sont s : )uvent regards comme synonymes. 
(D'Alembert Cl ). 
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Rather than identify them, D'Alembert distinguishes analysis and algebra 
(there are long separate articles on each). In fact the brief summary quoted 
here is a fair generalisation of the mathematical use of the term "analysis" In 
the mid-18th century. It was primarily a method, a procedure for solution; 
and ac; such always an algebraic method In contrast to geometrical, empirical 
or general Inductive methods. As a subject in itself It was associated, and 
sometimes identified, with algebra, but more especially as we have seen, 
with those parts of algebra which Involve Infinitesimals and Infinite series. 
To this extent analysis encompassed the differential and Integral calculus. 
The above summary also applies to the German language wrlt[ngs of 
the 13th century but here the usages were well organised; The words "Algebra" 
or "Buchstabenrechnung" (calculation with letters) were usually reserved for 
very elementary matters, rules of signs, n. otations, manipulation of fractions 
etc. The main part of algebra (equations, series, functions etc. ) was 
"Analysis der endlichen Grössen" (analysis of finite quantities), while the 
differential and Integral calculus was contained in the "Analysis der Unend- 
lichen" (analysts of the infinite). These two phrases were common textbook 
titles, for example volumes with each of these titles form the third part of 
Kastner's Die mathematische Anfangsgründe, In Klugel's Mathematisches 
Worterbuch (Kllgel[2] , Part I, 1803) the entry "Analysis" is separated into 
Analysis als wissenschaftliches System (analysis as a scientific , system) and 
Analysis 213 Methode (analysis as a method), reflecting the ambiguity to 
I 
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which we have already referred. In the former section analysis in a very gen- 
eral sense Is described as the study of any kind of combination of quantities 
through calculation. In this sense it would include algebra as Its first part. 
Then analysis in a "narrower and proper" sense is defined as "the science of 
the forms of quantities". (KlUgel added that this is sometimes called the 
theory of functions). In this sense he distinguishes algebra and analysis: the 
former considers quantities as known or unknown, ' the latter considers them 
as'constant or variable. There then follows the division Into "Analysis der 
endlichen Grössen" and "Analysis des Unendlichen" as described before. At. 
alternative and quite common terminology for these finite and infinite kinds 
of analysis was "niedere Analysis" ("lower" or elementary analysis) and 
"hUhere Analysis" (higher analysis) respectively. (See for example Rogg[1j. ) 
By the end of the 18th century the algebraic and infinitesimal methods 
that had been used to solve the geometry problems of the 17th century had 
proved so enormously successful in a whole range of physical problems that, 
under the general heading "analysis", they had become the dominant part of 
mathematics. The intuitive concepts of space, time and motion, long assoc- 
sated with geometry and mechanics, were losing ground to the more formal 
manipulation of functions and equations by the methods of calculus. Tt was 
Inevitable after the advent of analytic geometry that these developments 
should lead, during the 18th century, to analytical or "rational" mechanics. 
in the Prciace to his Mecanigue analytique (1788) Lagrange wrote: 
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.... No diagrams will be found to this work. The methods which I 
expound in it demand neither constructions nor geometrical or mech- 
anical reasonings, but solely algebraic operations subject to a uniform 
and regular procedure. Those who like analysis will be pleased to see 
mechanics become a new branch of it .... (Translation as in Kline 
[1] 
p. 615) 
The purely algebraic, or analytic, treatment of mechanics described 
in this quotation was evidence of the major transition taking place in the devel- 
opment of mathematics. This was not only the rise of analysis and its subse- 
quent arithmetisation. It was the replacement of the empirical and intuitive 
elements in mathematics by more formal symbolic and arithmetic procedures. 
More fundamentally arithmetic (and thereby operations with symbols) was 
being freed from the need to be interpreted geometrically. The truth of 
Euclidean geometry was giving place to the truth of arithmetic. Geometry, 
however, did not decline, It developed enormously (and In its turn was finally 
freed from the need to be empirically interpreted) over the period of the 
"arithmetisation" of analysis. The latter was a huge and lap hazard pro- 
cess, occurring to no-one suddenly and being advanced and retarded over 
many generations until there was a general and stable concensus. 
Aft&: r the work of Euler and the Bernoullis it was the French math- 
ematicians of the late 18th century who contributed most to the prominence 
of analysis, By around 1800 analysis was not simply a new an i fruitful 
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branch of mathematics, it had displaced geometry as the paradigm of math- 
ematics. And this was understood, for example by Laplace, in terms of its 
superior generality and degree of abstraction. In hL Exposition du systems 
du monde (1796) Laplace writes: 
The algebraic -analysis soon makes us forget the main object 
[of our 
researches] by focussing our attention on abstract combinations and 
it is only at the end that we return to the original objective. But in 
abandoning oneself to the operations of analysis, one Is led by the 
generality of the method and the ine!!: imable advantage of transforming 
the reasoning by mechanical procedures to results often inaccessiblo to 
geometry. (Laplace [1] , translation as in Kline 
[13 p. 615). 
Confidence in the furture of analysis was reflected in the great number 
of new and widely read works appearing soon after the French revolution. 
These Included Lagrange's Theorie des Fonctions anal i ues (1797, German 
1798,2nd ed. 1810), and Lecons . sur le calcul 
des fonctlons (1806), Tratte 
eldmentaire.... (1802,2nd ed. 1806, English 1816, German 1817), Carnot's 
Reflexions sur la metaphysigue du calcul.. (1797, German and English 1800, 
2nd ed. 1813). 
The main purpose of these works, and others like them, was to 
spread and teach the methods, and achievements of the calculus. In most 
standard textbooks one could expect to find all, the elementary processes and 
rules of differentiation and int; gration for a wide range of functions, 
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applicätions to finding maxima, minima and singularities of curves and sur- 
faces (also their rectification and quadrature), the solutions to many ordinary 
and partial differential equations, and perhaps Lagrange's calculus of vari- 
ations. 
There were numerous ways of introducing the concepts of differential 
and of derivative. They either involved infinitesimals explicitly, the use of a 
limit without a proper arithmetic definition (though L'Huilier virtually had this 
correct), or the use of Infinite series without a clear definition of convergence. 
None of th'; se methods were regarded as wholly satisfactory though Lagrange's 
technique of assuming a Taylor series expansion for all functions enjoyed 
considerable, if short-lived, enthusiasm In the first decade or so of the 19th 
century. Tha works of Lacroix and Carnot mentioned above adopt a kind of 
amalgam of several of these methods. Inspite of being a matter for concern, 
and numerous attempts to improve the relevant definitions, there was really 
little sense of "crisis". The foundations of analysis were not as significant 
to the matrematicl ns of the early 19th century as they have become In our 
eyes. Logical structure was secondary to truth. For although various pec- 
uliaritles and paradoxes were knownto arise from using infinitesima]$ and 
Infinite series these could cast no doubt at all on the truth of the main body 
of analysis. That was guaranteed both by : t3 overall coherence and its over- 
whelming success In applications. The foundations were desirable not so 
much for the sake of truth but in order to conform the subject to the newly 
I 
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developing ideal of mathematics as being independent of any Intuitive appeal to 
such things as vanishing quantities, motion, or ideas borrowed from geometry. 
4.1.2. Bolzano's view of Analysis 
Bolzano was fairly well acquainted with the mathematical literature of 
his time. In his papers of 1816 and 1817 there are over twenty references to 
important works on analysis which had been published within the previous 
twenty years. These included works by Lagrange, Lacroix, Gauss and . Cre:: e. 
He also knew at least some of the works of Newton, Euler and D'Alembert. 
To a large extent then it was natural that he inherited the general views of the 
time on analysis that we have outlined in the previous- section. There are a 
number of specific remarks which show that this was true. In BL (Preface) 
the differential and integral calculus, are classified as higher analysts. 
(Bolzano says he regards this subject as containing "the most Important dis- 
coveries In mathematics" (A495; DP, VI)). On the same page he e, -plains the 
term "purely analytic" as being equivalent to "purely arithmetic, or algebraic" 
and says that a "purely analytic procedure" Is, 
one by which a certain function is derived from one or more other 
functions through certain changes and combinations which are express- 
ed by a rule completely Independent of the nature of the quantities 
designated. 
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The example is given of forming (1 + x)n from (1 + x). 
Thus far this seems quite a straightforward interpretation of "analytic" 
In terms of algebraic operations. On closer inspection, however, there are 
some significant differenc*: s in Bolzano's view of analysis not only from the 
modern understanding but also from tl.. e views of his contemporaries. From 
our modern viewpoint what comes first logically in developing analysis, def- 
ining a domain of values such as the real number system, came about last of 
all historically. It is in consequence of a proper (analytic) definition of the 
number cuacept (as well as the continuity of a function) that we should regard 
the main result of RB, the intermediate value theorem, as a theorem of ana- 
lysis. Bolzano regards the result, ac was usualat the time, as part of "the 
theory of equations" (A431; RB. 1). Doubtless he would have regarded this 
theory of equations as part of analysis (Analysis der endlichen Grössen), 
but more because It Is algebraic than because of the underlying limit concept. 
So inspite of the careful continuity definition (applied in BL and RB), the 
outlook and priorities are rather different from the viewpoint which emerged 
later in the century. It was regarded as more significant to find a way of 
solving an equation than to prove a property of continuous functions. 
Concerning the way In which Bolzano's understanding of analysis diff- 
ered from that of his contemporaries there are two points to be made: one 
a matter of substance, the other a matter of emphasis. The substantial 
matter Is the categorical rejectica in BL and DP of Infinitesimals or Infinitely 
I. 
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small quantities. He says that the usual definition of such quantities as 
I 
"actually smaller than every ..... conceivable quantity" is "contradictory" 
(A269; BL, V and A497; DP, VIII). With specific reference to calculus Bolzano 
assumes "it must be known to everyone" that the rules of calculus "can be . 
expressed in such a way that the concept of the infinitely small (which might 
perhaps often be associated with the symbols dx, dy, dz ... ) is completely 
avoided" (A495; DP, VI). By this time this was probably not even a minority 
view. It was quite popular to reject both infinitesimals and limit concepts. 
The full title of Lagrange's 1797 work was, "Theorie des fonctions analytiques 
contenant les principes du calcul differentiel, degages de toute consideration 
d'infiniment petits, d'evanouissans, de limites et de fluxions, et reduits ä 
1'analyse algebrique des quantites finies. And a substantial work by 
DuBourguet (1810 
, referred to In 
DP) is entitled, Traites elementaire du 
caicul differentiel et du calcul Integral, independans de toutes notions de 
quantites infinitesimals et de limites. 
Bolzaro himself was not in the tradition of these works; he preserved 
a clear and essential limit concept while rejecting the Infinitely small. How- 
ever, the latter was still used by several authors and was a matter of serious 
controversy. For example, J. Schultz in whom Bolzano had found an ally on 
several Is: ues, Is criticised (A497; DP, VIII) for his use of the Infinitely 
small. Whereas for some authors it had been a characteristic of analysis 
since the 17th century that it Involved the algebraic treatment, of the Infinitely 
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small, it is clear in Bolzano's early writings that for him such quantities had 
no proper place in any part of mathematics. 
The other distinctive feature of Bolzano's thinking on analysis is the 
extent to which he dissoc. ated the subject from geometry. For someone like 
Isaac Barrow in the 17th century the early problems of calculus were geom- 
etrical problems and they were most appropriately solved by purely geometrIc- 
al means. On the Continent during the 18th century the algebraic formulation, 
aided by Leibniz's notation and the development of the function concept, passed 
from bein ;a convenient description of a geometrical or mechanical situation 
to being an Independent body of theory capable of geometrical or mechanical 
Interpretation. A symbolism which began as a servant to geometry became, 
not its master, but independent and superior (in its generality) to geometry. 
To guarantee this Independence it was therefore essential that analysis should 
borrow nothing from geometry unless it could be reformulated completely to 
arithmetic terms. Bolzano saw this clearly, and especially in terms of the 
generality of arithmetic and analysis. The quantities of geometry were 
"spatial quantities" and accordingly theorems about them were only a special 
case of more general theorems (A435; RJ3,7). 
The attitudes of late 18th century mathematicians to the relationship 
of analysis and geometry were various and , muddled. The Intermediate value 
theorem of RB provides a 'good example. It was widely accepted and used. 
It was clearly "true", but such clarity and truth was a product of the 
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geometrical interpretation and did not extend to the general functional formul- 
ation of the theorem. Kästner and Gauss saw the need to give a properly 
analytic proof but wany others did not and seem to have been quite content 
with the appeal to geometric intutition. He is therefore far from being con- 
ventional when Bolzano emphasises repeatedly in RB Preface that the proof of 
the intermediate value theorem must not make use of concepts or methods 
borrowed from geometry. The title of RB (Purely analytic Proof.... ) rein- 
forces this understanding of "analytic", and in the first paragraph of the, 
Preface "a-purely analytic truth" is contrasted with "a geometric consider- 
ation". The implication is that it is necessary to the proper sense of "analytic" 
that it implies "non-geometric". The arguments for this in RB are the matter 
of generality already mentioned (leading to logical circularity) and also the 
"genus argument" against using concepts from one kind of theory in another 
(A434; RB, 6, see 2.4.1. ). In fact, in consequence of Bolzano's regard for 
"kinds" one might be left in doubt from reading RB alone whether he would 
actually endorse tha application of algebra to geometry (or anything else), 
I. e. whether he would allow analytical geometry as valid mathematics! 
Such doubt is completely dispelled by, "the most general way of determining 
the nature of a spatial thing Is to state certain equations between co-ordinates" 
(A495; DP, 6). Nevertheless the tension in i '. ese early works between the 
principles of genus on the' one hand, and generality on the other, is never 
resolved. The genus principle invoked on several occasions with the phrase 
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peraf3«o Ls Ks äa»o'(vos [transition to another kind] seems to imply mutual 
exclusion of theories and their respective concepts. The generality principle 
Implies a one-wnay relationship of inclusion, or of the application of the more 
general to the less general. With DP the generality principle is clearly the 
dominant one; the rectification problems are geometrical but they are being 
solved by the powerful, more general methods of analysis. However, the 
main conclusion to which we wish to draw attention here is that in both RB 
and DP various considerations led Bolzano to emphasise more than many of 
his contemporaries that analysis derived its meaning partly in contrast to 
geometry, and that being analytic implied being non-geometric. 
As we have seen in the previous two chapters Bolzano's main motivation 
in his mathematical work was the improvement of the foundational aspects of 
theories: the clarifying of concepts, and the provision of rigorous, appropri- 
ate proofs for the important theorems. It would naturally have been the 
foundational problems in analysis that most interested him and there was 
plenty of scope for his contributions. That he was well aware in 1810 of the 
continuing confusion in this area is clear from the following: 
I do not want to mention anything here about the defects in the higher 
algebra and the differential and integral calculus. It is well known 
that up till now there has not been any agreement on the concept of a 
differential. Only at the end of last year the Royal Jablonosvky 
Society of Sciences at Leipzig gave as their prize-question the 
0 
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discussion of different theories of the infinitesimal calculus and the 
decision as to which of these is preferable. (A96; BD, V). 
That he says no more at this stage about the foundations of calculus Is 
evidently because there were already more problems than he could solve to 
his satisfaction In the more elementary parts of mathematics. 
4.1.3. Bolzano's view of his works on analysis 
The programme started in BD of re-organising mathematical theories 
(including the simplest ones of arithmetic and geometry) did not progress far. 
Parts of the "zweyte Lieferung" (second issue) of BD were written but not 
published (see Bolzano [1] Vol. 2A5). There was no lack of enthusiasm on 
Bolzano's part, but to continue the work he clearly needed such enthusiasm or 
I 
interest to be shown on the part of other mathematicians. Since this was not 
forthcoming in reviews or correspondence he decided to postpone the major 
work of BD and, as he candidly acknowledges, "make myself better known to 
the learned world by publishing some papers which, by their titles, would be 
more suited to arouse'attention" (A455; RB, 27). Ile explains in the same 
passage that this also applies to BL and DP. There seems to have been some 
difficulty in finding publishers for these works and so In addition to the desLLe 
to obtain criticism and interest in his work there may also have been a simple 
commercial motive. At all --vents the topics of these analysis works were 
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chosen for publicity purposes- to gain attention. In this respect they were 
not conspicuously more successful than his earlier efforts. 
There are few new results proved in these pai; srs; their main purpose 
In each case is to give new proo's of well-known theorems mat were essential 
to analysis. Bolzano regarded them each as being the first truly rigorous 
proof. This attention to the proofs of basic theorems was the result of funda- 
mental conceptual requirements: the removal from analysis of Ideas of 
Infinity and infinitesimals, as well as the remnants of geometrical intuitions. 
These papers really represent just a few exz mples of how Bolzano would like 
to reorganise analysis. He describes DL as, "a sample of a new way of 
developing analysis" (A279; BL, XV). 
The aim of attracting some attention by means of these analysis works 
was eventually achieved, but long after Bolzano's death. The first important 
recognition of Bolzano's work wal in connection with BL in Hankel's article 
Grenze (Limit) in Ersch and GrUber's Allgemeine Encyklop . die in 1871. 
Thereafter there are regular references to Bolzano's early work on analysis 
In the literature - often, however, confined to footnotes. (For example, there 
are more than a dozen such fooxnota references to BL and RB In the Lncyk- 
lopadte der mathematischen Wissenschaften between 1898 and 1916). 
However, the modern recognition of Bolzano's work raises an Important 
historical point. From Hanket's article in 1871 to the extracts in Birkhoff 
[1 ] commentators have been Inclined to give particular credit to Bolzano 
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for matters which were not of great significance to him. We are thinking 
here of the proper artithmetic concept of limit and the concept of the con- 
vergence of infinite series. These concepts had been used in some form for a 
long time (see 4.2.2 and 4.3.2) and judging from other examples in his 
writings (e. g. A439,448; RB, 11,20; A557; DP, 44) Bolzano would not have been 
too modest to claim them as new and original if he had regarded them as such. 
He does not do so. Undoubtedly he had great confidence in these definitions; 
they satisfied his conceptual requirements, he knew they would be fruitful 
and effective in the development of analysis, but never does he claim them t: 
be his own. Nor could this be explained by his trying to avoid disapproval at 
a time when, at least in some quarters, the limit concept was simply unfash- 
Ionable - he could hardly disguise the fact that Its use was fundamental to his 
approach in all three of his works. Thus In judging Bolzano's work It is 
worth distinguishing carefully between the definition of a concept (for which, 
In the case of limit Bolzano would not claim responsibility), and the liberation 
of that concept Into effective use in a theory (which, armed with a sense of the 
modern value of the concept, we may rightly trace back to Bolzano). The 
effective use of a new concept requires the vision of an overall context or 
theory within which the new concept has clear connections with already well- 
establlsheiA concepts of the theory, and consequently clear connections 
with the existing problems of the theory. 
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4.2. Infinitestmals and the Limit Concept 
4.2.1. Introduction 
In this chapter we are outlining the conceptual preliminaries to Bolzano's 
main proofs. These are the introduction of arbitrarily small quantities and 
their effective use in expressing the concept of limit, the precise statement 
of a convergence criterion for infinite series, and the definition of the con- 
tinuity of a function. 
From the modern point of view there is a clear logical priority among 
these concepts. The concept of limit should be defined first; this then forms 
an essential component In the definitions of convergence and continuity. 
Simple and obvious as this may appear today after a century of well-established 
use, it had taken about two centuries from the first emergence of these con- 
cepts until such an understanding as we now have came to be widely accepted 
and taught (roughly, from 1670 to 1870). This process of clarification was 
attended by two major influences. One was the general replacement of geo- 
metry by arithmetic and algebra as the new paradigm of mathematics; the 
other was the presence of infinitesimals and the apparent need to incorporato 
them into the wider arithmetisation programme which the success of calculus 
methods had accelerated. Bolzano's work on the foundations of analysis was 
naturally fected by the variety and confusion of the 18th century contribu- 
tions. 
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4.2.2. Infinitesimals and the Limit Concept before 1815 
Infinitesimals did not enter mathematics with, or because of, the cal- 
culus. They were considered by Greek mathematicians in discussion of the 
infinite divisibility of spac- and time (e. g. ? eno's paradoxes). They were 
also in common use by 17th century geometers (e. g. Cavalierl) in solving 
quadrature and tangent problems. Infinitesimals, or infinitely small quantit- 
ies, were fundamentally geometric in origin and use; they were typically 
thought of as measuring the magnitude of a point or the distance between two 
"adjacent" points. 
The mathematical use of infinitesimals is sometimes traced back to 
Archimedes' use of the method of exhaustion (e. g. Leibniz [51). But in at 
least some c: ses (e. g. Measurement of a Circle Prop. 1) this method does 
not, even implicitly, Involve infinitesimals. It would be more accurate to 
trace their mathematical ancestry t' the technique (sometimes called the 
"discovery method") in Archimedes' The Method, where a solid is regarded 
as consisting of infinitely many, infinitely thin, surfaces. Now although the 
Greeks could not have had an arithmetic concept of limit, they did understand 
what must be Its Immediate predecessor, the concept of arbitrarily close 
approach. It is this which Is at the heart of the method of exhaustion. Thus 
both infinitesimals and the limit concept have their origins in geometry. 
From their association in. Archimedes' work until well Into the 19th century 
they were closely, and yet uneasily, linked with one another. 
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The 19th century is often regarded as a period of the "arithmet[sation 
of analysis" (e. g. Klein [11). A pre-requisite for this, the arithmetisation of 
arithmetic, had occurred about two centuries earlier, At the turn of the 17th 
century number was still typically regarded metrically In terms of geometric 
magnitude. The rise to predominance of arithmetic and algebra was not, of 
course, a co-ordinated plan. It is a pattern suggested to us In retrospect by 
events (usually publications) which in themselves were haphazard, expedient 
and perhapz of little significance in their own time. What is relevant here is 
how the three concepts, limit, convergence and continuity fitted into this 
pattern. One of the first arithmetic interpretations of limit was given by 
Wallis in 1655. He says, in reference to a certain (convergent) series, that 
by increasing its number of terms the difference of its value from a certain I 
quantity "may be continually diminished so that it eventually becomes less 
than any arbitrarily assignable quantity" (Wallis [1] ). This is emphatically 
not an arithmetic formulation of the modern limit concept as misleadingly 
suggested in Pringsheim [1] p. 64, Kline [1I p. 963. It Is only an essential 
- preliminary step, the awareness that the notion of arbitrary close approach 
as It appears in the method of exhaustion could be usefully expressed In a 
purely arithmetic context. It was to be another major step requiring the 
concept of a variable, to come to the formulation and use of the modern 
symbolic definition of the limit concept. 
As we said above, Wallis's description of the limit property Is given 
C 
131 
In the context of Infinite series. The terms "convergence" and "divergence" 
are used for the first time by J. Gregory in 1668 (see Kline [11 p. 461). The 
concepts were used only intuitively and vaguely. A function was still regarded 
(by Newton for example) as a curve and so continuity was still a geometrical 
matter. 
The advent of the calculus methods Initiated by Newton' and Leibniz In 
the late 17th century focussed much more attention on infinitesimals or infin- 
itely small quantities. The general methods they adopted required an arith- 
metic approach. The arithmetic treatment of the necessary Infinitesimals 
seemed to be regulated more by the known results than by any consistent pro- 
cedure. Inconsistencies and paradoxes were easily produced. Thereafter t 
Infinitesimals played a major and controversial role In the foundations of 
calculus. We are only concerned here with the various meanings that were 
given to Infinitesimals and their relation to the limit concept. 
Both Newton and Leibniz Initially employed infinitesimals in defining 
and calculating derivatives, but they each later sought ways of avoiding 
reliance on them. In De Quadraturs ... (Newton 
[2] id76, published 1704) 
Newton seeks to avoid Infinitesimals entirely: the Increment in x (denoted by 
"o") Is allowed to approach zero through ordinary finite values and the ratio 
of this Increment to a corresponding change in a function of x approaches the 
"ultimate ratio". The latter Is clearly understood In terms of an Intuitive 
notion of limit, not a substitution or calculation with zeros; 
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Ultimate ratios In which quantities vanish are not, strictly speaking, 
ratios of ultimate quantities, but limits to which the ratios of these 
quantities decreasing without limit, approach, and which, though they 
can come nearer ttan any given difference whatever, they can neither 
pass over nor attain before the quantities have diminished indefinitely. 
(Newton [3] ) 
Leibniz, although giving his main emphasis to the methods and results of 
calculus (rather than Its concepts), could not Ignore the peculiar behaviour 
required of infinitesimals. In John Bernoulli's treatise of 1691 on the differ- 
ential calculus (which was mainly is terial from Leibniz's lectures), he 
states as a postulate: "If a quantity is diminished or increased by an infinitely 
small quantity it is neither diminished nor increased" (Bernoulli, John [l] ). 
At various times Leibniz offered all sorts of interpretations of infinitesimals, 
but his explanations were basically of two kinds. There was the interpretation 
as a variable (the "potentially" Infinitely small), according to which describing 
a quantity as "infinitely small" was just a manner of speaking signifying that 
the quantity, "could be taken as small as one wishes" (Leibniz [6] p. 90). 
And there was the interpretation as a constant, as something "less than any 
qua. itity" (Leibniz, [5] p. 322) which, even if a fiction, could be used as a tool, 
"as algebraists retain Imaginary roots with great profit" (Leibniz, [7] p. 150). 
These represent the main attitudes to infinitesimals throughout the 
18th century. They were either completely replaced (e. g. by limits or by 
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the intuition of an instantaneous rate of change, so-called fluxions), or else 
they were tolerated. They were tolerated either as arbitrarily small, but 
ordinary, quantities, or as fictional "ideal" adjuncts to ordinary arithmetic. 
Generally speaking British mathematicians favoured the replacement, Contin- 
ental mathematicians favoured the toleration, of infinitesimals. But their 
use was almost universally distrusted. Berkeley's criticisms in The Analyst... 
(1734) of infinitesimals and differentials had provoked a flurry of publications 
but no real answers. The attitude of John Landen in his Residual Analysis 
(1764) was typical: he said he wanted to develop calculus "without the aid of 
any foreign principle relating to an imaginary motion or incomprehensible 
infinitesimal` (Landen [1]). He effectively used a method of limits. The works 
of Fontenelle [1] (1727) and Carnot [1] (1797) were exceptional in maintaining 
the real existence of infinitesimals. In Wolff [21 p. 597-602 the infinitely small 
was said to be actually Impossible but could be a convenient fiction useful for 
discovery. In his dissertation De vera Infiniti notione (Klästner [4] ), KUstner 
says that infinity and the infinitely small are not quantities but just express the 
possibility of unbounded increase or decrease. So to say that the last term of 
the series +I+8+,,, Is 0 and its sum is 1 merely means that the terms 
decrease Indefinitely and their sum approaches 1 Indefinitely. 
The standard phrase used to describe Infinitesimals was "less than 
every assignable quantity".. Thus D'Alembert in the Encycloped. e Method- 
gue..... under the general article Infini (Vol. 8,1765) writes: 
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Infiniment Petit (Geom. ) on appelle ainsi en G6ometrie les quantities 
qu'on regarde comme plus petites que toute grandeur assignable. Nous 
avons assez explique au mot Diff6rentiel ce que c'est que ces pretendues 
quantites, & nous vvons prouve qu'elles n'existent r6ellement ni dans 
la nature, ni dans les suppositi3ns des Geometres. 
Euler sensibly remarked that for a quantity to be less than every assignable 
quantity it must necessarily be zero. But then two zeros were said to be 
capable of either an arithmetic or a geometric ratio to one another. Thus the 
rejection cw'_ infinitesimals was only nominal, different kinds of zeros, or 
ratios between zeros, were Introduced. (In Torrelli [1] there is an attempt 
to distinguish a geometrical and a metaphysical ratio of zeros). Schultz 
rejected the non-zero infinitely small as a mere fiction but then (Schultz [4] ) 
described the differentials dx, dy as zeros which are equal In quantity but 
different in quality. 
Inspite of the early British work on the limit concept (Wallis, Newton, 
Robins), perhaps tha clearest 18th century advocates of the fundamental nature 
of the limit concept were d 'Alembert and L'Huilier. D'Alembert's formula- 
tion In the_Encyclopedie article Limite Vol. 9 1765) was as follows: t 
Limite, s. f. (Mathemat). On dit qu': 'ne grandeur est la limlte dune 
autre grandeur, quand la seconde peut approcher de la premier plus 
pros que d'une grandeur dcnn&, si petite qu'on la puisse supposer, 
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sans pourtant que la grandeur qui approche, puisse jamais surpasser 
la grandeur dont eile approche; ensorte que la diff6rence dune pareiile 
quantity a sa limite est absolument inassignable. 
... A proprement parler, la limite ne coincide jamais ou ne devient 
jamais egale a la qüantite dont eile est la limite mais celle-cl s'en 
approche toujours de plus en plus, & peut differer aussi peu qu'on 
voudra. 
There was still therefore the association of limit with the infinitely small 
through the notion of an "absolutely unassignable difference". The Insistence 
on never reaching, or being equal to, the limit was probably due to the geo- 4 
metrical example of a limit (which immediately follows in the D'Alembert 
article) from a sequence of polygons inscribed in a circle. However, D'Alem- 
bert (in the same article) was perfectly clear on the place of the limit concept: 
"Le theorte des limites est la base de la vra[e Metaphysique du calcul differ- 
ent[el. 11 
L'Huilier adopts a similar position in his paper Exposition elementaire 
des principes des calculs superieurs (L'1. uilier [111787). He has a clear 
understanding that analysis can be rigorously founded on the method of limits 
but he advocates continuing to use the language of Infinitesimals. His form- 
ulation of the limit concept Is sound though rather restricted and still only 
verbal: 
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Given a variable quantity always smaller or greater than a proposed 
constant quantity but which can differ from the latter by any proposed 
quantity however small this constant quantity, Is called the limit In 
greatness or in sm-alness of the variable quantity. (L'Huilier [1] ) 
The variable in L'Huilier's definition is therefore not allowed to oscillate 
towards a limit. 
The time was not yet ripe for these notions to be taken up and improved: 
there seems to have been no general feeling in the 18th century for the poten- 
tial of the Umit concept. L'Huilier's work was not widely read, and according 
to Boyer [1], D'Alembert's limit concept appeared to some as, "enmeshed In 
as dark a metaphysics as was that of the infinitely small. " Indeed it appears 
to have been the popular opinion to be as deeply suspicious of limits as of 
Infinitesimals. This distrust of the limit concept must have been further 
reinforced by the wide popularity and acclaim given to two works appearing 
In 1797. These were Lagrange's Theorie des fonctions analytiques... 
(Lagrange [3]) and Carnot's Reflexions sur la metaphysiquo du calcul 
infinitesimal (Carnot [11). The former explicitly excludes limits and the 
latter emphasises the superiority of infinitesimal methods over the calcula- 
tion of limits. 
However, during the 18th century trat concept of infinitesimal had been 
considerably refined. The varieties of interpretation had been subject to a 
gradual process of the survival of the fittest. Interpretations as special 
4 
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sorts of non-zero constants, or special kinds of zeros had virtually become 
extinct. The general tendency was to interpret the phrase "infinitely small" 
as a manner of speaking which did not so much denote a special kind of quantity 
(e. g. one which is already "less than any assignable quantity"), but rather a 
quantity which could be taken as small as desired. Carnot, in the work men- 
tioned above, uses language which combines both ideas ambiguously: 
We will call every quantity which is considered as continually decreas- 
ing, (so that It may be made as small as we please, .... ) an infinitely 
small quantity.... 
.... quantities called infinitely Small are never quantities actually 
nothing nor even quantities actually less than such and such a deter- 
minate magnitude, but merely quantities .... allowed to remain 
variable.... continually decreasing until they become as small as 
we wish.... (Carnot [1] p. 15) 
There is clearly a problem here in the notion of a variable. Variable 
quantities are being regarded as special kinds of quaºitittes of which the 
change or "continual decrease" is part of their nature rather than our choice. 
But Carnot was one of the last to use the term "Infinitely small quantity" in 
such a definite, objective sense. After 1800, and even later in the 19th 
century on the Continent, the term "Infinitely small" was often used, perhaps 
Innocently, in the sense of "arbitrarily small". Thus for example, Cauchy 
In 1821 uses "infiniment pett: " In this way In connection with his definition 
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of the continuity of a function f(x): 
on attribue a la variable x. un accroissement infiniment petit a, ,,.. . 
la valeur numerique de Ia difference 
f(x + a) - f(x) 
decroit indefiniment avec celle de or . En autres termes, la fonction 
f(x) restera continue par rapport äx entre les limites donnees, st, 
entre ces limites, un accroissement Infiniment petit de la variable 
produit toujours an accroissement infiniment petit de la fonction 
e11e-meme. (Cauchy [1]). 
The limit concept as we have seen, made very little progress and 
gained no general approval during the 18th century. Its 19th century revival 
began with the work of Lacroix. In 1797 his Tratte du calcul... appeared but 
as far as the foundations were concerned It was rather confused. He presented 
Lagrange's method of Taylor series expansions In terms of limits, but there 
was also reference to the limit of a divergent series and the derivative as a 
quotient of zeros. This was all much improved in the highly successful 
abridged version of 1802 (Traits elementaire... ). Here the method of Lag- 
range was dropped and the limit concept was clearly made basic. In the 
second edition of the Tratte du calcul... (1810) there Is an Improved version 
of the limit concept, With reference to the example of a function - he x+a 
writes: 
La difference entre a et la fraction propose e, etant exprimee en 
4 
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general par 
2 
ax a 
a-= x+a x+a 
devient d'autant plus petite que x est plus grand, et p'; ut Atre rendue 
moindre qu'aucune grandeur donnee, guelaue petite gue soft cettc 
grandeur; ensorte que le fraction proposee peut approcher de a aussi 
pr? s gue Von voudra: a est done la limite de la fonction 
xax 9 
relativement a l'augmentation indefinie que peut recevoir x. 
...... la fonction Xax , quolque p, uvant s'approcher 
indefiniment 
de la Limite a, ne saurait Jamals 1'atteindre et ä plus forte raison la 
surpasser; macs ce serait ä tort qu'on insererait cette circonstPnc3, 
00 -P OF comme une condition dans la definition generalo du mot limiter, .... . 
(Lacroix [1] ) 
There are two improvements here on the limit concept of D'Alembert and 
L'Huilier. The function Is allowed to reach its limit and It Is made perfectly 
clear how the "variable quantity" varies. 
The evolution of the limit concept was slow and tortuous; it was simply 
not easy to understand in arithmetical terms. R. Woodhouse (a Senior 
Wrangler and Fellow of Calus College Cambridge) wrote in 1803, "the def- '` 
Inition of a limit Is neither simple nor conci: sa" Woodhouse[ 1]. The reason 
for this difficulty lay in the fact that the formulation of the concept was funda- 
mentally connected with deeply rooted geometrical ways of thought and 
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language. The main requirements for the limit concept were to develop a 
suitable notion of a variable, to find a suitable general symbolism for sequences 
and functions and to establish the existence of numerical limits (especially 
when whese were irrational). 
The method of exhaustion had employed only geometric objects: a 
changing one (e. g. a polygon of which the number of sides was repeatedly 
doubled) approached arbitrarily closely to a fixed one (e. g. a circle). In the 
18th century the geometrical objects were replaced by the general concept of 
quantity (Grösse, grandeur). The basic form of all the limit definitions of 
this century was: if a variable quantity -can approach arbitrarily close to (or 
differ by less than any given quantity from) a fixed quantity, then the latter is 
the limit of the former. A quantity, and certainly a variable quantity, would 
not easily be interpreted abstractly. After all, numbers to not change, they 
are what they are. It is typically things like distance, velocity and direction. 
which change or vary. A variable quantity, even if denoted by a letter, was 
most naturally thought of in terms of the motkon of a particle. In the 18th 
century (as opposed to the 20th) the letters of algebra needed to denote and 
If they were to be variables their denotation must vary. Thus a limit would 
be conceived as a boundary of whatever it was that was varying. And the 
language of "approach" and "variable" served to emphasise this. It was 
therefore significant when. D'A1'imbert (and L'Huiler and Lacroix) made more 
use than there had previously been of the (arithmetic) term "difference". 
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Another Important development in the language used to describe the 
limit concept was to add to the phrases about approach and difference the Idea 
that the difference is a matter of choice. For example, "la fraction proposee 
pent approacher de a aussi pros que 1'on voudra" (Lacroix), and "... & peut 
differer aussi peu qu'on voudra" (D'Alembert). The arbitrarily close approach 
of polygons to a circle was not simply a circumstance set in motion by the re- 
peated doubling of the number of sides, it was a process over which we have 
control and choice. To exhibit and express this choice a suitable symbolism 
and notation was important but still (1800) ncwhere used or exploited. Such 
notation also required a clear understanding that every limiting process really 
Involved two variables: the quantity approaching a limit and an independent 
variable of which the former Is a function. Lacroix, at least, understood 
this when he refers explicitly (see above) to: "la 11mite.... relativement ä 
l'augmentation Indefinle que peut recevoir x. " 
Finally, seeing the need to establish the existence of a numerical 
limit was surely the most difficult step in the full arithmetisation of this con- 
cept. Certainly up till about 1815 mathematicians had always taken refuge 
in geometrical ideas and analogies. It was assumed that if one could satis- 
factorily give numerical values to the variable quantity then there was also a 
numerical value for the limit. The gradual realisation in the 19th century 
that this was not so ushered in the final phase of the arithmetisation pro- 
gramme - the construction and definition of the real numbers. 
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4.2.3. Infinitesimals and the Limit concept in Bolzano's work 
From the references which appear in BL, RB and DP It is clear that 
Bolzano was aware (, f most of the important authors and works on analysis in 
the late 18th century. He refers in some wüy to most of the authors mentioned 
in the previous section (with the main exception of Carnot). However, the 
selective summary in that section of views on Infinitesimals and limits would 
probably not have appeared coherent or significant in Bolzano's time; It was 
inevitably assembled from a modern point of view. Certainly Bolzano's work 
on analysis was not in direct response to the situation and problems described 
there. As we have seen, the works of 1816 and 1817 concern particular, 
Important theorems and Bolzano had at least half an eye on the publicity value 
of the topics chosen. They were thorough works but modest in both their size 
and alms. 
One of the difficulties of describing and assessing the development of 
a concept, or a particular contribution to a concept, is that it may be used by 
an author and even refined In a variety of ways without It ever being explicitly 
mentioned or considered in itself. This is the case with Bolzano's work with 
the limit concept. We have already referred (4.1.3. ) to the fact that the use 
of this concept was fundamental to Bolzano's approach In all his analysis works. 
But the concept is never actually referred to In either BL or RB. In DP there 
Is only brief mention, in a geometrical context, of "the method of limits". 
A natural reason for the use of a concept preceding Its mention is that it may 
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only be through its use in various contexts that the concept can be Isolated at 
1. 
all and be distinguished by naming. This could not be the reason In the present 
case because the concept, even If controversial, was by then well known and 
Bolzano must have been aware of the fact. There are, how ; ver, several othor 
reasons why he may have preferred not to refer explicitly to limits. Just 
because they were controversial meant that they were- unsuitable from the 
point of view of his seeking to gain general approval for his works. Then, as 
far as BL was concerned, Bolzar_o wished to be as straightforward and simple 
as possible, he says in his concluding note (. 1424; ßL, 144) that, "in the pres- 
ent work we have decided to proceed everywhere only from concepts which 
are already known and common, and to avoid all the more difficult Innova- 
tions". The context here is primarily that of imaginary and irrational quantit- 
ies but considering its unwelcome reception in some quarters the limit concept 
may also have been felt to be a "difficult innovation". Finally, and p3rhaps , 
most importantly, is the fact of the. very restricted context in which Bolzano 
uses the limit concept. There is no attempt at a general theory of conver- 
gence, continuity or differentiation, these concepts are employed only In 
their Immediate application to the proofs of the binomial theorem, the Inter- 
mediate value theorem and the formulae for rectification and quadrature. 
The way the concept of limit is tacitly used in defining convergence 
and continuity will be considerr. d in the next two sections; our purpose now 
Is to explain the mechanics of how the notion' of arbitrarily close approach 
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was expressed arithmetically in BL. Infinitesimals, in the sense of a peculiar 
kind of constant or zero, are emphatically rejected and their role in attempting 
to symbolise the notion of arbitrarily close approach is taken by what we may 
most suitably call "arbitrarily small quantities". We quote from BL: 
Instead of the so-called infinitely small quantities I have also always 
made use, with the same result, of the concept of those quantities 
which can become smaller than any given quantity, or (as I sometimes 
call them to avoid monotony but less precisely) quantities which can 
become as small as desired... The requirement of conceiving a 
quantity (I mean a variable quantity) which can always become smaller 
than It has already been taken, and generally can become smaller than 
any given quantity, really contains nothing that anyone could find 
objectionable..... On the other hand the Idea of a quantity which can- 
not only be assumed to be smaller but is really to be smaller than 
every quantity, not merely every given quantity but even every alleged, 
I. e. conceivable, quantity, is this not contradictory? Nevertheless 
this is the. usual definition of the infinitely small. (A269; BL, V) 
Bolzano is careful to explain what it is that he rejects under the name 
of "Infinitely small quantity". He understands by this term a (non-zero) con- 
stant which is smaller than every concetvabie quantity. As we saw in the 
previous section this meaning, common in the mid-18th century, still linger- 
ed Into the 19th century but Bolzano was wrong to describe It at that time 
C.. 
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as "the usual definition of the infinitely small". The interpretations as a var- 
table, or else as a manner of speaking for "relatively negligible", were by 
then more common. His objection to the infinitely small is rather less 
emphatic than his clear rejection of the Infinitely many (this was in the con- 
text of infinite series, see 4.3.3, ). In the above quotation there is the rhet- 
orical "... Is this not contradictory? "; InDP we read, "those.., who make use 
of the concept of the infinitely small can never avoid the suspicion of contradic- 
tion in the concept itself' (A497; DP, VIII), Certainly the concept is to be 
avoided (A 495, DP, VI), but only In BL, XI(A275) does Bolzano actually commit 
himself to describing it as self-contradictory. Such a view had many pre- 
decessors and, of course, was very reasonable. However, hesitation in 
regarding Infinitesimals as self-contradictory was also vindicated by the 
discovery of non-standard analysis that given the axiom of choice, or some 
equivalent, actual infinitesimals could consistently be adjoined to the real 
numbers. 
Thcugh not historically fair, Bolzano's characterisation of the infinitely 
small served well to show, by contrast, what he believes is sufficient for 
analysis, I. e. "quantities which can become smaller than any given quantity". 
These are, he says, variable quantities which can always become smaller than 
they have already been taken. There Is no danger of self-contradiction here 
for "there are often such quantities in space as well as in time" (A269; 13L, V). 
This was no new idea. Bolzano's definition applies perfectly to the difference 
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between a variable quantity and its limit as described by D'Alembert and 
Lacroix. It is Important though that Bolzano recognises this as a distinctive 
use of ordinary quantities which successfully replaces the older use of Infinite- 
simals. (By the 19th century some writers, e. g. Cauchy, ýrere using the 
word "infinitesimal" for Bolzano's concept of arbitrarily small) His refer- 
ence to arbitrarily small quantities as variable quantities (A269; BL, V) just 
reflected the use and confusion of the time. They were consistently used by 
Bolzano as what we should call arbitrarily chosen constants. Mention has 
already been made of the importance for the development of the concept of a 
variable that the value of a variable symbol should be understood as a matter 
of choice. Bolzano does this clearly, and when he says (BL, V as above p. 194) 
that it Is "less precise" to describe arbitrarily small quantities as "those 
which can become as small as desired", this does not stem from the extra 
emphasis on choice in the phrasing; it is simply more precise to actually say 
what Is desired, I. e. to state, with a symbol, a "given quantity". In fact 
this distinction highlights what we regard as Bolzano's main contribution to 
the development of the limit concept: the facility with v. hich he uses symbolism 
for arbitrarily small quantities. This was all that was required to take ad- 
vantage of the limit concept but was lacking to any really effective degree In 
earlier authors. 
The first example of this facility Is in BLJ12 (A292) where It Is shown 
that if x is a proper fraction, 
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the notable circumstance occurs that the binomial series 
1-xt x2 - .... xr can be brought as close to the value of 
(1 + x) as desired merely by sufficiently increasing the number 
of its terms. 
In order to keep this difference less than a quantity Da sufficient inequality 
is found for r in terms of D. (The . corking here is Identical to that In a mod- 
ern elementary analysis text) No doubt it had been known for a long time 
that this could be done but it was not common to actually go through the work- 
Eng and m2!. e'the final inequality explicit. The effect of doing so was two-fold. 
On the one hand it emphasised that all the quantities involved were perfectly 
ordinary finite quantities subject to all the usual algebraic operations and that 
the entire argument was open to inspection. On the other hand it drew attention 
to the arbitrarily small quantities, I. e. to the difference between a "variable 
quantity" and some fixed quantity. Following the result just mentioned (BL312) 
there is a series of paragraphs devoted to the treatment of such quantities. A 
conventiona: i notation is Introduced for quantittea Intended to be arbitrarily 
small (A295; BLg14); w and Cl are used by Bolzano In much the same was as E 
is used today in elementary analysis. Then there are several lemmas which 
effectively provide short-cuts In working with w's. The following are the 
main ones: 
BL§15,16: Forfixed r, (A+w) f (B+c ) (C+w)f..... 
(A295) 
r 
t(R+ci) =At Bt Ci... ±R+fl. 
f 
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BL 17,18: A. w= IZ and so (A +w) (B+w)=A. B+f2, 
(A296) 
B L§19: _ B+w $+Ci (A296) 
BL§27: i the quantities w, w in the equation A +w =B +w 
(A307) 
can become as small as desired while A and B 
remain unchanged then It must be that A=B exactly. 
The first three of these correspond n. turally to limit theorems if wo 
regard the A, B etc. occurring in them (as Bolzano did) as partial sums of 
Infinite series. Adding suffices for clarity Bolzano's lemmas correspond 
respectively to: 
(1) lim A. + urn B = lim(A + B-, ). 
(ii) (lim A) (lim B) = lim (A D, ) 
(ii) 11m 
A. 
_ 
lim A. 
lim ß 
(assuming non-zero denominators). 
B^ n. 
The fourth result quoted is rather different, the A and B are constants and are 
to be thought' of as the result of a limiting process. What Bolzano needs from 
this lemma is equtvaient to: Iff(x) = g(x) for all x, lim f (x) = limg (x) as x 
approaches a. It can be regarded as a direct arithmetic formulation of the 
method of exhaustion. Bolzano applies it in BL§28(A307). BL§64(A394) and 
RB§7(A463). Thus In spite of the very specific context in which he Is work- 
Ing Bolzano does develop what could be described as an elementary, but gen- 
erally applicable, theory of limits. It is entirely arithmetic, it uses a 
systematic notation and all arguments can be explicitly followed through; nothing 
is left mysterious. 
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4.3. Infinite Series and Convergence 
4.3.1. Outline of Bolzano's work on Series 
It was In connection with his treatment of series In 13L and RB that 
the merit of Bolzano's contribution to analysis was first recognised. This 
recognition began with Hankel's article Grenze of 1871 (Hankel [1] ) where 
he credits Bolzano with, "the first strict development of series". Wa shall 
describe in this section the extent to which this was deserved. 
Great care Is needed In assessing Bolzano's work on this subject 
because the notion of convergence gained so much more significance In the 
later 19th century than It could have had to Bolzano. It Is easy therefore to 
attribute to him a purpose and deliberation which he may not have had himself. 
For example, with respect to convergence, when considering his very success- 
ful treatment of the concept it is important to be aware that Bolzano nowhere 
actually uses the term "convergence" In BL or RB. The occurrence in A270; 
BL, VI is really a quotation but Bolzano's comment suggests he regards the 
term "convergent series" as meaning one with decreasing terms. This would 
certainly explain why he did not find the term useful. Bolzano himself saw 
the main significance of his work on series in the complete rejection (as he 
supposed) of the concept of infinity from analysis. Firstly, we shall state 
the main result of Bolzano's work on series, then give some sketch of the 
relevant earlier work, and finally return to Bolzano's papers for a more de- 
tailed assessment. 
f 
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In RB§§E, 7(A462) there appears, for the first time in mathematical 
literature what is now usually known as the general principle of convergence. 
The partial sums of an arbitrary power series in x are denoted F1 x, F2 x, 
.... Fax,...... Bolzano says, 
we regard the quantities 
F, X, F2 x, F3x,..., Fn x, ... n+rx'"' 
as a new series (called the series of sums of the previous one). 
Then there is the main theorem: If a series of quantities 
F1 x, F2 X, F 3x , ..... 9 Fn x.... 9 Fn +r x' '''0 
has the property that the difference between its nth term Fn x and 
every later one n+rx, 
however far from the former this is, remains 
smaller than any given quantity if n has been taken large enough, then 
there is always a certain constant quantity, and indeed only one, 
which the terms of this series approach and to which they can come 
as near as desired If the series Is continued far enough.. 
The principle is therefore not entirely general wince it is applied only 
to power series. The variable x is assumed to remain constant throughout: 
there is no suggestion in BL or RB of uniform convergence. The particular 
value of Bolzano's formulation here Is two-fold. Firstly, there Is the realls- 
ation that the behaviour of a series Is not determined merely by the behaviour 
of the terms, but by arbitrary (though finite) blocks of terms. Secondly, 
there Is the clear claim, and the attempt to prove, that the property of 
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"bunching up" is sufficient for the series to approach a fixed quantity arbitrarily 
closely. This sufficiency proof requires a prior theory of real numbers for it 
to be complete. (We consider Bolzano's proof in detail on p. 216 .) Tha prin- 
ciple behind this criterion for convergence had been suggested (in words not 
symbols) in BL, XIV(A278) but though it is often implicit it is never clearly 
formulated in DL where the emphasis is on the essentially finite treatment 
of all series. In fact it appears that Bolzano's Introduction of the conver- 
gence principle In ßB Is more a consequence of his desire to avoid the Infinite 
than a deliberate formulation of a fundamental concept. There is a sense then 
in which his success is accidental. It Is Ironic that Bolzano's work 13 not only 
earlier than that of Cauchy (to whom the convergence principle Is usually 
attributed, the Cours d'Analyse appearing In 1821) but, as pointed out In 
Pringsheim [1] p. 79, it Is also clearer since Cauchy still uses the ambiguous 
language of infinitesimals. But Bolzano's somewhat oblique treatment of con- 
vergence Is not only to be explained in terms of his own priorities but also 
against the background of the varied 18th century attitudes to infinite series. 
IV 
4.3.2. Infinite Series and Convergence before 1815 
Orc of the chief reasons for regarding the analysis of the 18th century 
as loose and ill-founded compared with the rigour of the 19th century is the 
very free use made then (especially by Euler) of divergent ce: ies. It has 
t 
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been pointed out (e. g. Kline [11 p. 460) that the "correct" concept of converg- 
ence was touched on several times during the 18th century by different authors 
only to be subsequently Ignored. The question of why the modern concept of 
convergence was not taken up and exploited at once is tempting to pursue but 
largely misconceived. The modern concept is inseparable now from such 
things as the theory of real numbers and the importance of uniform conver- 
gence for integration; It has a significance and attraction based on reasons 
which would be anachronisms in the 18th century. The concept at that time In 
its evolution had simply not proved useful enough, nor clear enough, to gain 
central role in the treatment of infinite series. It will be valuable though to 
describe what place it did have and to consider why it developed so slowly. 
To do this we need some outline of the occurrence and use of Infinite series 
up till 1800. 
Two Important problems of Infinite series had already emerged 
clearly by the end of the 17th century. These were (i) how to find the sum of 
a given Infinite series, and (ii) how to expand a given function into an Infinite 
series (usuälly a power series). The first kind of problem typically arose In 
the 17th century from attempts to solve quadrature and rectification problems. 
The second problem was very Important for applying calculus operations to 
trigonometric functions and even simple reciprocal functions. The urgent 
practical need here produced the binomial theorem for fractional, and negative 
exponents (Newton 1676) and Taylor series (1717). The concept of convergence 
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was eventually crucial for both kinds of problem but initially it arose with the 
first problem, that of summation. Gregory of St. Vincent resolved the para- 
dox of Achilles and the tortoise by summing an appropriate infinite geometric 
progression, and the meaning of the "sum" he expressed as follows: 
the terminus of a progression I3 the end of the series to which the 
progression does not attain, even if continued to Infinity, but to which 
it can approach more closely than by any given interval. (Gregory of 
St. Vincent [1] ) 
Though somewhat muddled this contains the germ of the modern concept of 
convergence in terms of limit. The actual words "convergent" and "divergent" 
used by James Gregory seem to have been more a means of describing how a 
series reaches its sum than whether it has one. The point here is that infinity 
was regarded as a "number" that could be included In ordinary calculation. 
(For example, see Wallis Arithmetica Infinitorum 1655; he and John Bernoulli 
regarded infinitesimals as "real" numbers arising from 
, Thus many 
of the early discussions of convergence and divergence were In the guise of 
const derations as to whether the sum of a particular series was finite or 
Infinite. There was no question then of a series failing to have a sum just 
because It became Indefinitely large. This attitude was clearly an Important 
factor in the slow development of a convergence criterion; while there was 
no great arithmetical distinction between finite and Infinite number symbols 
there was no pressing need to distinguish series with finite and Infinite sums. 
/ 
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Indeed the more urgent problem was to Improve the rate of convergence for 
the sake of improving tables and practical applications. 
The use of infinite number symbols and a kind of convergence criterion 
both appear In a paper by Euler on harmonic series In 1734 1; uler [11.0 n p. 119 of 
Reiff [1] it is said that this criterion coincides with the modern general con- 
vergence criterion but this is certainly an exaggeration of the passage he 
quotes and the example Euler gives. A more accurate comment (Pringsheim 
ýlý p. 78 Note 150) is that what Euler actually offers here is a correct diver- 
gence criterion to the effect that a series diverges If tim Its sal > 0. The 
example given by Euler Is the series ý+a+b+a+ 2b +'''" with Ith 
term 
a+c- 1) b 
(And here Euler Is'using i as a symbol for infinity! ) 
Now If the series Is continued to the term a+ (n I- 1) b 
then the sum of the 
series from the (I + 1)th term to the n. ith term Is smaller than n- 
1)1 e but 
a+Ib 
greater than 
(n - 1)Ic Since I Is Infinitely great this sum Is less than a+(n. I-1)b 
n -b c and greater than n nb 
c therefore It Is finite and the above series 
Is divergent. Euler was inconsistent with respect to Infinite series, some- 
times advocating great caution with divergent series and sometimes comm- 
fitting the wildest excesses with such series. He was, like many others in 
the 18th century, strongly Influenced by the work of Leibniz. In the work 
De serlebus divergent[bus, 1754 Euler E2] (written partly in response to 
criticism from Nicholas Bernoulli), Euler discusses the arguments for and 
against the use of divergent series. Among reasons for their use he quotes 
J II 
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approvingly Leibniz's determination of the series 1-1+1-1+.... as equal 
to Z. Leibniz said that "a quantity for which there are equal grounds for 
ascribing two values must be taken equal to their arithmetic mean .... thus 
the nature of things here follows the same law of justice. " ,:, eibniz [5] p. 386) 
He concluded, "although this kind of argument may seem more metaphysical 
than mathematical, it is nevertheless sound. 11 Oscillating divergent series, 
like 1-1+1-1+.... , caused much discussion as to what value should be 
attached to them, but It was assumed that they should have some value. Li 
the end Leibniz's probability method was acrepted by the Bernoullis, Euler 
(who used the method for many more complicated cases) and Lagrange. It 
was virtually unopposed throughout the 18th century and until Laplace disputed 
the method in Theorie de nrohzbil[te (1812). Ii one insists on associating a 
"sum" with a diverging series of this sort It Is Indeed a perfectly reasonable 
way of doing so. Unfortunately it had the unjustified, but plausible, cffect of. 
reinforcing confidence in the validity of binomial theorem expansions for un- 
restricted values of the variable. (Grandi hwd obtaii: ed 1-1+1- 
by putting x=-1 in the expansion of 1+x (Grand! 
[1]), and Euler put 
x=tin 11 x 
More important from our present point of view was the attitude to 
properly divergent series. James Bernoulli had proved In 1689 that the 
harmonic series was divergent (Bernoulli, James [1] ), and he drew attention 
to the fact that the sum of a series whose "last" term vanishes can be 
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infinite. To most mathematicians in the 18th century this result not only 
seemed highly paradoxical but was almost a contradiction in terms. Conver- 
gence was generally taken to mean "having a finite sum" and a sufficient 
criterion was regarded as being that the terms decrease Er magnitude to zero 
as a limit. The divergence of the harmonic series contradicted this and the 
result 1-I+1-1+.. =2 showed the criterion was not necessary for con- 
vergence. Euler, again under criticism from Nicholas Bernoulli, tried to 
distinguish the sum from the "value" of a series. The value of a series, he 
said, was the value of the expression from w: iich the series originates (Euler 
[3J ). Thus it was acknowledged that an infinite series cannot have a "sum" in 
the same sense as a finite series, we can simply associate a number, a value, 
with the series which may behave like a sum. 
Th3re had always been voices of caution over infinite series and during 
the 18th century attitudes tended to polarise into two camps. In the majority.. 
were those who felt that anything that can be written down and operated with 
formally (includingoo) must mean something. But a minority were very con- 
scious that an Infinite series can never actually be written down or summed In 
the usual sense, and operating with such a series may be meaningless. Of 
course, both sides used the language of convergence and divergence as well 
as the to symbol. We shall mention a few of those who advocated caution. 
Varignon [1) said early In the 18th century that no series should be used 
without Investigating Its remainder. Nicholas Bernoulli pointed out in a 
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letter to Euler that a divergent series can never exactly represent the value 
of the quantity from which it arose since even If continued to Infinity there Is 
still an error. In Bernoulli, N. [1] he gives as an example that 
11 x 
isnot="1+x+x' +... +x" 
but 
1 X+1 
1-x =1+x+x +... +x + 1-x 
D'Alembert was perhaps the strongest Influence for the cause of convergence 
In the 18th century. In 1768 he wrote: 
For me all reasoning with series wht, h do not converge and which- 
cannot be assumed to do so is always very suspect even when these 
reasonings agree with truths known otherwise. (D'Alembert [2J p. 183) 
Even in this second half of the century the Infinity symbol was still used freely, 
D'Alembert wrote (in reference to a series used by Langrange) that one can- 
not ascribe convergence to the geometric series 
_ 
e+e+... 
or 
e+e+,.,. 
00 -ooI--, % 
since neither e, nor e, equals 0 (D'Alembert [E] ). But what did 
D'Alembert mean by convergence? The Encyclopedie entry Convergent 
(Vol. 4,1754) Is very brief: 
Convergent, adj. on Algebre, se dit dune serte, lorsque ses termed 
vont toujours en diminuant. Ainsi 1, ,,.,, &c est une series con- 
vergente.. 
f 
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But by the entry for Se r16 Vol. 15,1765) this had slightly improved: 
.... lorsque la suite ou la serie va toujours en approchant de plus en 
plus de quelque quantit6 finie, & que par cong6quent les terms de cette 
serie, ou les quantites dont eile est composee, vont toujours en dimi: i- 
uant, on Pappelle une suite convergente, & si on la continue ä l'infint, 
eile devient enfin egale ä cette quantite. 
L grange's Theorie des fonctions (1797) Is sometimes hailed as 
marking the beginning of "the exact treatment of Infinite series" (Reiff [1] p. 155). 
This is on account of the careful treatment In the work of the remainder term 
for a Taylor series. However, Lagrange nowhere relates the behaviour of 
the remainder with the convergence of the series. The whole point for 
Lagrange was to be able to estimate the error in an approximation obtained 
from only a finite number of terms of a Taylor ssries. His notion of con- 
vergence Is still quite naive and no Improvement on that he expressed In 1770: 
... In order for a series to be able to be regarded as really repres- 
enting the value of a quantity sought it Is necessary for it to be con- 
vergent at its extremity, that is to say, Its last terms should be 
Infinitely small so that the error can become less than any given 
quantity. (Lagrange[2] ) 
Lagrange's proof of convergence here Is limited to showing that the terms 
of a series finally converge to zero. And In much of the work of Theorie 
des fonctions .... he tntrodti1: es, and relies on, series without any 
c 
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consideration of whether they converge or not. Hank-el comments: "Naive 
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trust in the good-nature of series had its last triumph with Lagrange. 11 (Hankel 
[1] p. 209). 
One of Bolzano's important reference works was Klügel's Mathemat; - 
ischeo Wörterbuch. But there was little inspiration to be found there in the 
article Convergent. With the ambiguity between definition and criterion that 
was so common with regard to convergence we read: 
A series is convergent if the successive terms become continually 
smaller. The sum of the terms then always approaches nearer to thA 
value of the quantity which is the sum of the series continued to 
infinity. (Kiilgel [2] ) 
Even around 1800 when Infinite series were well-established and be- 
coming much more sophisticated the question of finding a general character- 
istic to distinguish convergent series had not become a widely recognised or 
urgent problem. There were two reasons. Firstly, the common use in the 
18th century of infinity as a numerical value meant that the existence or 
meaning of an Infinite series did not depend on Its convergence. Secondly, 
the pragmatic policy of Ignoring the absurdities and paradoxes that sometimes 
arose from divergent series and just using them whenever they could be useful 
was very successful in those areas where success was obvious and appreci- 
ated - the solving of practical problems. However, this neglect of the theor- 
etical aspects of infinite series led to the most widely divergent attitudes 
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early In the 19th century. 
We shall end this survey by mentioning two very different works which 
were each published in 1813. The first is by von Prasse, Institutiones Analy- 
ticae, described by Hankel as "standing at a high point In ccLence in Germany". 
It is almost entirely concerned with the development and use of series but con- 
vergence Is only spoken of once where it is remarked about a geometric series 
that, "one says it diverges if x>1 and in other cases It converges, these terms 
are carried over to other series. " Prasse [1] . And that is all. In contrast 
there Is the important paper by Gauss on the hypergeometric series: 
.. x a(a+1)a(p+i)x' 1+a1. 
Y + 1.2 Y (Y+ 1) + .... 
Gauss [2ý 
He begins by considering the ratio of successive terms and dealing with tho 
cases x< 1 and x>1 by comparison with a geometric progression. The case 
x=1 occupies the major part of the paper with a detailed analysis of the pos- 
sibilities for a, ý, Y. He develops the criteria for convergence in an ad hoc 
way just for this particular case but it is exhaustive and strict and he even 
considers the cases when x is complex. It has been said that here the con- 
vergence of an Infinite series was investigated properly for the first time 
(Dunnington [1], Tropflee [1] ). The claim Is true but modest; the investiga- 
tion Is entirely concerned with this particular series. But no claims are made 
by Gauss about general criteria for use with any series. 
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4.3.3. Bolzano's work on Infinite Series and Convergence 
Bolzano does not set out anywhere in BL or RB to give a theory of 
Infinite series or convergence. What he says about these topics Is entirely 
for the sake of the theorems he is engaged in proving: the binomial theorem and 
the intermediate value theorem. His approach to the infinite cases of the bt- 
nomial series is however quite radical and icj evidently intended to apply gen- 
erally. He rejects the concept of an infinite series completely: 
every assumption of an Infinite series, as far as I see, Is the assump- 
tion of infinitely many quantities and every attempted calculation-of its 
value is therefore an attempted calculation of the infinite, a true cal- 
culus Infin[tesimalls. Therefore if one does not want to be Involved In 
such things ..... then one must refrain altogether from the acceptance 
and calculation of infinite series. (A268; BL, IV) 
Bolzano immediately goes on to speak of his replacement of infinitely small 
quantities by what we have called arbitrarily small quantities. Thus the 
reason for this ruthless approach to infinite series lies In the implicit assump- 
tions about infinity which Bolzano believes are made in the usual use of such 
series. This refers both to the infinitely large ("the assumption of a sum of 
Infinitely many quantities") and the Infinitely small ("a. true calculus Infinites- 
imal[s"), The connection between these concepts is not made very clear, it 
Is presumably thought that the infinitely remote terms of a convergent series 
will have to be infinitely small. (Compare the quotation by Lagrange on 
212 
convergence, p208), The consequent restriction to finite series does not mean 
the complete rejection of the general binomial theorem, although "it Is certain 
that this [binomial) equation really only holds precisely if the exponent Is a 
whole positive number" (A269; BL, V). But to deal with the eases of fractionsC. 
or negative exponents Bolzano speaks of the binomial expression being "equal 
in a certain sense" (A272; BL, VIII) to a finite portion of its corresponding bi- 
nomial series. By this he means that the difference between a binomial 
expression and Its corresponding series can be made arbitrarily small by 
taking the series far enough. For example, the binomial series 
I-x+ x" - X3 +,,, t xr cmi be put equal only in a certain sense, 
to the true value of 
2 +X}' =1 =1-X+X -x3+... l+l 
I. e. If x-1 +' X can 
become as small as desired by the Increase In 
r, i. e. if x< 1 1. (A272; BL, VIII, IX). 
In fact, as mentioned in the section on limit (p. 197) Bolzano shows explicitly 
(A292; BLe12) how to find the value of r which makes this difference less than 
a given quantity D. In §13 he remarks that for practical calculation these 
Imprecise but arbitrarily close equations are just as good as an exact 
equation and therefore merit "careful attention". He now describes such an 
Imprecise binomial equation as "valid In the sense that one considers added 
to one term ti. e. side] of the equation a quantity which can be smaller than 
any given quantity. 11 This l3aus to the series of lemmas on arbitrarily small 
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quantities, cw, fl etc. which correspond with results about limits. For the 
further results on the binomial thecrem Bolzano effectively proves theorems 
of the form f(x) =p, (x) + wa(x) for all r, where f(x) is the binomial to be ex- 
panded, p,. (x) Is a finite power series up to xr and (4r(x) i4 `he corresponding 
remainder. When the w,, (x) Is arbitrarily small, there Is a useful and valid 
case of the binomial theorem. We should now express this by saying that 
when linc4r(x) = 0, we define the corresponding infinite series to mean 
1i+, (x)) ; In this context the limit would necessarily exist and equal f(x). 
Bolzano's approach avoids the need to prove the existence of any limit but it 
has the great inconvenience that the binomial series (whenever it should be 
Infinite) Is not unique, It Is any one of an (infinite) sequence of finite series. 
In spite of his repudiation of the infinite and of infinite series it is clear that 
Bolzano must assume not only the potential infinity of integers as exponents 
but also the infinity of arbitrarily small numbers as differences.. Th3 Import- 
ant feature of Bolzano's treatment which was distinctive and fruitful was that 
only finite quantities ever entered into calculations and all calculations were 
only finite. 
The insistence on finite calculations, without the explicit use of the -' 
limit concept, led to rather elaborate circumlocutions in the formulation of 
many theorems. For example in BL 30(A315), 
A series developed in powers of x is to be either completely equal, 
or at least come as near as desired if the number of Its terms is 
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taken large enough, to the value of the complex function (1 + x)".... " 
The same sort of long-winded description occurs in many results throughout 
the rest of the paper (e. g. BL§§33,35,41,42,43 etc. ) and its repetition must 
have emphasised, to Bolzano at least, the significance of arbitrarily close 
approximation. There seems to have been a kind of feedback here between 
the two aspects of infinite series mentioned earlier, 1. e. direct summation of 
a series and the series development of a function. The binomial theorem is 
the development of a certain kind of function: the series was seen to be either 
exactly equal, or under suitable conditions arbitrarily close, to the function. 
Here the function comes first with the series derived from it and compared 
with it. In RB the priority is reversed and- a general series is considered 
with a property (namely that remote finite "blocks" of the series become 
arbitrarily small). which ensures that the series comes arbitrarily close to 
some fixed quantity which was not previously known or given. We shall now 
indicate how the significance of considering finite "blocks" of a series was 
likely to have been suggested by Bolzano's work on the binomial theorem. 
In the Preface of BL there is an Informal description of the idea of the 
convergence principle which Is used In RB. While considering proofs of the 
binomial theorem, "of which nothing could be criticised if they were not based 
on the Inad: nissable Idea of Infinite series 11 (A278; BL, XIV), Bolzano continues: 
Series are obtained which are indeed equal to one another from their 
first term up to arbitrarily many terms but they then !. ave just as 
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many unequal terms, so that in order to claim the equality of their 
value it is necessary to show that the sum of the unequal terms can be- 
come smaller than any given quantity if one makes the number of equal 
terms large enougiL. 
This is not explained any more in the Preface, but Boizano is almost certainly 
referring to the sort of Induction step In BL which takes the form of proving 
that If the theorem holds for exponents p and q separately then It will also hold 
for the exponent p+q; the p and q here are not just Integers but arbitrary 
numbers (see A335-346; BL§§38-41). Bolzano proves this by taking initial 
finite blocks of the expansions of (1 + x)? and (1 + x)4 (up to xr and xs res- 
pectively) and first showing that all terms of their product up to x" or xs (which- 
ever Is the smaller of r, s) are Identical with the corresponding terms of the 
binomial series for (1 + x)I'+ý . But then, as explained In BI§39(A340), there 
are always a number of other terms, in fact as many as the greater of r, s 
which are not Identical with the corresponding terms of the (1 + x)P+4 series: 
"these will be greater as one takes r and s greater ... therefore however 
many terms in the product M correspond to the binomial series, at least as 
many also deviate from it. " It is the behaviour of this finite block of terms 
from xr+' (if r <s) to x""s that determines, in the case of p or q not being 
Integers, whether the two series may be sai J to be equal or not. 
Only In the case when x Is a proper fraction does the special circum- 
stance occur that the unequal terms always become smaller and that 
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one can actually make the value of their sum as small as desired by 
the increase in r and s. (A341; BL, 61). 
Although it appears here in the context of the equality of two series, 
this behaviour of the finite block of terms in the product from x"1 to xr4. 
'g 
, 
as r Increases, Is precisely what Is described In the convergence criterion 
of RB§§6,7(A462). The nth partial sum of a power series Is denoted Fn x and, 
the difference between its nth term Fjx and every later term Fn+r x 
(no matter how far from that nth term) stays smaller than any given 
quantity If n has been taken large enough. 
Given this condition, then the theorem of RBä7 states that there Is a unique 
constant quantity which the partial sums approach arbitrarily closely. The 
argument here consists of four steps: 
(1) If such a constant quantity X exists it can be determined as 
accurately as desired; 
(ii) therefore the assumption of a quantity X, "contains no imposs- 
ability"; 
(III) therefore there Is a real quantity, X; 
(iv) this quantity X is unique. 
There can be no quarrel with the first, or the fourth step, Bolzano goes 
through the working correctly to show exactly how, using the assumptions, 
an F x can be found which differs from X by less than any given quantity d. 
c 
217 
We could paraphrase the original statement of the theorem by saying that If a 
sequence of partial sums "bunches up" then it has a limit. Bolzano's first 
step shows that if the sequence has a limit (which will generally not coincide 
with any of the partial su_.. ts) then the value of this limit may be determined 
arbitrarily closely by purely internal inspection of the partial sums. But here 
the argument breaks down; it Is hard to see how steps (1I) and (i[i) follow In 
any way from what has gone before. In BG Bolzano had emphasised that the 
possibility of a concept must be proved before the concept can be used (A68,71; 
BG, 11§3,, q7). In the passage from BD (A137; BD, 30) quoted on p. 55 he speaks 
of purely symbolic concepts (such as infinity and i) which,, if their use 
were shown to be consistent, could be adjoined to the "real" concepts of elem- 
entary mathematics. These ideas may have led Bolzano to believe that the 
possibility of the limit could be sufficient ground for its existence. And (1) 
may very reasonably have made hint feel that the limit certainly should exist, 
%: 
or that no Inconsistency would arise if It were assumed to exist. However, to 
the extent that we give Bolzano credit for recognising the subtlety of the need 
to prove the existence of the limit (and this, after all, Is the main statement 
of the theorem ßB§37), we must also admit that he falls to give this proof. He 
can hardly have been satisfied himself: the abrupt conclusion after the proof 
of (i) that "there is therefore a real quantity" Is wholly disconnected and 
Inadequate. It has no precedent in his other proofs except perhaps parts of 
the tentative BG, Part if, but there he often admits his own failures. RB 
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was intended to be something of a showpiece and presumably this may have 
prevented any admission of imperfection. 
It has not been pointed out before in the literature on this part of 
Bolzano's work (4.3.4) than. RBE7 is In fact just a formal statement of the con- 
vergence criterion, not Its first discovery. We have Indicated how It origin- 
ates from the work in the early part of BL but it is also used there explicitly 
to prove the convergence of the exponential series. In BL§70(A411) it Is 
correctly proved that, 
the series 1+1+1+1+.... +1 1.2 1.2.3 1.2.3... r 
can be continued so far that its increase for every further continuation 
remains smaller than any givea quantity. 
And he concludes, 
..... It follows from this there would have to exist a certain constant 
quantity which this series steadily approaches and to which It can 
come so near that the difference is smaller than any given quantity. 
It is tantalis[ns; in retrospect to consider how near Bolzano was, after 
proving property (1) (p. 216) of what are now often called Cauchy sequences, 
to actually identifying real numbers with Cauchy sequences of rationals. In 
fact there Is some evidence that Bolzano was aware that the result of RB37 
does depend on a "correct" concept or defin! tion of number. The theorem 
of RB§7 Is used crucially to prove RB§12, the original form of the Bolzano- 
Weierstrass theorem, and in his overall summary in the Preface of RB 
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Bolzano refers to the main existence result as follows: "Whence It follows 
for everyone who has a correct concept of quantity, 
[Grosse] that the Idea of 
[such] an I.... Is the idea of a real, I. e. actual, quantity. " (A451; 1B, 23) 
Also, during the 1830's in the course of developing his own, rather complicated 
theory of real numbers Bolzano does refer to the inadequacy of his RBS7 proof 
(Bolzano [6] ). 
4.3.4. Secondary Sources onBolzano's work on Convergence 
Unfortunately Bolzano's purpose of gaining some attention and support 
with the publication of BL and RB failed miserably. There is no definite 
evidence of either of these works having been read or appreciated by any 
mathematicians for about fifty years after their appearance. 
There have been a number of articles on the question of whether Cauchy 
may have read and used Bolzano's ideas on convergence and continuity. Most 
notable in recent years have been the papers Grattan-Guinness [1], Freuden- 
thal [1] and Sinaceur [1]. We do not propose to go into the details of the 
Issue here. It will probably never be known for certain whether Cauchy, In 
writing his Cours d'Analyse, owed anything to Bolzano or not. Clearly this 
was possible but the strenuous special pleading employed by Grattan-Gu[nne; 1,3 
to try and make It appear probable does not seem fair or profitable. The 
controversy is largely Irrelevant from our present point of view, that'of' 
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simply understanding Bolzano's work on convergence, except that it has pro- 
duced some serious misjudgements, by both sides, of the work In RB. We 
refer to these later. 
Hankel's article Grenze was the first published and authoritative 
acknowledgement of Bolzano's mathematical work on Infinite series. Mviously 
seeking to make amends for the unjust neglect of his subject Hankel speaks in 
glowing terms of the work in BL: 
Bolzano's concepts of the convergence of series are altogether clear 
and correct, his operations with inf: rAte series are all strictly proved.. '. 
... Briefly, he possessed everything which puts him in this respect 
at equal eminence with Cauchy = only without the Frenchman's P rt of 
dressing-up his ideas and presenting them in the most attz1active way. 
So Bolzano stayed unknown and would soon be forgotten; Cauchy was 
the fortunate one who was hailed as the reformer of the science and 
whose elegant writings spread quickly and widely. (Hankes [1] §19) 
This is rather exaggerated. There ai-e mistakes in Bolzano's work 
and It really bears little comparison with the prolific work of Cauchy. For 
example, Bolzano mistakenly claims that (1 + x) does not converge for x-1 
and positive a (A271; BL, VII); In fact with x=1 it converges for all n>-1. 
What is striking about Hankel's article is the omission of any mention of 
RB. His eulogy of Bolzano is entirely based on the "finite" treatment of 
the general binomial theorem, which we regard here as only an intermediate 
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stage on the way to his real Insight into how to treat convergence in RBOG, 7. 
As Stolz points out (Stolz [1] ), the combination of Hankel's readiness to 
credit Bolzano and the fact that earlier in his article (Hankel [1] 04-8) 
Hankel seems to think he is himself the first to establish the sufficiency of 
the Cauchy convergence criterion must mean that RB was inaccessible to him. 
This seems very odd because he can hardly have been Ignorant of the work. 
It is predicted, though not by title, in BL itself and it appears In Rogg's 
% 
Handbuch &r mathematischen Literatur (1830), as well as in the first volumo 
of the famous bibliography by Poggendorf published In 1863. Also, RB not 
only appeared separately In 1817 but it was published In 1818 In the AbhF nd- 
Lungen der kön[glichen böhmischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften. 
The purpose of the paper Stolz [1] (1881) was, as he describes it, to 
clarify and summarise the definitions and propositions on the principles of 
analysis [Infinitesimalrechn ung] which were peculiar to Bolzano in contrast 
to Cauchy. He believes that though Cauchy "founded analysis" Bolzano had 
"discovered some years earlier the basic concepts which in many ways 
agreed with those of Cauchy but which in important points were even better" 
(original emphasis In Stolz [i]p. 255). Among others he has sections on 
upper limits, convergence of series of real terms, differentiation of infinite 
series, and the rectification of curves. He makes use of the works BD, BL, 
RB, DP and the posthumous work Paradoxien des Unendlichen. The paper 
is brief with little commentary. The section IV on convergence mainly 
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consists of quotations from RB3§5,6 and 7. Stolz is wrong to regard RBI5,6 
as an explanation of the necessity of the convergence criterion. Bolzano just 
shows there that a geometric progression with common ratio less than one, 
or a series whose terms are smaller than such a progression, will satisfy 
the criterion In RBg6. 
Kolman, in his work on Bolzano originally written In 1955 follows Stolz 
in the error of supposing that in RB§5,6 Bolzano is showing the necessity of 
his criterion (Kolman [1] p. 50). While admitting the proof of sufficiency is 
defective he says that, "it goes as far as possible without a theory of real 
numbers". This seems a rather pointless and biassed claim in the absence of 
any justification. 
For the sake of completeness we should also briefly mention the paper 
Wussing [13 which quotes both Bolzano's RA7 and Cauchy's convergence def- 
inilion for comparison. He adds almost no commentary except the remark, 
"Bolzano makes use - before Cauchy - of the Cauchy convergence principle, 
a necessary and sufficient criterion for convergence". He does not say 
Bolzano proves the necessity (contrary to Grattan-Guinness 
[2] 
p. 72, Note 12). 
However, this mistake is made categorically by Steele in his Introduction to 
Paradoxes of the Infinite ( Steele (1) p. 29). and also by Sebestik in the intro- 
duction to his French translation of RB (Sebestik [1] ). Steele actually sum- 
marises the proof but has obviously failed to see the point that the limit can 
be approximated to any accuracy by the F. x alone. 
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There are two sources of commentary by Grattan-Guinness on Bolzano's 
work on series. These are the book Grattan-Guinness [2] and article Grattan- 
Guinness [1]; both appeared in 1970 and we shall denote them Foundations and 
New Analysis respectively. They contain a more detailed consideration of 
Bolzano's early work than had previously been given in any English publication. 
Two useful points that are 'made are to correct the error that RBf6 is about 
the necessity of the convergence criterion, and to state that ßB was available 
In Paris, in the Bibliotheque Nationale, in 118 (Foundations p. 76,77). Un- 
fortunately, however, much of the assessment of Bolzano is Ill-judged. The 
extravagant claims made about his work are nevertheless relevant so they need 
some consideration. Grattan-Guinness's judgements seem to be affected by 
his Idea of "limit-avoidance" as an understanding of the limit concept by which 
"we may move as close as we wish to the limit, while still avoiding the limit 
Itself". And in New Analysis (p. 378) he says of limit-avoidance that, 
the limiting value Is defined by the property that the values in a seq- 
uence avoid that limit by an arbitrarily small amount when the corres- 
ponding parror. ieter ... avoids its own 
limiting value. 
The theory, or approach, of limit-avoidance is regarded as a profound dist- 
anguishing feature of a "complete reformulation of the whole of analysis" 
which was Inaugurated by Bolzano and Cauchy (New Analysis p. 378). Limit- 
avoidance is meant to be the key to understanding Bolzano's definition of 
continuity (see p. 2 38). In that context he writes: 
. 
"ý; 
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This is the quintessence of his "pure analysis", for with it he started 
a revolution in approach to the subject: the arithmetisation of analyst's_ 
by means of limit-avoidance techniques such as in his definition 3.3. 
He used the apprco;; h consistently in his paper of 1817;... (Foundations, 
p, 55). 
And again a little later: 
Bolzano not only distrusted infinitesimals but also solved the problem 
of limits by Introducing limit-avoidance. (Foundations, p. 56, original 
emphasis in both quotes) 
Thus Grattan-Guinness regards limit-avoidance as something new with 
Boizano (and Cauchy) and that it is consistently adopted by him. (This, in- 
cidentally, is one of his main arguments for Cauchy's plagiarising. ) But both 
these opinions are wrong. In the Sec. 4.2.2 we have quoted earlier examples 
of unambiguous concepts of limit-avoidance such as that of Newton and D'Alem- 
Bert, And Bolzano (if he had used the term "limit" which he did not) must 
have allowed a sequence to achieve Its limit because In RB §5 he regards 
it series as examples which show that the convergence criterion is satts- 
fled by at least some series. Clearly after a sufficient number of terms they 
actually equal the "constant quantity to which they can come as near as 
desired". 
I 
In fact the whole Idea of limit-avoidance seems to be of doubtful value 
as a distinctive concept to apply to the development of limits. In many 
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definitions, such as those of L'Huilier and Cauchy, it is not specified whether 
or not the limit is allowed to be achieved. Not being excluded It Is presumably 
therefore Included - to the added generality of the concept. Yet Grattan- 
Guinness always seems to regard limit-avoidance as an advance; does he think 
it Is exemplified in the modern concept of limit? it is all very peculiar. 
In Foundations there is an account of the important paragraph RBJ7. 
Having pointed out that Bolzano has phrased his theorem, "in a way which 
again uses limit-avoidance" (but does it? ), he writes the following sentence: 
Since the existence proof was prior to uniqueness, he assumed that hs 
could take a variable value for the sum-function (varying, that is, 
Independently of its being a function of x), which could therefore be 
selected to be within an arbitrary degree of closeness to what he 
called the "true value" of itself. (Foundations p. 73) 
This is completely wrong, as a reading of the proof (RB, 22) is enough 
to show. Bolzano starts his proof by saying that If the quantity claimed by 
the theorem was not assumed to be unique and invariable It could easily be 
chosen suitably - it could even be identified with the F x terms. (This may 
seem silly or irrelevant but It is the way Bolzano does it. ) Then he goes on 
to say that the assumption of an Invariable quantity Is not Impossible because 
It can be _: bitrarily closely approximated etc. 
So mach for the account in Foundations. In the New Analysis there 
Is a section (2.2) on the convergence of series and the main print made 
C 
226 
(p. 376) is that both Bolzano and Cauchy, "found a general condition for con- 
vergence in terms of the behaviour of s,,,., - s as n tends to Infinity: a result 
of quite profound criginality. " We have pointed out above the importance of 
this treatment of finite b1 ks and how Bolzano may have been led to Its gen- 
eral application through experience In BL with the finite treatment of the pro- , 
duct of two binomial series. But It was not an original idea. We have quoted 
Euler's use of such finite blocks of an infinite series to obtain a divergence 
criterion (p. 201. (Grattan-Guinness refers to this paper himself in Founda- 
tions p. 75, Footnote 18. ) There are many detailed errors about Bolzano's 
work in New Analysis which we shall not mention here: most of them are 
pointed out in Freudenthal [1]. 
We shzll consider one further point from New Analysis because of its 
significance (if there were any truth in it) to our present treatment of Bolzano's 
analysis. Grattan-Guinness believes that between BL and RB there occurs 
the transition in Bolzano's thought between the "old" analysis and the "new" 
(New Analysis p. 38 , 1). ]Referring to Bolzano he writes there: 
Thus in 1816, for example, before the flood of his own new thinking, 
he published a treatise on the binomial series in the style of the old 
analysis which is really quite remarkably uninteresting. 
Now all three papers BL, RB and DP were almost certainly written within 
twelve months of each other (probably In 1814 or 1815 and then revised 
Sec. 1.3). And RB is said, In a footnote of BL (A312; BL, 32) to already be 
r 
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written out ready for printing. There would therefore need to be very strong 
internal evidence to maintain the idea of any major transition in outlook. We 
can see no such evidence at all. On the contrary, as we have indicated, there 
seems to be a steady progression in the basic ideas about convergence and con- 
tinuit-y (particularly the latter, see P-238). 
The Paper Freudenthal [1] is a lively rejoinder to Grattan-Guinness' 
New Analysis, The purpose of the paper is to discuss whether Cauchy plaglar- 
ised Bolzano, so much of the material is not immediately relevant to us. There 
are several corrections to New Analysis but in the Sec. 3 entitled "Bolzano's 
Pamphlet of 1817" Freudenthal makes an error himself. Referring to Bolzano 
he says (p, 379): 
His terminology is unusual: a sequence of functions Is called a ver''an- 
derliche Grösse, and a single function a bestandige Grösse, The Cauchy 
convergence criterion Is formulated for a sequence, not of numbers, but 
of functions, and the property that is formulated, Is, in fact, uniform 
convergence... 
For the concept of the uniform convergence of a sequence of functions it is 
essential to quantify over the Independent variable. There is no suggestion of 
such quantification in RB§6,7 or anywhere else In RB. Nor can there by any 
doubt about It precisely because of the perfectly normal use of best'tndlge 
Grdsse (constant quantity) ' In RB§2 and RB§7. The limit of the sequence of 
function values, F1x, F2x, ... Fnx, ... , say, IN-, is a constant quantity 
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because x Is being regarded as fixed; the sequence is point-wise convergent. 
The partial sum Fnx (not the sequence) is a veränderliche Grösse (variable 
quantity), as n varies, but this term Is only used in this context In RBe1. 
Usually verHnderliche Grdsse Is used for the Independent -variable x (e. g. ßB11). 
The recent paper Kitcher [11 is by far the most substantial and inter- 
esting study of RB that has appeared in the literature. Here our interest is 
on the paper's Sec. III which is chiefly about the proof of RBJ7. Kitcher's 
main point is, ostensibly, that the proof will not make sense (will be "utterly 
incomprehensible" and "hopelessly askew") if we view it as part of an attempt 
at arithmetising analysis. Instead, we are invited to view it "against the 
background of his [Bolzano's] ideal of algebraic analysis". In fact in this 
context the distinction seems more rhetorical than substantial for it is not 
clearly related to the remarks Kitcher makes in explaining the proof.. He 
divides the argument into two parts: ' 
[1]If the assumption that there is a constant quantity to which the 
sequence tends does not ccntain "anything impossible" then there Is 
such a quantity. 
[2] Since on the basis of that assumption we can determine the quantity 
as precisely as we like, there is nothing impossible contained in the 
assumption. (Katcher [l} p. 248) 
These corresponds to the steps, (1I) Implies (iii), and (I) implies (ii), In 
terms of our analysis of the a_gument above (p; 16 ). Kitcher says we 
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should consider [11 In the light of what he calls (and attributes to Bolzano/ the 
"liberal approach to quantities". According to this, we may take expressions 
to denote (analytic) quantities provided that our assumptions are compatible 
with the laws of analysis. So consistency implies existence. Evidence that 
Bolzano did follow this liberal approach is then adduced from numerous ref- 
erences to Paradoxien des Unendlichen. Then It Is easy to justify step [1] 
because a proposition is possible if and only if It Is compatible with the con- 
ceptual truths of analysis. This argument is in accord with what we have said 
above (p. 55 ) based on remarks made in BD. Our only criticism would be the 
strong and unqualified reliance Kitcher makes on the Paradoxien, a work which 
was not written (even then only in note form) until the last year of Bolzano's 
life in 1848. There are many drastic changes in this work from his earlier 
views (e. g. he there defends the existence and use of Infinitely large and 
small quantities) and so it Is quite unfounded to use it to support Intricate 
steps in an argument made thirty years earlier. 
As for step [2], this is admitted to be simply unjustified. A good 
example Is given to prove this which we could paraphrase as follows. Suppose 
tr were an algebraic number and consider a suitable Cauchy sequence (e. g. 
derived from Inscribed polygons) which converges to IT . The number defined 
by the properties of being algebraic and the limit of this sequence could be 
arbitrarily closely approximated to but to assume it exists would be contra- 
dictory. Kitther adds the spc culation that Boizano may have argued in the 
t 
230 
following way. Any incompatibility of the limit with the laws of analysis would 
be preserved by the approximation process, I. e. If the approximating quan- 
tities were compatible then so would be their limit. Thus the argument could 
be thought of as a kind of relative consistency proof. Such an idea is valuable 
because its plausibility shows that Bolzano may not just have been dissimulating 
in demonstrating the possibility of arbitrary approximation. 
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4.4. The Continuity of Functions 
4.4.1. Introduction 
The concept of function is more abstract and more recent than that 
of an infinite series and so the analytic concept of continuity had received less 
treatment before Bolzano's time than the concept of convergence. Accordingly 
there is less background material available or necessary for this topic. It 
will be con: -enient to deal with the background, Bolzano's own work and the 
secondary material all together, dividing the subject only into two sections 
dealing with the concepts of function and continuity respectively. 
4.4.2 The Concept of Function 
The idea of the value of one quantity depending on the value of one or 
more other quantities seems simple and must be extremely old. Yet the 
development of the mathematical concept of function was complicated and 
very slow. It first of all required the means to symbolise arithmetical dep- 
endenco and then after long use of the resulting relations and equations 
there appeared the Initial concept of function as any "analytic expression". 
The first explicit definition of function in this sense was actually published 
less than a hundred years before the time Bolzano was writing his early 
analysis works. It was given by John Bernoulli in 1718 (Bernoulli, John 
[2] 
). 
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Euler, his pupil, gives a similar definition in the Inroductio in analysin in- 
finitorum (1748) which reads as follows: 
A function of a variable quantity is an analytic expression composed in 
any way from this variable quantity and numbers or constant quantities. 
(Euler [4]) 
Euler's work in the 18th century was destined to give this new concept the 
fundamental place it was to occupy in mathematics. The time was ripe for 
Its introduction and definition. As for infinite series, the calculus had stim- 
ulated work concerning all kinds of functions and the concept had been con- 
sidered and some definitions attempted In the last decades of the 17th century. 
(Most notable here were the works Gregory J. [1](1667), Leibniz [8] (1673), 
John Bernoulli (Leibniz [11 p. 506,507)(1698)). However, most mathematicians 
of the 17th century would have thought of a function primarily as a curve and 
to appreciate Bolzano's view-point it is worth remembering that the analytic 
concept of function was really an Insight of the 18th century. 
The word "analytic" here certainly implied "non-geometric" but it also 
had a positive, though variable, meaning. The conservative view was that an 
analytic expression was composed only from the four basic arithmetical op- 
er"ations together with taking roots. The Inclusion of limiting or Infinite 
processes was controversial and the idea of a completely arbitrary function 
was not to appear until Dirichlet [1] (1837). It Is claimed in Youschkevitch [1ý 
that Euler had a completely general concept of function as early as 1755 
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because in the Institutiones calculi differentialis (p. 4) there Is the following 
account: 
If some quantities so depend on other quantities that if the latter are 
changed the former undergo change, then the former quantities are 
called functions of the latter. This denomination is of the broadest 
nature and comprises every method by means of which one quantity 
could be determined by others. If, therefore, x denotes a variable 
quantity, then all quantities which depend upon x in any way or are 
dec: rmined by It are called functionsof It. 
The generality of this account all depends on what Euler means by "every 
method". He always in fact uses functions which are representable by power 
series. Lacroix in the Tralte du Calcul... (1797 and 1810) says, 
Toute quantite dont la valeur depend du'une ou de plusleurs autres 
quantites, est dite fonction de ces dernleres, soft qu'on sacke ou 
qu'on Ignore par quelles operations 11 faut passer pour remonter do 
celles-ci 1 :a premiere. (Lacroix [lJ p. 1) 
And in K1[ne's judgement (Kline [11 p. 949) Lagrange uses the word "function" 
in the second edition of his Mecantque analytique (1811-15) to cover "almost 
any kind of dependence on one or more variables". On the other hand, Gauss, 
in his 1813 paper on hypergeometric series is obviously uneasy about allowing 
Infinite processes in a function. Ile speaks of the series, "tamquam functio 
quatuor quantitatum ot, (3 , 1(, x spectari potest" ("in as much as it can 
be 
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viewed as a function of the four quantities a, ß, Y, x") (Gauss [2, ). 
Thus even if the most general and abstract concept of function had not 
been appreciated by 1815 the use and notation of the concept of the usual algeb- 
raic and transcendental functions was well established and Bolzano assumes 
these to be well known. Functions for Bolzano are real valued but are not 
always assumed to be single-valued (A306; BL, §26). For the most part though 
he has In mind functions which are, or can be represented as, power series. 
Contrary to the claim of Kolman there is no discussion In RB (or in BL or DP) 
of the definition of the function concept. Kolman writes that, 
... before he proceeds to the proof of the theorem[RB§15] Bolzano 
gives a logically strict definition of continuity which in turn is pre- 
ceded by the definitions of variable quantity and function... 
Bolzano defined function in this work as a dependence given by an 
arbitrary known or unknown law provided that to every value of one 
variable there corresponds a determinate value. of the other. (Kolman 
[]p. 46,47) 
There Is, of course, no reference to this definition: it does not exist In the 
early work at all. Either Kolman was deliberately composing myths or he 
Is confusing RB with the Functtonenlehre to which he goes on to refer and 
which does contain a definition like that above(Bolzano [6]). The claim about 
defining variable quantities is even worse because his comments are virtually 
copied from Stolz who concocted a distinction of his own betwein freely 
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variable and continuously variable quantities. Kolman, however, does not 
mention Stolz and he omits the reference which Stolz gave to the (one) place 
in RB where the phrase "freely variable" occurs. We quote Stolz's original 
paragraph (Stolz [1] p. 257) headed, "II, Variable Quantities": 
A quantity which can assume all possible values between two given 
values is called according to RB, p. 49 "freely variable", a quantity 
which without assuming all values nevertheless takes values which 
differ arbitrarily little from each of its values, is called "continuously 
variable" (c, f. RB, p. 11,49). 
It is sufficient to look at the references to RB(A439,477) to see that the 
meaning of a "freely variable" quantity and. the distinction given here between 
freely and continuously variable are entirely of Stolz's own construction. 
4.4.3. The Concept of Continuity 
We have Indicated the beginning, of the 18th century as marking the 
transition from a geometric to an analytic concept of function. The corres- 
ponding transition from the spatial concept of the continuity of a curve to the 
purely arithmetical description of the continuity of a function lagged behind 
for about cile hundred years. But it is perhaps misleading to speak of a 
"corresponding transition". While a function was thought of as a curve 
continuity was redundant: wherever there was a curve it waa continuous. 
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Only with the increasing use of analytic expressions did the need arise to 
preserve and express the desirable properties of spatial curves. 
In Volume 2 of Euler's Introductio... (p. 11) hi divides both curves and 
their corresponding functions into continuous and discontim,:, us(or mixed)ones. 
But what Euler meant had nothing to do with what we now mean or what Is 
Intuitively meant by the word "continuous". A function was continuous in bis 
sense over a certain domain If it has the same analytic expression, or equation, 
over the whole domain. It is discontinuous at a point where the form of its 
equation changes. Thus for Euler continuity meant something like uniformity. 
This thoroughly confusing language continued well into the 19th century. Its 
significance was partly sustained by the controversy (mainly between Euler 
and D'Alembert) over whether the Initial form Lf a vibrating string can be 
given by a single expression or not. But as it was realised that the question 
of whether a particular curve or function can be represented by one or more 
equations Is rather arbitrary, Euler's language for the distinction was grad- 
ually dropped In favour of its more significant modei: i sense. 
The attempts of the late 18th and early 19th centuries to give a suit- 
able analytic definition of continuity need much more Investigation than will 
be given -here. The available historical literature is remarkably scarce on 
any work prior to Bolzano. The ideas about continuity in Lacroix[2] Art. 6C 
and in the 1814 paper Cauchy [2 j are relatively vague. In the Functionenlehre 
(Bolzano [6] p. 16) there is a note in which Bolzano mentions his criticisms 
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of ideas about continuity in Kästner [I], Fries [1], Eytelwein [1] and 
Lacroix[2]. Only the first of these had appeared when he was writing RB 
and he specifically mentions Kästner in connection with the intermediate 
value theorem. The main criticism (which is also made in RB, 12(A440) but 
not referring to anyone in particular) was that continuity of a function was 
defined as, or Identified with, the property of taking all intermediate values 
between any two values of the function. Bolzano was emphatic that though this 
was a true theorem about continuous functions it would not suffice as a definition 
of continuity. This insight was obviously closely connected with his seeing 
the need for a proof of the intermediate value theorem. Boizano's insistence 
on distinguishing clearly between a true property, and a correct definition, of 
continuity was significant. He was accustomed to giving examples, or counter- 
examples to illustrate and confirm distinctions (e. g. A467; RB, §10). From 
the absence of any such example here, and Its Intrinsic Interest, It Is reason- 
able to conclude that he did not know an example of a function to show that 
taking Intermediate values Is insufficient to ensure continuity. (All commen- 
tators who give an example mention the type of function given in Darboux [1] 
(1875) 1. e. f(x) = sin 
(2) 
ýx 0, f(0) = 0. rs this really the first such example? ) 
Bolzano was more likely to have been led to his definition, not for such tech- 
nical reasons, but on primarily conceptual grounds. The taking of Intermed- 
Late values was just a crude translation of the alien spatial Intuition; it would 
not express the essence of the more general analytic concept. 
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The definition of continuity in RB is pre-figured by a clear but relative- 
ly informal and incidental account in BL§29(A309). We discuss this important 
lemma later (5.2.3) but here we shall justquote what is said on BL, 34(A314) 
about continuity: 
In fact a function is said to be continuous If the charge which occurs 
for a certain change in the arg. ment can become smaller than any 
given quantity if the change in the argument is taken small enough. 
Bolzano proceeds to argue that, assuming there exist functions 
i'x and fx 
each const ting of an arbitrary number of terms, r, then the equation 
r, 
F(x+w)- rrrr fx +0 indicates that Fx is continuous because F(x +w) - Fx = 
o (fx +n) can become smaller than any given quantity if (with the same r and 
x)w is taken small enough. Now to assume the existence of such an fx is to 
r 
assume that Fx is differentiable so this result amounts to the fact that differ- 
entiability implies continuity. The argument that follows to show that also 
r "- p 
fx must be continuous Is wrong; it Is falsely assumed that 
F(x -i+)- Fx 
may be made arbiti arily small by decreasing I and cii. It-Is In the course of 
the main proof of BL329 that Bolzano appeals to the Intermediate value theorem 
and refers to the forthcoming proof in RB. There Is no further mention of 
continuity In BL. 
In RB the question of continuity aris,. s In the Preface in the course 
of criticism of earlier proofs of the intermediate value theorem. At RB, 11 
(A439) Bolzano states his own definition: 
f . 
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According to a correct definition, the expression, that a function fx 
varies according to the law of continuity for all values of x inside 
certain lin Ks. * means just that, if x is some such value the difference 
f(x + w) - fx can b.; made smaller then any given quantity provided w 
can be taken as small as we please. With notation I Introduced In 
§14 of Binomische Lehrsatz etc. (Prague 1816) this is, f(x +w) = fx +1'1. 
The footnote * reads: 
There are functions which vary continuously for all values of their 
root, - e, g. ax + (3 . But there are others which are continuous only 
for values of their root inside or outside certain limits. Thus 
x+ (1 - x)(2 - x) is continuous only for values of x< +1 or >+2 
but not for values between +1 and + 2. 
Bolzano's definition is clear, original and suitably formulated in 
symbols for easy arithmetical application. The limit concept is not required 
explicitly, as with the convergence criterion, due again to the use of arbitrar- 
ily small quantities. This procedure Is admirably practical. Continuity Is 
used essentially In the main theorem RB§15(A479), and In RB§17(A484) It Is 
straightforwardly proved that polynomials are continuous. In DP3§1-6(A514- 
520) a number of theorems are proved about continuous functions. The first 
main theorem, DP§2 is rather long-winded and Imprecise but it Is basically 
the statement that a continuous function of a continuous function Is again 
continuous. There is a confusing ambiguity on the statement of the theorem. 
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The phrase in the first sentence, "those values of x which approach as close 
as desired to all is taken to include a when fx is said to be continuous for this 
range. (At least, In the proof it Is assumed that fx , nproaches fa arbitrarily 
closely. ) But when X is said to be determined (as a functior., say,?, of fx) 
for this range of values of x, a must be excluded. The point of the theorem is 
to show that X Is also determined at x=a provided' and f are continuras, 
i. e. that its value is 4, ff (a) 3. The proof given is straight-forward and 
correct. Stolz, In attempting to clarify the theorem as It stands gives a para- 
phrase (Stolz [11p. 263) of both the proof and theorem which Is muddled and 
Incorrect. For example, Bolzano does not say In the theorem, "if X Is defined 
and continuous at x= a". Nor does Stolz point out what the theorem Is really 
about. Kolman (following Stolz, as ever, ' withcut acknowledgement) does say 
in a footnote (Kolman [11 p, 53) that In modern terminology the theorem means 
lim F {f(x)] =F (1[m f(x)); though he should have written q' instead of F 
x-sa 
since he puts X= «f(x)} , (Stolz puts cp(f(x)J = Fx). In DP§3 Bolzano extends 
the result to the case when X is a continuous function of a finite or Infinite 
number of continuous functions, fx, Fx, fx...... Thus the theorem Is true In 
the finite case but not necessarily true In the Infinite case. The proof is the 
same for either case and it is obviously wrong. It is assumed both that X may 
be an arbitrary function of fx, fix, fix, "... , etc. and that all but one of these 
functions can be held fixed so a: s to reduce the result to that of DP§2. Then 
DP§§5,6 are special cases of DP§3. 
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Bolzano's primacy and success in the defining of continuity has often 
been acknowledged (e. g. Pringsheim [2]and Kline [1]p. 951), and so (less 
often) has the superiority of his formulation over that of Cauchy (e. g. Freuden- 
thal [1] p. 380, see p. 188). Coolidge remarks on the continuity definition, "If 
Bolzano had done nothing else in mathematics, this alone would secure for 
him a place in the history of the subject. 11 (Coolidge [1]) Inexplicably, 
Kitcher does not seem to have appreciated this part of Eolzano's work, "Given 
the unclarity of the notion of "continuous function" employed by Bolzano and 
his contemporaries. " (Kitcher [1] p. 260) 
Grattan-Guinness has claimed the continuity definitions as a great 
example of the accord between Cauchy and Bolzano, especially In exemplify- 
Ing his Idea of limit-avoidance. Having quoted Bolzano's continuity definition 
from RB, 11(A439) he reformulates it In two ways: 
Definition 3.3 
f(x) is continuous at x= xo if f(x, +(x) - f(xo ) is small whena Is small. 
Let us reinterpret the definition as defining the limiting value f(x, ) 
of f(xo + a) as cc tends to zero, rather than continuity. It is continuity 
that guarantees that as a matter of fact this limit exists, and to avoid 
confusion we shall denote It by the symbol B (which is unconnected 
with the symbol f(x)) rather than'f(xo ). Then we have: 
Definition 3,4 
The function f(xo +a) has a (unique) ILmit, of value B, as a-h 0 If 
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f(xo +a) -B is small when a is small. In other words we may move as 
close as we wish to the limit B, while still avoiding the limit itself. 
The full significance of Bolzano's definition 3.3 can only be grasped 
when seen in terms of the pattern of definition 3.4. j3olzano has de- 
fined continuity there but he has done it in a limit-avoiding way in 
terms of arithmetical subtraction of expressions. (Grattan-Guinness [2] 
p. 54,55) 
But the significance of limit-avoidanco is still far from clear. 
In Birkhoff [1] there is a section entitled, "Bolzano on Continuity and 
Limits". This only refers to RB and is mainly taken up with a modernised 
version of the convergence criterion RB§7. The continuity definition of RB 
Preface is stated but then instead of giving Boizano's version of the intermed- 
late value theorem (e. g. RB§15, 
§18) 
a theorem is stated which appears on 
RB, 14(A442). This "hybrid" theorem belongs to nobody - it is an arithmetic' 
form of an assumption Bolzano is in the course of criticising on the grounds 
that It Is effectively equivalent to the theorem to be proved (see 5.3.1). It 
has been Inadvertently mistaken for the main theorem of the paper, but 
Bolzano would never have used the phrase occurring In It, "the function van- 
Ishes or becomes infinite". 
Undoubtedly Bolzano's great achievement in the continuity definition 
was to express what had been a spatial intuition to purely arithmetic terms. 
He seems to have been mottv'ted to seek such a definition on conceptual 
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grounds: an analytic concept of function requires a purely analytic concept 
of continuity. He had arrived at the insight contained in his definition by 
the time of writing BL and it is reasonable to conjecture that It was suggested 
by the notion of arbitrarily close approach that had been so successful with 
infinite series, In contrast to his merely implicit treatment of convergence it 
is clear that Bolzano was well aware of the central importance to analysis of 
his concept of continuity. 
I- 
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Chapter 5: Analysis II 
5.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 4 we have considered Bolzano's treatment In his early ana- 
lysis works of those concepts (namely those of limit, convergence and contin- 
ulty) which have turned out to occupy a central place in modern analysis. As 
mentioned in 4.1.3 these concepts were not always those to which Bolzano 
himself attached particular significance In the course of working out his "new 
way of developing analysis" (A279: BL, XV). This Is hardly surprising, their 
modern significance is a product of one hundred and fifty years of reinforce- 
ment through repeated refinement and generalisaticn. What matters here 
historically is to understand what was significant to Bolzano and see how it 
relates to what has become fruitful in later mathematics. A useful new con- 
cept often emerges, not Intentionally or through direct effort, but rather In 
the course of pursuing some other goal. It Is the recurrent theme of this 
thesis that Bolzano developed some Important new concepts (or at least re- 
finements of existing concepts) as a result of following his fundamental 
requirements for mathematical proofs and concepts. 
In his early analysis :, -orks the main purpose was to give rigorous 
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proofs of certain fairly elementary results. In the present chapter we shall 
briefly examine each of these works in the. light of this aim and show how the 
proofs they contain are related to Bolzano's general methodology. Attention 
to the background of each theorem Is especially necessary hore not only to 
provide the appropriate context but because Bolzano himself always begins 
with a thorough consideration of all the previous relevant work known to him. 
His concepts and ideas arose as much in criticism of earlier efforts as In 
original response to a problem. Accordingly each of the following main sec- 
tions begins with an Introduction containing background material with the 
emphasis on those authors mentioned by Bolzano. Then there follows an 
account and assessment of what each paper actually contains. 
 
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5.2. The Binomial Theorem and BL 
5.2.1. Introduction 
The original formulation of the binomial theorem for a rational expon- 
ent was given by Newton in a famous letter of 1676 published in Newton [4]. 
The first strict proof, with a proper consideration of the conditions for con- 
vergence and allowing for a complex variable, is generally acknowledged to 
have been given in Abel 
[1] (1826). The proofs attempted in the eighteenth 
century were either by means of calculus or by combinatorial methods. There 
was virtually no treatment of the two major problems of the convergence of an 
infinite series and of the meaning of an irrational exponent. For the most 
part these were not "problems" at all. Such questions did not arise when the 
main concern was the actual calculation of approximate values of the series 
for practical purposes. Typical of the better proofs at this time (e. g. those 
of Euler) was the remark that for the binomial series to be "suitable for cal- 
culation" the argument x must be a proper friction. Bolzano's proof in BL 
was the first to take both the problems of convergence and of an Irrational 
exponent seriously. 
k 
Fundamental as it was to many applications of calculus the binomial 
theorem was slow to be recognised in its own right and in the first half of 
the eighteenth century there were only a few attempts at a proof. The 
German term "binomische Lehrsatz" does not even appear in the Mathem- 
atisches Lexikon compiled by Wolff in 1716, though it is present in the edition 
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of 1747 (Wolff [43). In Euler [5](1749) the binomial theorem is Introduced 
without explanation as a "theorema universale", - lt is used extensively but 
there is no attempt at a proof. 
The early calculus proofs (for example those by Col. -on [1](1736), and 
Maclaurin [1](1742))were, as pointed out in Pringsheim and Faber (1], both 
Inadequate and circular. They were inadequate in assuming the existe : ce of 
a power series development for (1 + x)° and only determining the coefficients. 
They were also circular because the binomial theorem was originally used In 
finding the derivatives of rational powers which were then being used to prove 
the binomial theorem. 
A proof for a positive integer exponent was given In James Bernoulli 
[2] (1713) by considering combinations; It was Liven in Castillon 
[1](1742) 
with the refinement of an inductive proof of the combinatorial argument. The 
same improvement is found In Kästner 
[5] (1745). For rational exponents aT 
relatively satisfactory proof did not appear until Euler's paper of 1775 (Euler 
nn-1x2 n(n - 1)(n - 2)x 
3 C2] ). Here Euler denotes the series 1+ nx {- 2! + 3! +, ,, 
by [n] 
, so for positive integer n, 
[n] _ (1 + x) 
n. He then shows that 
[n]= [m + n] just by considering the first few terms of each side, there 
13 
is no Induction. Then [m] = [2ml, [in] _ [3m] etc. and generally for any 
az 
Integer a, [am] _ Em] . Consequently 
for Integer I, CI1= 
ý2 
_ (1 +x )ý 
iL 
= (1+x)' . In Pringsheim and Faber 
f l] so 
2J= 
(1 + x)1 and generally [i-] 
this paper of Euler's is spoken of in glowing terms as the first "fully valid" 
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proof, significant for its new fruitful method of attending to the summation of 
the binomial series rather than the development of the function (1 +xj But 
without any discussion of convergence, I. e. without any consideration of whether 
the symbol [n] above denotes a quantity at all, the proof can hardly be called 
"fully valid" or be regarded as satisfactorily dealing with the summation of 
series. It is a significant but modest paper. The work L`Hullier 
[2] (1795) 
gives a rather similar proof to that of Euler with the Improvement of having a 
proper Induction step for proving [m]. [n] = [m + n] . 
Between Euler's paper of 1775 and the end of the eighteenth century 
there appeared a considerable number of proofs of the binomial theorem for 
rational andnegative exponents. Rarely Is there a mention of convergence or 
of the case of an irrational exponent. The paper of Segner [ll is one of the 
best in this respect: he follows the same lines as Euler but notes that an irra- 
tional exponent can be regarded as a limiting case of rational exponents and 
that the variable will Vin general" be smaller than 1. However, the absence 
of consideration of an irrational exponent would still not have been recognised 
as a defect. Apart from the practical irrelevance of such exponents which 
has already been noted, it seems that their theoretical possibility was often 
not considered. For example, in KIUgel's Mathematisches W8rterbueh 
(KlUgel [21 (1803)) under Binomischer Lehrsatz we read, "... 2. The 
formula Is general, the exponent n. may be an Integer or fraction, positive or 
negative". 
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The notation nS, for the binomial series denoted [n] by Euler, was 
probably first introduced by. Busse (see KiUgel [2] Vol. 1, p. 325) and lt was 
widely adopted. Bolzano uses this notation in BL, Xis . There were no signif- 
scant new contributions to the binomial theorem until Bolzauo's BL. 
Bolzano must have studied most of the previous proofs of the binomial 
theorem. Ii DL Preface he gives a detailed classification and criticism of 
the various methods that had been used. But he does this without giving any 
specific references. References were generally still rather haphazard in the 
mathematical literature of this period: there would have been a large number 
of such references and after all BL was Intended to be a fairly elementary 
textbook. Bolzano lists about thirty authors known to him who had attempted 
a proof of the binomial theorem (A268; BL, IV), but he mentions no titles! 
In many cases It is quite clear which work ßolzano must have Intended and 
since the list is fairly comprehensive (especially for the later eighteenth 
century) we give, in the next section, a probable list of Bolzano's sources. 
The list is certainly not exhaustive, for example, he does not mention signt- 
ficant proofs by Maclaurin and van Swindon. In fact Bolzano may have rolled 
on one or two reference works. In KlUgel 
[2] the article Binomischer Lehrsatz 
lists all but four of Bolzano's list with regard to authors whose works appear- 
ed before Klogel [2] was published (i. e. all but the last seven of Bolzano's 
authors). This work was probably Bolzano's main source; the references 
there are given accurately ar.; l In detail though there is very little comment 
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by KlUgel. In order to give his criticism of previous methods of proof Bolzano 
must have studied the majority, if not all, of these references. 
The criticism In BL Preface Is In two parts. First he comments on 
misunderstandings of the meaning of the binomial theorem, then on the 
attempts to prove It. The former maialy concerns the rejection of infinite 
series and we have already dealt with this in Chapter 4. The previous proofs 
must all be defective, Bolzano says (A271; BL, VII), because none of them 
Involves the condition x<f1; the proof should therefore hold generally but 
the result c'oes not. The most basic fault was, of course, the lack of attention 
to convergence and Bolzano lists this first, albeit in his own rather elaborate 
way: the series are said to be equal when only the terms up to the rth term 
are shown to he equal, "beyond this rth term.. , the difference between the 
. 
two series can perhaps never be reduced as much as desired" (A272; BL, VU! ). 
The Euler and L'Hullier proofs of 
[m] 
. 
[n]= [m + n] are evidently in mind 
here. There are three other main types of proof which Bolzano analyses: 
proceeding from a general form, (1 + x)n =A+ Bxp + CxY + ... and determ- 
fining the (3, Y, .... A, B,.... (A273; BL, TX): proof by Taylor's theorem 
(A276; BL, XU); and finally an argument from Interpolation in a geometric 
series (A277; BL, XIII). The last of these is briefly dismissed, and the main 
objection to using Taylor's theorem Is that this is a much more difficult 
theorem than the binomial theorem and It can only be strictly proved by using 
the latter (see also A268; BL, 1V). Thus here again (as in the geometrical 
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work) is an allusion to a correct ordering of theorems according to complexity. 
The method cf assuming a general series for the binomial series and determ- 
fining its coefficients and exponents is considered in detail. This, in principle, 
Is the method Boizano adults in BL so his criticisms here are especially 
important as they indicate the errors which his own procedure attempts to 
avoid. 
There are three steps that are criticised. First there Is the argument 
from 
n1 
to 
P-1 
n(A +Bxß+... )=(1 +x)((ýBx + YCx 
+.... ) 
.. . 
(z) 
This deduction is usually made either by differentiation (which Bolzano says Is, 
"still based on the most shaky foundations" (A275; BL, XI)) or else the proced= 
ure of differentiation is imitated without explicit mention. He explains the 
latter as the use of divisors which are eventually put equal to zero. (He may 
also have had the so-called method of "residual analysis" In mind here, e. g. 
In Landen [1J. ). The second' criticism Is over the fact that having shown (1) 
Implies (2) and finding the constants to satisfy (2) they then assume, at least 
tacl,. ly, that (2) Implies (1). Thirdly, Bolzano says that the exponents Y, 
..... are often just assumed to be 1,2,3 , .... without sufficient reason. 
Several of the. general criticisms levelled against the binomial theorem 
proofs, such as the arbitrary use of infinite series and the use of divisors 
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which are put equal to zero, are also held against the usual derivation of the 
exponential and logarithmic series. The treatment of these series as an applic- 
ation of the binomial theorem, forms a substantial part of BL (BL, 102-144). 
Bolzano had two p! irposes in mind with BL apart from the aim of 
attracting some attention and response to his work. It was "a sample of a new 
way of developing analysis" (A279; BL, XV) and at the same time it was meant 
to be a new, substantial contribution to analysis in being the first really strict 
proof of the binomial theorem and associated results. Consequently It had to 
cater for two kinds of readers. As a way of developing analysis it was to be 
accessible to beginners and suitable as a textbook, but as a thoroughly strict 
proof it was to be complete and rigorous. To cope with this Bolzano indicates 
In the Preface (A280; BL, XVI) many paragraphs which can be omitted on a 
first reading. He also points out that the main proof Is not nearly so long as 
might be supposed from the total number of pages (it occupies about 20 of the 
144 pages). Apart from the style, which is far from terse, there are several 
reasons for the work's length. It is not only about the binomial theorem; it 
Includes proofs of the multinomial theorem and the exponential and logarithmic 
series. There is explanation and motivation suitable for beginners who have 
not met any of these topics before.. The concepts of convergence and differ- 
entiation which Bolzano regards either as novel, or unsatisfactorily explained 
In earlier texts, are treated on each occasion by his elaborate method of 
working explicitly with arbitrarily small quantities. 
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5.2.2. Bolzano's Sources on the Binomial Theorem 
The list of authors which Bolzano gives (A268; BL, IV) follows no obvious 
order exactly, It is partly by nationality and partly ch: "onological. We have 
followed his order and given, for each author, the work containing hismost 
relevant contribution(s) to the binomial theorem. Where appropriate the ref- 
erence to the relevant section of a large work has been given. Any work which 
is doubtful or has not been checked because of being unavailable has been pre- 
fixed by a question-mark. We have included references to the polynomial or 
multinomial theorem. 
Colson, J. The method of fluxions and Infinite series etc. 
translated from the original (I. Newton) with a per- 
. 
petual comment. 1736, p. 309 
Horsley, S. Isaacs Newtons Operaque e:: stant omnta commentar- 
UIs ülustrabat S. Horsley, 5 vols. 1779-85. 
Vol. I, p. 286, footnote. 
Simpson, T. A general method of exhibiting the value of an 
algebraic expression involving several radical 
quantities in an. Infinite series.... Phil. Trans. 
1751, p. 20. 
Robertson, A. The binomial theorem demonstrated by the principles 
of multiplication. Phil. Trans. 1795, p. 298. 
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Sewell, W. Newton's binomial theorem legally demonstrated by 
algebra. Phil. Trans. 1796, p. 382. 
Landen, J. A Discourse concerning the Residual Analysis... 
London 1758. 
C1alrautA. C. , Anfangsgrunde der Algebra,... Berlin 1778 
Dritter Theil, XLVIII 
Aepinus, F. V. T. Demonstratio generalts theorematis Newtonian[ de 
binomto ad potentinm indefinttam elevando. 
Novi Comment. Petrop. 1760/1, Vol. VIII 
Castillon, J. A demonstration of the polynomium of Sir Isaac 
Newton. Phil. Trans. 1742, Vol. XLII, p. 91. 
L'Huilier, S. Principlorum Calculi Differentialas et Integralas 
Expositio Elementaras... Tübingen, 1795. 
Lagrange, J. L. Th6orle des fonctions analytiques.... 
Paris 1797,1813, Paragraph 18, 
Kästner, A. G. Demonstratio theorematis binomialls. Leipzig 1745. 
Theorema binomiale universalster demonstratum, 
G 3ttingen 1758. 
Euler, L. Demo. istratio theorematis Newtoniant de evolutions 
potestatum binomii pro casibus quibus exponentes 
non Bunt numeri integri. Novi Comm. Petrop. 
1775, Vol. XIX, p. 103. 
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Euler, L. (continued) Nova demonstratio quod evolutio potestatum binomii 
Newtoniana etiam pro exponentibus fractis valent. 
Nova Acta Petrop., 1787, Vol. V., p. 52. 
Segner, J. A. von Demonstratio univarsalis theorematis binomlalls 
Newtons. Nouv. Mein. de Berlin 1777, p. 37.9 
Scherfer=Scherffer, K. ? Institutionum analyticarum 1771-2. 
Karsten, W. J. G. ? Anfangsgrunde d.; r Mathematischen Wissenschaften 
3 vols. Rostock 1780. 
? Mathesis theoretica elematar ac sublim[or. 
Rostock, 1760, p. 567. 
Klügel, G. S. Mathematisches Wörterbuch. Vol. 1,1803 Articles: 
Binomial- Coefficienten and Binomischer Lehrsatz. 
Bemerkungen über den Polynomischen Lehrsatz 
(In the collection by Hindenburg below). 
? Analytischer Trigonometrie (Anhang) Braunschweig, 
1770. 
Busse, F. G. von Elementarischer Beweis des allgemeinen binomischen 
Lehrsatzes, contained in Kleine Beyträge zu Math- 
ematik und Philosophie, Dessau, 17859p. 17. 
Pfaff, J. F. Peculiaris differentialia investigandi ratio ex 
theoria functionum deducta. Helmstadil, 1788 §XII. 
.t 
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Pfaff, J. F. (continued) Disquisitiones analyticae, Fielmstadii 1797, 
Vol. 3, p. 301. De Theoremate polynomials. 
Rothe, H. A. Theorema binomiale ex simplicissimus analyseos 
finitorum fontibus universalster demonstratum. 
Leipzig, 1796. 
Hindenburg, K. F. editor of: Der polynomische Lehrsatz, das wichtigst3 
Theorem der Analysis. Sammlung combinatorisch- 
analytischer. Abhandlungen, 1796-1800, Vol. I. 
Kaussler, C. F. translator of: Vollständige Anleitung zur Algebra 
von L. Euler 3ter Teil, Anhang I: Allgemeiner 
Beweis der binomischen Lehrsatzes, 1796. 
Schulz =? Schultz, J. ? Kurze Entwicklungen einiger der wichtigsten 
mathematischen Theorien, Königsberg, 1803. 
Pasquich, J. ? Anfangsgrinde der gesammelten theoretischen 
Mathematik, 2 vols., 1812. 
Rosling, C. L. ? Grundlehren von den Formen, Differenzen, Differ- 
entialen und Integrallen der Functionen, Erlangen, 1805. 
Jungius, F. W. ? Die Lehre von der Combination und Permutation 
usw. Berlin, 1806. 
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Fischer, L. J. and 
Krause, K. C. F. ? Lehrbuch der Combinationslehre und der Arithmetik.. 
Dresden, 1812. 
Crelle, A. L. ? Versuch eine rein analytischen usw. Darstellung 
der Rechnung mit verHnderlichen Grdssen usw. 
Göttingen, 1813. 
Nordmann, r3. ? Grundriss der Algebra. Leipzig, 1815. 
5.2.3. Account and Assessment of BL 
None of the results in BL was actually new but as a textbook treatment 
of the binomial theorem it was much more detailed and comprehensive than 
any of its predecessors. It contained several methods and proofs which werd 
original and which had an important bearing ön the foundations of calculus. bi 
fact it is because Bolzano's methods effectively Involve differentiating conver- 
gent power series from first principles (using arbitrarily small quantities 
Instead of a limit operation) that the work Is so long. The apparatus needed is 
elaborate to develop and cumbersome to use. 
There are three main sections corresponding to the topics mentioned 
in the title. The binomial theorem occupies §§1-51, the polynomial theorem 
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is dealt with in §952-59 and the exponential and logarithmic series are the 
subject of §§60-74. These sections can be further sub-divided as follows: 
ý< 
Binomial theorem 
89 1-10 positive integer case introduced 
combinatorially and proved by 
induction 
M 14-22 properties of arbitrarily small quan- 
tities 
23-29 various lemmas, effectively on the 
differentiation of convergent series 
30-51 proof extended to positive and negative 
rationals and irrattonals 
Polynomial theorem § 52-59 polynomial theorem in the form 
(1+äx+ä. Y2+.... + ax'" )n 
r §§ 60-69 " power series for exponential and Exponential and 
logarithmic series 
logarithms 
70-74 definition of e and the use of natural 
logarithms 
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In the opening section Bolzano discusses the positive integer case of 
the binomial theorem and the combinatorial argument for the coefficient of the 
general term xr in the expansion of (1 + x)n . The essence of the combinator- 
Ial argument, which by this time was fairly standard, is to show that 
r+1r+1'r: 
then since it is clear that 
riý 
= n, it Is also clear 
n n(n - 1)(n - 2) ... (n-r+`1) (by Induction) that 1= Now Bolzano rejects rl r. 
this argument, as a proof, in favour of a proof by induction, saying that the 
former, "dues not seem to us a genuinely scientific proof since It derives the 
conclusion from an alien concept" (A287; BL, 7). It is not clear whether 
Bolzano realised that the combinatorial argument Involves an "and so on-' step 
-which really needs induction. There are not two alternative methods of proof 
here. There Is a proof by Induction of a given formula and an explanation 
(logically unnecessary) of how one might discover the formula. But what is 
of interest here is that Bolzano rejects the combinatorial argument on con- 
ceptual grounds. It should therefore not even form part of a correct proof. 
Evidently he felt that an argument for counting possible choices was alien to 
the simple multiplication and addition of like terms involved in this case of 
the binomial theorem. This may seem rather far-fetched. After all, count- 
Ing the combinations Is simply a way of counting the like terms that will 
appear in the multiplication. Counting is thoroughly arithmetic and Ideas of 
choice (or combination) are just auxiliary and a matter of conve-. iience. 
ýIowever, such plausible reasoning Is neither relevant to Bolzano's claim nor 
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correct. To be alien on Bolzano's view a concept need not be from another 
part of mathematics, it Is sufficient that It does not appear In the theorem 
being proved (see A15,16; BG, VIII, IX). Some concer` of choice or selection 
(I. e. the gathering together and counting of like terms) is c_, sential to the cow- 
binatorial method and Is Irreducible: It Is not explicit or essential In the state- 
ment of the theorem. We need to emphasise here that Bolzano does not reject 
or minimise the value of the combinatorial argument. He puts It first and 
spends a long time explaining It; lie also says It makes clear the correctness 
of the series for positive integers. What he rejects is that such an argument 
can be part of the unique objective proof of this case of the binomial theorem. 
It Is, of course, true that the combinatorial approach only has direct applica- 
tion to the positive integer case. The objective proof of a theorem should be 
that of the most general case (according to the principle stated in BD(A209; BD, 
102) that proofs should always proceed from the general to the particular). 
This example of Bolzano's application of his methodology highlights 
two points to which we shall return later. Bolzano g: vcs only negative criteria 
for determining an objective proof (e. g. there Is no positive reason given for 
supposing the subsequent proof by Induction in BL37 is a "genuine scientific 
proof'). Secondly, there is the tension between the uninformative, but pre- 
ferred, proof by induction (A237; BL, §7) and the explanatory value of the re- 
jected combinatorial argument. This tension Is unexpected because it 
appeared In the geometry work, at least, that the proof which exhibited and 
e 
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correct. To be alien on Bolzano's view a concept need not be from another 
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102) that proofs should always proceed from the general to the particular). 
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supposing the subsequent proof by Induction in BL37 Is a "genuine scientific 
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ferred, proof by induction (A287; BL, S7) and the explanatory value of the re- 
jected combinatorial argument. This tension is unexpected because it 
appeared In the geometry work, at least, that the proof which exhibited and 
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followed the objective ground of a theorem should, in some sense, be the 
most explanatory. 
Before the general case of the binomial theoram is considered there 
now follows a long section (BL, Se11-29) of preliminaries r(% specifically re- 
lated to the binomial theorem. This is the most interesting section of the 
work from a modern point of view because here Bolzano develops in an original 
way, and In some detail, three very significant Ideas. These are: the conver- 
gence of infinite series, the continuity of functions and the process of differ- 
entiation. The first two we have already dis sussed in Chapter 4. As with 
convergence, Bolzano nowhere says explicitly that he is defining the derivative . 
(of 
a power of x when he proves in BL§23(A300) that 
x+W' x" 
_"-ý + S1, 
but this would obviously have been recognised ' ;: y any informed contemporary 
reader. Here, of course w and Cl are the arbitrarily small quantities which 
Bolzano uses In place of a limit operation and which we have discussed In 
4.2.3. Although differentiation plays a vital part in his proof of the binomial 
theorem and he proves In BL§29(A309) that the derIvittve of a convergent 
power series Is again a convergent series, he nowhere mentions differentia- ' 
tion in BL except to cast aspersions on its foundations and validity. Pro- 
suniably he avoided such reference only because of the strong association at 
this time of calculus operations with the suspect concept of infinitesimals. 
(For example, see A495; DP, V_T footnote) This avoidance is ironic in that 
Bolzano seems to have had the understanding and technique at his disposal 
C f, 
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to have written a thoroughly rigorous account of differential calculus. 
However, what is done In BL Is tailored to the problem in hand and the 
derivative of x is first proved for na positive or i,: gative rational and 
finally for n an irrational. In the course of this proof Bolz: no is careful 
only to use the binomial theorem in the positive Integer case which he had 
already prcved thus avoiding the circularity mentioned above (p. 247 ). The 
main argument here for the rational case is clear and correct making essential 
use of the lemmas on arbitrarily small quantities in . 
BLO17,19,21. For the 
irrational case Bolzano says (A303; BL, 23) *: iat, "it follows from the dedin- 
Ition of the concept of an Irrational power that the quantity a 
US 
gives a value 
as close to that of an as desired if'- Is as close to the value n as desired, " q 
Neither an Irrational number nor an Irrational power had yet been strictly 
defined but as with the sufficiency argument of RB§7(A465; RB, 37) Bolzano 
assumes the existence of a quantity (here the an where n Is Irrational) pro- 
vided it can be arbitrarily closely approximated to by quantities already con- 
sidered as known or existing (here the a? 
/' 
which, h: general, will themselves 
be irrational). The argument here avoids the real issue but at least Bolzano 
recognises that there is a separate problem with the concept of an irrational 
power; this was a problem which even if recognised before was hardly over 
acknowledged. 
The lemma of BL, §29(A309) Is the most significant of these prelim- 
[nary results. In order to asnreciate the statement of the lemma It Is 
".,. .i.. ' 
.. 
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necessary to realise that for the function F Bolzano has in mind (in modern 
terminology`, the difference between the partial sum of a convergent series 
r 
and the limit function of that series. The lemma states that if the value of Fx 
becomes arbitrarily smaIi with increasing r, and a given value of x, then so 
does its derivative fx. This therefore justifies the term by term differentia- 
tion of convergent series. It is not d-3finitely stated, but nevertheless very 
likely that Bolzano only considered the result for power series. He nowhere 
mentions, for example, the relevant contemporary problem of infinite tri- 
gonometr:.: series. The proof, which Is basically correct, assumes that the 
functions concerned are continuous and ßolzano makes this the occasion for 
defining, in a rather impromptu fashion, what Is meant by a continuous 
function. This has been discussed in 4.4.3. An Important gap in the proof, 
which Is acknowledged in a footnote (A312: BL, 32), is the assumption of the 
intermediate value theorem; this was proved separately In RB. 
In the latter part of the proof In BL, 
§29 Bolzano shows the important 
fact that, as we should now express It, differentiation Is a mapping between 
continuous functions. The way In which it Is shown that continuity Is a nec- 
essary condition for a function to be differentiable also shows that Bolzano 
clcarly understood at this time how his verbal definition of continuity was to 
be used precisely and formally. Just as we have claimed this as the first 
appearance of the precise' continuity definition this must also be the first 
proof that differentiability of a function implies its continuity. (It is by now 
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fairly well known that Bolzano was also the first to provide a counter-example 
showing that continuity was insufficient for differentiability, see Bolzano (6] 
§75. ) 
The section BL§ i0-51 Is the centre-piece of BL and contains the main 
substance of the work: a detailed proof of the binomial theorem and Its range 
of validity. There are some mistakes in tho course of the proof (notably a 
serious error In the range of validity) and It Is presented in a very long and 
complicated way. This is partly a result of the long-winded methods employed 
and partly It is the price to be paid for the unprecedented detail and thoiough 
ness that Bolzano wanted to achieve. Even with the explanatory paragraphs 
such as 
934 
and 937 it would have been (and still Is) quite difficult to follow 
the logical layout of Bolzano's procedure. 
The proof really falls into two parts which could well be described 
today as proofs of uniqueness and of existence. In the first part, for which 
the key paragraphs are 
9930,32,33, it is shown that if there is a power series 
in x the value of which, for given x and n, becomes arbitrarily close to 
value of (1 + x)ý , then it must be the binomial, series 1+ nx +nn21x+ 
n(n-1)... (n-r+1)xr 
... ,. +r. (As explained in 4.3.3 for ßolzano the 
"binomial series" for n is this finite series of arbitrary length. The "bi- 
nomial equation" holds If the value, for given x and n, of the binomial series 
n 
Is arbitrarily close to the value of (1 + x) .) The necessary conditions found 
In this part of the proof also serve to delimit the possible ranze of validity 
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of the binomial theorem by showing some values of x for which It cannot hold. 
The second part of the proof, for which the key paragraphs are BL 38,40,41, 
shows that the binomial equation actually does hold fc- jxi <1 and for positive 
or negative and rational or irrational n. 
The logical structure of the proof was a considerable achievement. In 
most, If not all, previous attempts to prove the binomial theorem only one of 
the above two parts was considered. For example, treatments In the works 
cited in our bibliography for BL by Simpson and Hindenburg deal only with the 
first part and remain silent or vague on the -ange of validity. The works"by 
L'Huilier and Euler on the other hand start from the integer case of the theorem 
and really assume it will make sense in the rational case without any general 
derivation of its form. Also the details of both parts of the proof, supported 
by the lemmas we have described and the relatively rigorous treatment of 
convergence and differentiation, render Bolzano's work far superior to any-, 
thing that had appeared earlier. Without analysing the details of this section 
in full we shall mention here certain points by way of explanation or criticism. 
The argument of §30 can best be expressed in modern terminology in 
the Identity, (1 + x)" = n(1 + x)° -- (1 + x)" , where In place of the 
function (1 + x)n is put the supposed power series development A x« +,,,,, 
Rxe + U. , The resulting necessary condition on such a power series is the. 
denoted t on BL, 39(A319). By repeated differentiation of the series a more 
elaborate necessary condition, Is found In BL, §31 but this Is only used for a 
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part of 035. Then in §32 the arguments for the exponents and coefficients of 
the series are given very thoroughly and clearly. The main point in this is 
that the condition of §30 Is to hold "for all x smaller `han a certain value", so 
It must be an identity (as proved in the lemma §28). 
In contrast to most of the earlier work, the proof given In §35 Is 
blatantly incomplete and wrong. It Is claimed at the outset that, 
the binomial series can never give the value of (1 + x)n if x is > 
or even =. * 1, unless at the same time n Is either a whole positive 
number or zero (A327; BL, 47). 
In fact, of course, the series for x=1 does converge to 2 for n>-1. and 
for x=-1 It converges for n)0. The idea used throughout 
X35 derives 
from §32 part 3, that the term n(n - 
1)... (n -r+ 1) (n - r)Axr must become 
arbitrarily small if the binomial series is to converge. Bolzano tries to show 
that this will not happen for x>1 but to do so he is content to consider just 
the ratio of successive terms and to prove that this has modulus greater than 
1. However, In general this is an alternating series and it Is necessary to 
ar. ý 
ensure that, If a,. Is the above general term, 
I 
a,. -) 
k where k>1. 
Not 
, surprisingly most of 
Boizano's ratios in this proof actually have limit 1 
and no inference is possible. In the very long calculation of the ratio at.., /a,. 
for positive n (case 2. on A330: BL, 50) there is a minus sign ignored half-way 
through the working and the case of x=-1 is not properly considered at all. 
In spite of these error s the work on the positive aspect of the b1nomial 
I 
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theorem, that is that It does hold for xc1, which occurs In the remainder 
of this section is perfectly correct. As we have indicated in 4.3.3 this 
section of Bolzano's work may have suggested to him the convergence criter- 
ion given in A462; RB, §6. In BL, §42(A348) he does rely on the remark In 
BL, §12 for the starting point of the induction for any negative integer. The 
various cases follow of n being a fraction of the form 1/m(043), any positive 
fraction (p44), negative fractions (045) and finally Irrational n (946). The 
last-mentioned case Is conspicuous by Its presence at this stage In the 
history of the binomial theorem. But as wit'i its appearance in the derivative 
definition of §23 we can really only credit Bolzano with its recognition. The 
"proof" for this case follows from the claim that "as a consequence of the 
concept of the symbol (1 + x)1 , also (1 + x)Ryr"' comes as close to the value 
(1 + x)& as desired" (A356; BL, 76). 
There seems little of lasting Interest in the remainder of BL that hat. 
not been dealt with In Chapter 4. Given the binomial theorem, the work on 
the polynomial theorem was quite standard and includes nothing more than was 
to be found, say, In the work Hindenburg (11 . It remains an historical cur- 
losity that the series for a (§64) and 
e (972) as well as the corresponding 
logarithmic functions (§§66,72,73) may be calculated, as Bolzano does here, 
either directly from the binomial theorem or by similar methods to those 
which he had used for the binoraial theorem. 
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5.3 The Intermediate Value Theorem and RB 
5.3.1. Introduction 
I 
By the "intermediate value theorem" we shall mean the result that if 
a function f(x) of one real variable is continuous on the closed interval [a, b] 
and if f(a) and f(b) have opposite signs, then f(x) is zero for at least one x 
In the open Interval (a, b). This Is sometimes actually called "Bolzano's 
Theorem", as for example in James [1] and Courant and Robbins [1] . The 
latter source wrongly regards the theorem as occurring In Bolzano's Para- 
doxien des Unendlichen (Bolzano [5] ); It is only In RB that the theorem is 
statcd and proved by Bolzano. Together with an early form of the Bolzano- 
Weierstrass theorem these are the major results proved In RB. Their proofs 
are achieved using the convergence criterion and the definition of continuity, 
both of which we have discussed fully In Chapter 4. Here we shall be concern- 
ed with the actual proofs, their technical significance and the way they are 
related to Bolzano's general principles. The Preface to ßB Is aslong as the 
main part of the paper and explains in detail why Bolzano saw so clearly the 
need for purely analytic proofs; it Is therefore worth separate consideration. 
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5.3.2. The Preface to RB 
After having said on A432; ßß, 4 that the' Intermediate value theorem 
had not yet attracted much attention Bolzano proceeds to describe five different 
types of proof that had been given. This is a slight rhetorical exaggeration 
since some only seem to occur once and they are not all distinct. Furthermore, 
they have In some cases been embellished to facilitate criticism which allows 
Bolzano to demolish each type of proof, mainly on the grounds of incorrect 
method, thus leaving the reader in a receptive state for Bolzano's own proof 
which contains, "I flatter myself, not a mete confirmation, but the objective 
justification of the truth to be proved" (A448; RB, 20). 
Although Bolzano gives specific references to the previous work In the 
seven footnotes on A433: RB, 5 he does not Indicate how these match up with his 
five types of proof. This avoids any definite charge of mis-representation 
though it is usually quite clear which work he has In mind. The kinds of proof, 
which are described at length (A434-448; ßB, 6-20), may be summarised as 
follows: 
I. Purely geometrical proofs relying on the fact that a continuous curve 
joining two points, one above and one below the x-axis, must 
intersect the x-axis. This is said to be the most common kind of 
proof (which is probably true) but, curiously, It is not to be found 
In any of Bolzano's references. 
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H. Proofs based on the "wrong " concept of continuity (namely that 
of a function taking all values between any two of its values, see 
4.4.3) together with the concepts of time 9nd motion. This must 
refer primarily to Lagrange ý4j but also, to a' esser extent, to 
Lacroix [3] and Clairaut [iý . 
M. Use of the principle that, "Every variable quantity can pass from 
a positive state to a negative one only through the state of being 
zero or infinite. " This definitel; " refers to the proof in Kllstner 
[3) 
where reference is made to the following geometrical illustration 
In Kästner I1' p. 200. Consider a line rotating about a point not 
on the x-axis. Its Intercept with the x-axis changes sign only by 
going through zero or being "Infinite". 
IV. Use of the principle that there must be a "last" value for which 
the function is negative and a "first" for which it is positive. 
Though not quite fairly described, this almost certainly refers 
to the method used in R 3sling [1] where the author does point out 
that his values a and b (where the transitions from negative values 
and Into positive values occur) must differ by an arbitrarily 
small quantity; he does not use the terms "last" or "first". 
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V. Use of the fundamental theorem of algebra in the form stated at 
the beginning of RB Preface: "Every algebraic rational Integral 
function of one variable quantity can be divided into real factors 
of first or second degree. " This result is used at the outset in 
the "proof" in KlUgel [2] Vol. 2, p. 447 but in any case only a 
kind of converse of the Intermediate value theorem would follow 
from the reasoning here. 
Bolzano is conscious of the close relationship between the proposition 
which forms the title of RB (I. e. not the intermediate value theorem but the 
special case when the function Is a polynomial function) and the fundamental 
theorem. At the beginning of the Preface to RB he says that the second and 
third proofs of the latter theorem given by Gauss (Gauss [3ý and [4] 1816) 
"hardly leave anything to be desired", but in his discussion of case V. above 
he maintains that both these proofs actually depend on the RB title theorem. 
Thus the choice of subject for RB, in Bolzano's eyes, was strategic: it 
supplied the necessary missing link in the rigorous proof of the fundamental 
theorem as well as being essential to complete his own proof of the binomial 
theorem (A312; BL, 32). Moreover, from his account of the previous work it 
Is easy to qee why Bolzano should recognise the need for such a purely ana- 
lytical proof. Almost every criticism that he makes of the previous proofs 
is directly related to one of his methodological principles. We list them 
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here in the order corresponding to the above types of proof I. - V. 
I. The geometrical proofs are clearly contrary to the principle of "con- 
ceptual correctness" (2.4.1), they are a "crossing to another kind" and it is 
logically circular to prove a result true of all quantities from one true of 
only bpatial quantities (A434: RB, 6). 
H. The concepts of continuity (4.4.3) and of motion (2.4.1 and 3.1.2) have 
already been discussed. It is striking that in hardly any of the references 
Bolzano giv:: s Is the essential condition of the, continuity of the function even 
mentioned. Bolzano's demand that "all characteristics of the subject must be 
used in any correct proof" (A213; BD, 106, see 2.4.3) ensured that this was not 
neglectcd in his own proof. 
III. Such a complex truth as the principle used here could not possibly be 
an axiom (2.4.5); it is actually equivalent to the theorem being proved. 
IV. The criticism here is a matter of plain mathematical fact. 
V. The fundamental theorem is a more complex truth than the RB title 
theorem and this determines their objective order of derivation, the former 
from the latter and not vice versa (A211; BD, 104 and 2.4.3). 
Bolzano was not the only mathematician at his time to see the need, . 
or at least the desirability, of purely analytic proofs for analytic results. 
For example, Gauss says in reference to his earlier proof Gauss [11 , 
"that first proof depended, at least partially, on geometrical considerations 
while the one which I am embarking on here will rest on purely analytic 
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principles. " (Gauss [2] §1) And as the survey of proof-types II. -V. shows, 
there were several authors who avoided geometrical methods for their proofs 
of the intermediate value theorem. However, we have seen that for Boizano 
the need for analytical pr:, afs was not just something he felt as a matter of 
taste or convenience. For a long time he had considered the whole question of 
what a mathematical proof should be and he was able to articulate many reasc-ns 
for this need which were part of a wider, coherent view of all theoretical know- 
I 
ledge. Thls made his criticisms of past work Into a powerful programme. In 
the preser+ case it was not just that geometric proofs were inadequate, they 
were wholly Irrelevant; analysis Itself had to develop the means to answer its 
own problems. In the nature of things (as Bolzano saw them) this had to be 
possible. 
After giving an account of the main proofs of RB we shall be able to 
make some assessment of the claims for their strictness and consider the 
secondary sources on RB. 
5.3.3. The Main Proofs of RB 
The two principal theorems of RB are the predecessor of the Bolzano- 
Weserstrass theorem In ßB§12 (A469) and tr, i Intermediate value theorem In 
RB§15 (A479). For convenience these will be referred to as Theorem 1 and 
Theorem 2 respectively. Theorem 1 makes essential use of the convergence 
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criterion (4.3.3) and Theorem 2 depends on Theorem 1 and the definition of 
continuity which first appeared In BL but which is repeated in RB Preface 
(4.4.3). Their proofs in RB are quite long and to help clarify their structure, 
and their affinity with moü.; rn methods, we shall paraphrase the statement 
and proof of each theorem in modern language and style. The structure and 
all steps of the proofs remain exactly as in the original and the only change In 
notation is the Introduction for Theorem 1 of a sequence of sets to avoid the 
recurring phrase "all x which are < ....... 
". In Theorem 2 we have given 
only the finit case where «and A are positive. 
Theorem 1 If a property M holds for all numbers less than a certain number 
u, but not for all numbers in general, then there is always a greatest number 
Ufor which all numbers less than U have the property M. 
4 
Proof: By assumption there is some number D such that M does not hold for 
all numbers less than U'+ D. Let S,,, = {x: x<u+ D/2" I for m=0,1,2... 
and consider which m, if any, Is the smallest with the property that M holds 
for all members of S,,, . If there is no such n then u itself is the number 
required. For given any larger number u+d, we have u+ D/2 n< u+d for 
sufficiently large m, and if M applies to all numbers less than u+d then M 
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applies to all members of S,, for such m. This contradicts the assumption 
that there is no such m. 
Suppose now that m is the smallest integer for which M holds for all 
members o: S,  . So M does not hold for all members of S., _, . We now 
repeat the above set construction using u+D. /2m in place of u, and D/2T" 
(I. e. the difference between the upper bounds of Sm and Sm_, ) In place of D. 
Let Nn = [x: x<u+ D/2m + D/2m; 
nI for n=0,1,2,. .. and consider 
which n, If any, is the smallest with the property that M holds for all members 
of Sm, n . Ti there Is no such n then 
'u + D/2m Is the number required. Othe - 
wise let n be the smallest Integer such that M holds for all members of Sm, n 
but not for all members of Sm, n _I . 
The difference between the upper bounds 
and we repeat the process on this Interval. Continuing In this time is D/2+n 
this way there are two possibilities: 
M m+n (a) We come to a number of the form R=u+ D/2 + D/2 +, ...... 
m+n+..: ºr 
+ D/2 such that M applies to all numbers less than R but does not apply to 
all numbers less than R+ D/F+n+... 
+r+s for all s=01 , 2,. " ". In this case P Is 
the number required. 
(b) There is no such number and the process continues indefinitely. Now 
m"n m"n+O. the partial sums of the series u+ D/2 + D/2 + D/2 +, .,... . 
do not exceed the partial sums of the geometric progression u+ D/2 + D/2 
2 
+ D/23 + ..... with common ratio 
2. By the convergence criterion both 
series are convergent. If u+ D/2 + D/2 
+p 
+ D/2 
+n+o 
+ .... , con- 
verges to U, then U has the properties required. ' For If M ctd not hold for 
:i 
c ... ... 
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any smaller number say U-S, then 
m m+ n+... " r 
U-5>u+ D/2 + ... + D/2 - to for arbitrarily 
small to and so, 
U- (u + D/2m +... + D/2 
m"n+ "r 1>9 
-w. 
Now the left-hand side can be made as small as desired by increasing r but 
since 6 is fixed and w Is arbitrarily small we have a contradiction. 
Finally suppose that M also held for all numbers less than any number 
larger than U say U+c. By assumption M does not hold for all numbers 
r+n m+n+... +r less than u+ D/2M + D/2 +... + D/2 for any r. But for sufficient- 
ly large r the series is arbitrarily close to U and since the difference between 
m+n+... +r m+n+... +r- l D/2 and D/2 tends to zero as r Increases, the sum 
m m+n m+n+...; r-i 
u+ D/2 + D/2 + ..... + D/2 
Is arbitrarily close to U, 
so u+ D/2m +,,,. + D/2m+n+"'; 
r-1 
<U+E which is a contradiction. 
Theorem 2 If fx and cp x are continuous functions of x for all x between oc 
and ß and If fa < qa and f f3 > cp(3 then there Is a value of x between cc and (3 
for which fx=c'x, 
Proof: Suppose a and (3 are pos[tive and A [s the greater, so A= cc + 
where I Is some positive number. 
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(i) Since fa < cQ« we must have f( a +w) < c; ( cc + w) for sufficiently 
small W. Because, being continuous for w<I, we can make f( cc + w) - 
fa (= f2 say) and (p (a + w) - cQ a (= . 
Cl' say) arbitrarily small and so 
cp(oc+W) f(a+w; =CQ« - fa + (f - . 
fl 
A+ n, - 
n 
where by assumption A Is positive and so for small enough to we can make 
f%' - fi so small that the right-hand side is positive, Le. f( a+ w) < 
c? ((x +. w)" 
Now regard the relationship f(a + W) < (V( a+ w) as a property M 
of co .M holds for all w less than a certain value and M does not hold 
for 
all w (e. g. (i - I). So by Theorem 1 there Is a value U which is the greatest 
number such that all c j< U have the property M. 
(it) U must be between 0 and i since if it was equal to I then f( a+ w) < 
a+w) provided w<I, But just as f%< cpoc implies by continuity f( a+ w'. ) 
(P (a +w) I: w is small enough, so f(a + i) > T(a + I) Implies f(a +I- w) > 
q)( of +I- w) . If w is small enough. Clearly U cannot be greater than I since 
then I<U but f(a + i) > (P( a+ I). It Is certainly positive so U lies between 
0 and i, and a+U lies between a and (. 
(iii) We cannot have f( (x + U) < cp(a + i? ) since this implies, as before, 
f(« +U+ w) < T( a+ U'+ w) for small enough w, contradicting, the pro- 
perty of U as the greatest number such that all numbers smaller than U have 
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property M. But neither can f(oc + U) > 4(a + U) because then again wo 
have f (a +U- w) > (a +U-c i), contra xy to the property of U that 
numbers smaller than U have property M. So f(a + U) _ (a + U) and 
the theorem Is proved. 
5.3.4. Assessment of RB 
On the assumption that Bolzano is working implicitly with what we now 
call real numbers we shall first prove that the theorem of RB§12 (or Theorem 
1 of the previous section) implies the Bolzano-Welerstrass theorem. We 
take the latter In the form: a bounded sequence of real numbers contains a 
convergent subsequence. Let the property M In Theorem 1 be, "not a member 
of a sequence of real numbers All, the theorem then says: Given a non-empty 
set of real numbers A with a lower bound, there exists a greatest lower 
boundfor A. Now let A be a non-empty bounded sequence of real numbers. 
Being bounded below it has a greatest lower bound say, h, but since A Is also 
bounded above the set B= f y: y x, Vx cA } Is non-empty and bounded 
below so B has a greatest lower bound (say k) which, it Is easy to see, must 
also be a least upper bound for A. If {a. ] is an increasing subsequence In 
A then for all E>0, 'there is an N with a >k-E for all n>N. 
But ah, e k for all n so Ik- aj <E for all n>N and so (a] con- 
verges to k. Similarly if ja, 3 Is a decreasing subsequence in A it con-,, 
verges to h. But any sequence has a montonic subsequence (Scott 
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and Tims 
[I] 
p. 116) so the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem is proved. 
In the above formulation in terms of bounds it may be shown that 
Theorem 1 implies the statement that an increasing --equence bounded above 
must be convergent, This is proved in Scott and Tims [1] n 129, where. the 
latter result is taken as a "Fundamental Axiom" in place of a definition of 
real numbers. Naturally the convergence principle follows from this axiom 
and so Theorem 1 also implies the convergence criterion "proved" in ßBä7 
(A463). 
In the later Functionenlehre (Bolzano `6]) Bolzano actually uses the 
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem and In Rootselaar [1] we read, "For this 
theorem [Bolzano-Weierstrass] Bolzano refers to his own work, in which up. 
to now it has not been found. " Since it follows . 3o easily 
from RB§12 this 
would certainly appear to be what Bolzano had In mind in this reference. 
Theorem 1 is a result of central importance to the later development. 
of real numbers and function theory in the nineteenth century. Its appearance 
and proof In 1817 Is therefore of greater significance than simply being for 
the sake of Theorem 2. Bolzano was aware of its importance throughout 
mathematics (A476; RB, 48), though it would be Interesting to know what 
applications he saw for it in "chronometry"! We do not know of any earlier 
statement of the theorem. 
Given the convergence criterion of RB §7 then the proof is perfectly 
sound and although long-winded In Its expression It was no more so than was 
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normal at this time. The particular merits of the proof appear in its part 5 
(which begins on A474; RB, 46) and they are: 
(i) the careful application of the convergence criterion (by comparison 
with a geometric series) to the series produced by the successly. halving 
process; 
(ii) the detailed checking that the "sum" U) of the series has the required 
property by the correct and perfectly modern use of arbitrarily small quantities. 
It Is an interesting question whether the method of proof which Bolzano 
adopts for Theorem 1 is original. Previous commentators have been rather 
unoriginal and unhelpful here. In a vague reference which does not specify ßB but 
which probably refers to RB312, Schwarz mentions "a method of proof devised 
(ersonnen] by Bolzano and developed further by Weserstrass" (Schwarz [1] 1872). 
This opinion that Boizano was the originator of the method is quoted with approval 
4n Stolz[lJp. 255,258. G. Cantor denies this, but only says that the proof Is 'In essence 
very old" (G. Cantor [1]) and gives no specific references of work before RB. Cantor's 
remarks are repeated In Jourdain[l] and Coolidge[1J(where they are attributed to' 
Jourdain). Even the tncyklopädie article in Vol. I, A5,1 only refers to Cantor's article,. 
The question is not clear cut and there Is truth on both sides,. although we 
feel that there is more to be said for Bolzano's originality here than against. 
It. On Cantor's side the judgement In Kolman [11 p. 49 Is the best that can 
be said, "The procedure by which Bolzano proves his theorem was already 
contained in an embryonic form In Euclid, " There is a successive bisecting 
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process in Euclid's Elements X, 1 and examples of exhaustion methods in 
Book XII, but the "convergence" involved in Greek work relies on geometric 
Intuition. We have no hesitation, on th-3 other hand, n claiming that both of 
the points (i) and (ii) above were. original with Bolzano. Zu the extent that 
the convergence criterion itself was original then (I) must have been so, and 
(ii) would not normally at this time have been dealt with arithmetically and 
precisely although a purely verbal description could hardly be sufficient In 
this case. 
As for Theorem 2, there can be no d ubt about the originality and 
rigour of Bolzano's work in this'proof. It depends crucially on his definition 
of continuity which was so effective just because It was purely arithmetic. 
Bolzano had mastered the technique of applying the definition to present pre- 
cise arguments about functions in a manner which would hardly seem out of 
place In a modern textbook. As with Theorem 1, an important merit of 
Theorem 2 Is the generality of its formulation. We have referred to the fact 
that in previous proofs of the intermediate value theo: em the continuity of 
the function Is hardly ever mentioned. This was because tho theorem was 
usually Introduced and proved for the sake of finding approximate roots to 
polynomial equations. So the only case considered was that of a polynomial ' 
function and this was "obviously" continuous 'Bolzano proves the fact in 
RB317(A484)). It was because Bolzano had concentrated on the general 
case of a function (for whicr he points out on A443: RB, 15 Theorem 2 may 
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be false) that he was led to make a proper definition of continuity essential to 
the proof. 
The main defect of Theorem 2 is the first paragraph of the proof 
(A479; RB, 51) in which fx and c'x are said to be compared wi".. h one another 
"simply in their absolute values". This is consistent with Bolzano's earlier 
use of the inequality sign but makes obvious nonsense of the theorem. Fortun- 
ately it does not affect the working of the proof but we do have to interpret 
the inequality sign in the normal modern sense. Bolzano cannot conveniently 
use the symbol consistently. 
A further weakness, possibly related to the matter of symbolism, 
Is that Botzano shows no indication of being aware that the first "between" In 
his statement of Theorem 2 (A479; RB, 51)'shou; d includo the end-points while 
In the second instance It should not (the sign < Is nowhere used In Bolzano's 
early work). 
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5.4. The Rectification Problem and DP 
5.4.1. Introduction 
The problems with which Bolzano is dealing in DP, those of the rectif- 
ication of curves, the complanation of surfaces and the cubature of solids, 
form a family of problems which began, for the Greeks, as a part of pure 
geometry and which has only received satisfactory treatment within a major 
new branch of twentieth century analysis, mE. asure theory. In the course of 
this long +ransition the efforts to solve these problems have played a fruitful 
part L-i the progress of analysis. This was particularly true during the seven- 
teenth century. 
Bolzano's consideration of previous work on the problems ranges from 
Archimedes hypotheses to the very latest work on the subject by Crelle for the 
criticism of which an Appendix was added to the main work (A589; DP, 76). To' 
put his comments into some context we shall give a very brief outline of the 
history of these problems up to Bolzano's time. 
For the GreP!. s two magnitudes were comparable and had a ratio pro- 
vided they were of the same kind. This was the case whenever a multiple of 
one exceeded the other (the so-called "axiom of Archimedes"). From this it 
was deduced that the repeated subtraction of at least half of any given mag- 
nitude would result. In a magnitude smaller than any preassigned magnitude 
of the same kind (Euclid's Elements X, 1). This was the principle used in 
the method of exhaustion for the indirect proofs of various simple quadratures 
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such as the area of a circle or of a segment of a parabola. The area was 
approximated by a sequence of polygons and then it was shown, by contradic- 
tion, that the sequence could eventually be neither =ore nor less than the 
particular value of the area. Several cubature problems ( ach as volumes o! 
revolution of conics) were also solved by this method but the Greeks did not 
succeed, as far as we know, with the rectification of any curves beyond tho 
circle nor with the complanation of any surfaces beyond that of the sphere. 
The first real advances in these problems came in the seventeenth 
century by means of important modificationP to the method of exhaustion. " The 
polygons were replaced by rectangular strips and there was a vital shift In the 
final step of the reasoning. In place of the reductio ad absurdum of the older 
method the appropriate infinite series was now considered and a crude limit- 
ing process used. The development of analyt[c geometry by Descartes and 
Fermat was, of course, crucial to formulating general methods of sciution. . 
It Is ironic that at just about the time that Roberval had shown the length of 
the arch of a cycloid to be four times the diameter cf the generating circle 
Descartes had written, "the ratios between straight and curved lines are not 
known, and I believe cannot be discovered by human minds. 11 (Descartes [1] 
(1637) p. 91). The general rectification of the cycloid soon followed and then 
the rectification of an algebraic curve, the semi-cubical parabola, was giver 
independently by Neile, van Heurat and Fermat in the late 1650's. Fermat's 
method compared an arc with the circumscribing tangents drawn at Its 
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end-points, while Netle used the fact that a small arc Is virtually the hypotenuse 
of what is now called the "differential triangle". In modern notation this is to 
say, ds = dx3 + dyt or ds/dx =1+ (dy%dx)i . After the advent of the 
general calculus methods of the 1660's the latter formula became well known 
and also quadratures were effected by the reverse of differentiation. Huygens 
had shown that the rectification of the parabcla reduced to the quadrature of the 
hyperbola, but the rectification of the ellipse and hyperbola posed new problems 
for analysis which were not solved until the next century. Huygens had also been 
the first to find the surface area of a segment of a paraboloid of revolution. 
The special complanation and cubature problems of surfaces and volumes of 
revolution could immediately be solved as simple integrals. The more general 
surface integral and multiple integral formulae only appeared in the second half 
of the eighteenth century. 
In the course of the Preface to DP Bolzano makes several specific 
references to the works of nearly twenty previous authors concerned with the 
rectification problems. This is less Impressive than It appears. More than 
half of the references are to attempts to prove the hypotheses of Archimedes 
on curves and surfaces. (This does not refer to the "axiom of Archimedes", 
see A493; DP, IV and Note [1], A595. ) Those references that really are on 
the rectification problem cover a very narrow spectrum of the work and do 
not include any of the authors we have mentioned above. However, Bolzano 
was surely right to stress the reliance made by most, If not all, methods of 
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rectification on the Archimedean assumptions. (This is a point that has been 
neglected by modern commentators on this subject) 
As an example of the kind of approach Bolzanc, was familiar with we 
shall outline Lagrange's proof o° the rectification formula. This is mentioned 
first among those in which at least the calculus part of the work is deemed sat- 
Isfactory, (A499; DP, X). Lagrange begins (Lagrange [3] p. 218): 
For the solution of this problem we start from the principle of 
Archimedes, adopted by all geometers ancient and modern, according 
to which for two curved lines, or onus made up of straight parts, 
which are concave on the same side and have the same end-points, 
the one which encloses the other is the longer. From this It follows 
that an arc of a curve, which is all concave on the same side, is 
greater than its chord and at the same time less than the sum of the 
two tangents drawn at the ends of the arc and contained between these 
end-points and their point of intersection. 
Lagrange continues with a lengthy verbal description of the following diagram 
(which Lagrange does not give). 
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For convenience we shall paraphrase the rest of the argument using this 
diagram. From the Archimedean principle, 
PQ < arc PQ < PT + TQ. 
Clearly, TPV< QPV< T3V and so, 
SQ < PQ < arc PQ 
and arc PQ < PT + TQ < PT +Tß 
therefore SQ < arc PQ < PR 
Let the curve have equation y= fx and let the increase in x from P to Q be 
I; f'x will be "the tangent of the angle under the tangent" at P. So RB = if IX 
and PR =i/1+ (f' x)t , similarly SQ "= i1+ 
[f'(x + i)]s Put 
cox =T1 + f'x then, from the above, the arc length PQ lies between I>x 
and I e? (x + i) for arbitrarily small I. If the length of the arc Is given by the 
function ex, 
Iqx < 1(x+I)- ýx <I qý(x+i) 
and as it tends to zero this gives ý'x x =ill + (f' x)2 dx. 
(Lagrange himself, of course, defined the derivative «. 'x as a coefficient in a 
Taylor series, not as a limit, so the last step of his argument is slightlymore 
complicated. ) 
An important criticism in DP Preface (which Lagrange's proof avoids) 
is liable to be misunderstood. 7n commenting on the continued misuse of in- 
finitesimals Bolzano says: 
Why does the length of an infinitely small are only coincide with the 
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length of that straight line which goes through the ordinates which 
bound it if it has the direction of the chord or tangent, but not if it 
goes through the ordinates at some other kind of angle? (A497; DP, VIII) 
The criticism is repeated in diff. rent ways on the two following pages. Vojtech 
says that Bolzano's objection here "is, of course, wrong" (Bolzano 
[3] 
p. 200 
Note 45). Eut a consideration of the context shows that Bolzano is not ctis- 
puting the correctness of the result concerned nor that it can be proved. He 
is disputing that it can possibly be correctly proved by using infinitesimals in 
the way, for example, that Schultz does. Tire arguments from infinitesimals 
or from the simultaneous vanishing of quantities are, as he quite correctly 
claims, completely arbitrary and vacuous. 
After further criticism of the Archimedean hypothesis already men- 
tioned, on the grounds that it cannot easily be modified to deal with the general 
case of space curves of double curvature, he returns to the above idea and ' 
suggests that a better hypothesis from which to prove the rectification formula 
might have been: 
The relation of the length of an arc curved according to the law of 
continuity (whether simple or double) to its chord comes as close as 
desired to equality if the arc is taken as small as desired. (A50a; DP, XIV), 
This Is interesting because it Is the most common assumption made in mode. n 
proofs of the formula (e. g. Hardy [11). It is, however, rejected by Bolzano 
as being in no way an axiorr_ cad requiring for its proof a result at least as 
strong as the rectification formula itself. 
r 
289 
5.4.2. Account and Assessment of DP 
The work DP is of rather a different character from the four other 
works we have consi iered. The content and the style are both more muddled, 
even the title of the work suggests this. Perhaps In his effort to gain attention 
Bolzano tried to include work to interest as many mathematicians as possible. 
A long Initial section on the determination of functions Is followed by gcomet-" 
rical definitions and comment interspersed b : tween the main rectification 
proofs with no clear connection between the two. Because the material is 
so diverse some of the work has already been dealt with in earlier chapters 
as indicated in the following summary of the contents of DP. 
1- 10 Various properties of continuous functions (See 4.4.3) 
(A514-533) Determination of functions from given sequences of 
functiornus! ng a process analogous to geometrical 
similarity. 
11-31 Definitions of line, straight line and determinable 
(A533-557) spatial object (See 3.4.2) 
Definition and distinction of length and distance 
(See 3.4.4) 
Application of siMLlarity to lengthsof general lines. 
ýý 32-34 Solution of the rectification problem. 
(A557-564) 
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N 35-49 Definition, determination and properties of 
(A564-572) surfaces and the area of surfaces. (See 3.4.2) 
99 50-51 Solution of Complanation problem 
(A572-578) 
§9 52-60 Definition, determination and properties of 
(AS79-582) solids and the volume of solids. (See 3.4.2) 
61-62 Solution of Cubature problem 
(A582-587) 
C3 Analogy between main proofs 
(A587-589) 
Bolzano's solution to the rectification problem is radical, original 
and exasperating. It contains some valuable and subtle Insights into the con- 
cepts of line, length and function, but these are inextricably mixed up Iri the 
proofs with very dubious assumptions. and rather. vague concepts of similarity 
and "determination". The reasons for the radical approach are, as In all 
Bolzano's previous innovations basically to do with concepts. We have 
mentioned In the last section that Bolzano regarded the fact that the length 
of an arc approaches the length of. Its chord as the latter tends to zero, as a 
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theorem to be proved from the rectification formula rather than vice versa. 
One reason for this emerges from the remarkable comments he makes on the 
use of inscribed and circumscribed polygons for the quadrature of a plane 
surface. He. says (A506; DP, XVII) that this method is not "scientific" because 
the truths to be proved are not derived, by the method of limits, in 
the way they should be in a truly scientific proof - from the concepts 
of the thesis Itself - but only through certain associated concepts that 
have been brought In here quite fortuitously (per allena et remota). 
Anybody should realise that those infinitely many regular polygons 
circumscribed around a circle and inscribed within it are completely 
alien objects if one wishes to find not their area but that of the circle 
Itself. 
Thus the method of limits was kept strictly within arithmetic, there was to 
be no "crossing to another kind" even by means of a limiting process. But 
what constitutes a "kind"? Bolzano nowhere attempts to discuss this, but 
his Interpretation here seems impossibly strict. No doubt he regarded the 
length of a curve as an intrinsic property of the curve which does not require 
(and should not be given) a definition in terms of the length of straight lines. 
But this is no reason to prevent us using a limiting process from rectilinear 
figures in order to find the value of this length. In DP§19(A547) the len h 
of a line in general is defined as a quantity derived from the nature of the 
line (with respect to a given unit of distance) and subject only to the natural 
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additive property (see 3.4.4). 
For his alternative approach to rectification Bolzano makes use of a 
general concept of similarity In the form of the following theorem: 
Lengths of lines which are similar to one another are In proportion to 
the lengths of other lines determined from them in a similar way. 
(A554; DP, 030). 
As shown h: º the proof of this theorem it does simply mean that in similar 
figures the ratios of corresponding lengths are equal. The basic idea of 
Bolzano's method Is simple but his presentation, in DP, §32, and for the'two- 
dimensional case given at the end of the Preface (A507), is rather confusing. 
We shall concentrate here on clarifying the. latter version since it acts as a 
good model for all the principal proofs in DP and suffices to reveal the weak- 
nesses of Bolzano's approach. 
Let y= fx by the equat[on of a plane curve and let Fx be the are 
length up to a given value x. The first part of the proof shows that dF/dx 
depends only on df/dx (or that df/dx determines dF/dx). Then assuming the 
relationship between these derivatives is independent of the particular curve, 
Bolzano uses the case of a straight line to deduce the rectification formula, 
The main steps in the arguments are as follows: 
(i) As x Increases by Ax the arc length increases by F(x. + Ax) - Fx 
and this quantity is determined by all the ordinates of the curve over 
the interval L x, I. e. by the values of f(x +mA x) as m takes all 
values from 0 to 1. 
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(11) The value of F(x +p x) - Fx is therefore also determined by the 
values of f(x +mA x) - fx for mc [0,11 . 
(iii) If, for two or more curves, the values of 
f(x +mp x) - fx 
mAx 
for mE [0,1] are the same (for each m) then thecurves are 
similar. Therefore the ratio F(x + AQ 
X) - DC will also be the 
same for these curves. 
(iv) So the values 
f (x mAX x) - for m f- [0,1] determine the 
value 
F(x +A x) - Fx 
Ax 0 
(v) This is true for arbitrarily small A x, so, 
df/dx determines dF/dx . 
(vi) For the straight line y=a+ßx FX =x1+ (3 
so dF/dx =1+ ýi1 = 
ý+ 
(df/dx)2 so generally 
Fx =f 
[l 
+ (df/dx)2 dx as required. 
For part (vi) above Boizano actually introduces another function y=qx with 
length function 'x before putting (px =a+ (3 x. He then says, 
there is without doubt some corresponding law by which for all lines 
the functions Fc and 4x can be derived from the functions fx and ?s 
(A610; 
LPG 
=). 
And in the more general case of a space curve y= fx, z= ?x in DPR32 we 
C 
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have the same claim, 
without doubt there is some general la"v by which for all lines the 
functions Fx and Ix are derivable from the , iature of fx, ?c and 
'x , cox, (A560; DP, 47) 
This general law is likened to a kind of "higher rule of three" (A528; DP, 15); 
there is tha vague suggestion that this could be viewed as a kind of extension of 
the similarity principle from elementary mathematics. But it is important tc, 
be clear here exactly what Is proved by similarity and what is not. The only 
step In the proof outlined above where similarity Is used is part (III), and it 
forms a legitimate and correct step. The existence of a "general law" by 
which the length function is related to the curve function is simply an assurnp- 
tion. It is not claimed to have been proved, by similarity or in any other way. 
Bergmann Is therefore wrong to say of Bolzano's similarity theorem DPI30 
that, 
It plays the same role in his proof as the usual method for solving the 
rectification problem of dividing the line into infinitely many small 
parts which are regarded as straight. (Bergmann [1] p. 188). 
This is not so, Bolzano does not use similarity to make the transition between 
straight and curved lines. Instead it is precisely for this purpose that he 
uses the assumption of a genes al rule applying to both and straight and curved 
lines. The lack of prootfor this assumption is a major defect in Bolzano's 
method. Worse still, the assumption is not even plausible in the light of his 
fI 
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earlier objection to the standard limiting procedure on polygons. If the 
latter are indeed "alien" and of a different kind to curved lines then we should 
surely expect a different rule for expressing the lenth of a straight line from 
the rule for a curved line. 
The work DP is the first occasion when Bolzano freely uses calculus 
notation tb3ugh he feels the need to stress that this does not mean the implicit 
use of infinitesimals (A495; DP, VI). Du Bourguet's notation for partial deriv- 
atives is followed (A524: DP, 11) and Taylor series expansions are assumed 
for all functions without any justification. Possibly the latter assumption 
(which is unnecessary for the main proofs) was a concession to followers of 
Lagrange who wished to define the derivatives of a function by means of the 
Taylor series coefficients. Finally, we note the curious fact that the phrase, 
"every conceivable proper fraction including 0 and 1", is used repeatedly 
throughout DP in the sense of "every real value from 0 to 1" (e. g. A508; DP; 
XIX). 
There Is no doubt that th.: main strength of DP lies In the purely geo- 
metrical work it contains, so this brief assessment of the analysis work on 
rectification needs to be considered in conjunction with the relevant -sections 
of Chapter 3 for a fair impression c. f the paper as a whole. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
6,1. The Mathematical Achievements 
Bo1k-ano's achievements in the five works considered here were tho 
most significant parts of a much larger whole; namely the extensive notes and 
drafts on mathematical topics which Bolzano constantly worked on durir.; his 
time at Prague University. (See especially Bolzano 
Cl, Vol. 2B, 2/1,2/2 and 
2A5). His considerable contributions to geometry and analysis form, in each 
of these areas, a closely related system of concepts and theorems. It was 
not only Bolzano's method of working that promoted this unity (in his notes 
he constantly reverts to earlier problems and solutions, correcting and re- 
vising them), but it was also a natural consequence of his belief in the exist- 
ence of a few fundamental simple concepts governing a particular subject 
(2.4.4). We shall summarise those achievements that can clearly be dis- 
tinguished in Bolzano's early works and which were, in the sense explained. 
below, original to Bolzano, 
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(i) The complete reorganisation of the elementary geometry of points, 
lines and triangles, avoiding the use of the concepts of motion and the plane, 
and giving a central role to-the concept of sir21arity (3.2). 
(Ii) The analysis of the concept of the straight line resulting In Important 
distinctions concerning distance, direction and order, together with their funda- 
mental properties which need either to be proved from definitions or to be 
embodied in an axiom system. (3.3) 
(iii) Topological definitions of line, surface and solid together with various 
special cases of these, (3.4.2). 
(iv) The modern definition of the continuity of a function of one real vari- 
able and its use for various properties and theorems about continuous functions 
Including: the derivative of a continuous function Is continuous, a continuous 
function of a continuous function is continuous. (4.4.3). 
(v) The use (though not explicit definition) of the modern definition of the 
derivative of a function of one real variable. (5,2.3). 
(vi) The correct statement, and attempted proof, of the convergence 
criterion for an Infinite series, (4,3.3). 
c 
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(vii) An attempted proof of a general statement of the binomial theorem 
which in many respects was far superior to ea"lier efforts. (5.2.3). 
(viii) The statement and proof (from the convergence criterion) of an-orig- 
anal form of the Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem, 
(ix) The proof (from result (viii)) of the intermediate value theorem. 
(5.3.3). 
The claim that these results were original to Boizano needs further 
explanation. The development of most major mathematical concepts involves 
a long evolutionary process which no individual can lay claim to have 
"achieved" personally, it is most likely, for example, that in the first 
decade of the nineteenth century Lagrange and Gauss had at least as clear ' 
an idea as Bolzano had of what should be meant by the continuity of a function 
and the convergence of an Infinite series. But the development of Ideas Is 
a fitful, haphazard process and one thing that has often led to rapid advances 
In mathematics has been the formulation and use of an appropriate symbolism, 
In the present case, by referring to the originality of Bolzano we simply 
mean that it Is In these five works of his that there appears for the first 
time In the mathematical literature essentially the same arithmetic form- 
ulation used for the concepts of convergence, continuity and derivative that 
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turned out later in the century to be acclaimed as securing the foundations 
of analysis. The same formulation of these concepts has not been improved 
in any fundamental way in our own day. 
Although it appears that the time was ripe for the sort of breakthrough 
made by Bolzano's work, we have seen that it actually had a minimal Influ- 
ence on other mathematicians. By the time. It was recognised in the literature 
(by Hankel, Stolz etc. ) the same work had been done far more thoroughly by 
many other mathematicians, This does not detract from Bolzano`s achieve- 
ment and it remains of interest to consider why he, and no others at this tim 3, 
was so successful. 
lk 
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6.2 The Significance of Bolzano's General Views 
The views Bolzano expresses in the five early works on the general 
nature of mathematics are hardly sufficient to be called a "philosophy of 
mathematics". There is little or no discussion of the nature of mathematical 
knowledge or truth. But there is an Important ideal of mathematical proof 
involving the principle of "conceptual correctness" (2.4.1). This principle 
acts as an effective method of criticising and Improving proofs. Sufficient 
evidence has already been adduced in the previous chapters to show that it 
was this method of criticism, and therefore these general views on the nature 
of mathematics, which led, more or less directly depending on the case, to 
the achievements listed in the previous section, Wo mean by this that these 
views promoted the choice of suitable problems by showing where new proofs 
were needed and sometimes they indicated the lines of an appropriate solution. 
But they never, of course, constitute the solution, that was entirely a matter 
of mathematics. We shall attempt to clarify the matter a little further. 
In order to substantiate the claim that general views on the nature of 
mathematics led to certain mathematical achievements we may proceed 
(in the case of Bolzano at least) In the following two stages. Firstly, it 
should be made clear that the mathematical results were closely related to 
the consIr ration and refinement of certain concepts, Secondly, it needs to 
be shown how the general views led to the consideration of these particular 
concepts and why they were modified or replaced in the particular way they 
I. 
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were. The first requirement Is much the simpler and has already been carried 
out in the main chapters, but we shall summarise the situation here using the 
numbering of the results as in 6.1. 
The work of (i) was explicitly the result of excludii: b the concepts of 
motion and the plane from elementary geometry. This also meant the ex- 
elusion of superposition arguments for congruence proofs. (ii) was precisely 
the result of analysing the concept of straight line and (iii) was related (as 
argued in 3.4. -) to the 
distinction of the concepts of length and distance. The 
Important new formulations In (iv), (v) and ý ri) arose, as described in Chapter 
4, from the exclusion of all spatial intuitions as well as those of time and 
motion. This involved a refinement of the concepts of function, infinite 
series and continuity. A purely quantitative account was necessary in analysis 
and a pre-requisite for this was the conceptual distinction between somothing 
which was meant to be smaller than any arbitrary quantity and yet be non-zero 
(an infinitesimal), and an arbitrarily small quantity. The theorems of (vii), 
(viii) and (ix) all depend essentially on the new tont&pta defined in (iv), (v) 
and (vi). 
A good deal of mathematics, in the past and present, seems to have 
been achieved without any apparent preoccupation with concepts. Why was 
It so Important In the present case? To suggest an answer to this, and to 
prepare the way for the second task referred to above, some general re- 
marks will be useful about this rather self-conscious, quasi-mathematical 
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activity of analysing mathematical concepts. 
Before the rise of the axiomatic methol in the nineteenth century 
mathematicians were inclined to regard their theorems as true in an absolute 
sense. The definition of complex concepts represented a taue analysis of 
the concept Into simple components, When axioms were stated they too were 
true expressions of relations between simple concepts. Usually such axioms 
were unmentioned and the relations of simple concepts were just assumed, 
with a varying degree of awareness that such assumptions were being made. 
The great majority of mathematical work be ore 1850 proceeded, very 
successfully, on such an intuitive use of concepts. This testifies to the extra- 
ordinary fruitfulness, and reliability over a wide range, of the concepts that 
had been acquired of number, function, curve, area and so on, Including even 
the concept of infinitesimal. Such concepts were not static: they were con- 
stantly being affected by new theorems and distinctions, by practical problems 
and by the way they were passed on to new generations. Occasionally, how- 
ever, mathematics Itself produces problems of such difficulty and profundity 
that they provoke a sustained and deliberate consideration of the concepts 
concerned. In some sense the limits of the intuitive use of a concept have 
been reached and a new approach hae to be made. The classic examples of 
this are the problems of irrationals and parallels, and the paradoxes arising 
from infinitesimals In the eighteenth century and from set theory at the turn 
of this century. The resolution of these problems produced new concepts, or 
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a new understanding of the place of earlier concepts, and these opened the 
way for large new areas of mathematics. The Important point here is that 
these changes in concepts were made in direct respc'se to a breakdown in 
the mathematics, They were mathematical remedies for mathematical prob- 
lems. 
Bolzano's attention to mathematical concepts was unusual in that It did 
not arise in the way we have just described. The issue is complicated because 
his work was the occasion of the rigorous rejection of Infinitesimals and It 
therefore has the appearance of conforming to this pattern. But we have 
Boizano's own word on many occasions that it was not so much particular 
mathematical problems that inspired his work as his Inclination to philosophy 
in general and his views about proofs and conctpts in particular. This is 
further confirmed by the fact that his views on proofs led to the reject[on of 
methods which were not generally regarded as posing any mathematical 
difficulty. For example, he rejected the combinatorial argument for tho 
positive integer case of the binomial theorem (p. 260, N, and the use of sequ- 
ences of polygons for the quadrature of the circle (p. 291).. There is also his 
postponement of the concept of the plane in elementary geometry.. (3.1.3). 
Bolzano's general views formed a methodology which made strict 
demands on the concepts which could occur in proofs and the order in which 
they should occur (2,4), These demands had the overall effect of purging 
mathematics of all empirical elements and thus rendering its concepts more 
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exact and susceptible to purely logical treatment. Accordingly Bolzano's work 
was chiefly centred on the replacement of all spatial and temporal intuitions 
in analysis and re-organisation of geometry. This completes our argument 
for the claim made at the !., eginning of this section, 
The main conclusion of this thesis is therefore that it was largely in 
response to his general views about the nature of proof that Bolzano brought 
about some. Important developments In mathematical concepts. Furthermore. 
because these changes answered to some contemporary mathematical needs, 
particularlj in analysis, they led directly to Important and fruitful new math- 
ematics. 
x 
The arguments in favour of Bolzano's general views and his require- 
ments for profs are unfortunately only vaguely Indicated In the early works. 
There Is an implicit appeal to preserving "natural kinds" (through his re- 
peated use of the Greek prohibition against "crossing to another kind") and 
also to a hierarchy of concepts in which theorems Involving "higher" concepts 
(t, e. more general concepts) may not be proved by making use of concepts 
from "lower" levels. But there is a tension between these two principles 
themselves in Bolzano's work. Both principles prohibit the use of geometry 
for analysis proofs, but why does the "natural kind" argument not prohibit 
analytical geometry? Many other question: arise about Bolzano's position. 
Is it possible to make sense of his idea of a unique, preferred proof for a 
theorem? (Are there, in any case, criteria for different proofs? ) How does 
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this relate to Kitcher's suggestion of a theory of mathematical explanation? 
(see p. 260 and Kitcher [1] pp. 267-269). How do Bolzano's views relate to 
the modern conception of axioms and formal theories? These are questions 
which might be useful areas for further investigation. 
Finally, it is worth noting that it has only been possible to complete 
the present study with any degree of conviction because of two fortunate 
characteristics in Boizano himself. There was no lack at the beginning of 
the nineteenth century of philosophers ready to make remarks about math- 
ematics anJ vice versa. What was unusual in Bolzano was that he had both 
the philosophical insight to see so strongly the need for important fundamental 
changes In mathematics and the mathematical expertise to carry out his own 
programme oi conceptual refinement and produce valuable results. There 
can also be no doubt that many of the great mathematicians of that time were 
strongly motivated by conceptual, and even philosophical, considerations. 
Again, what was special in Bolzano's case was his willingness and ability to 
articulate these considerations so clearly and fally throughout his works. 
Thus In spite of the neglect of his work In the nineteenth century, and his 
consequent lack of influence, the positive relationship which we have describ- 
ed here between Bolzano's general views and his mathematical results render 
his work of substantial and enduring histork. al importance. It sheds another 
ray of light on the mystery of how change takes place In the realm of math- 
ematics. 
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